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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 3

SEPTEMBER 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



Kirchlein Business Branch

DEC 24 1952

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1951

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Smith of North Carolina.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The chair regrets that, due to the absence of the chairman from the Senate for 2 weeks, the matter of these hearings has been delayed. They will proceed more expeditiously from now on.

Who is our witness today, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Eugene Dooman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DOOMAN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE H. DOOMAN, LITCHFIELD, CONN.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, please, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Eugene H. Dooman, and my home is at Litchfield, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. I am retired.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, will you tell us what positions you have held in the United States State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, from the beginning, in 1912, when I entered the Foreign Service, I was first assigned to the Embassy at Tokyo to study the Japanese language.

After several years' tour of duty in several of the consulates in Japan, I was assigned to the American Embassy at Tokyo as third secretary in 1921.

I remained there until 1931, when I was transferred as first secretary of the Embassy at London.

From 1933 to 1937 I had the Japanese desk in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, and in that last year I was transferred to Tokyo as counselor of the American Embassy.

In 1942 after my return from Japan I was assigned to the Embassy in Russia as minister consular. I returned to the State Department in 1942 and after doing various things I was assigned in February 1945 as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.

And I retired on the 31st of August 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the importance of that Far Eastern Committee mentioned as your last position held in the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. It had previously been found that discussions between the various departments—that is, primarily the State Department, the War Department, and the Navy Department—in connection with problems that arose out of the war through negotiations were unsatisfactory.

And in 1944, I believe it was, a committee was formed, known as the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. The members of that committee were the Assistant Secretaries of those respective Departments, the Chairman being James Dunn, who was Assistant Secretary of State.

Under the Coordinating Committee there were two subcommittees, one for Germany and one for Japan, and it was the function of those committees to formulate a joint agreement or meeting of the minds of the three Departments on various problems that had both political and military content.

The Subcommittee on the Far East, of which I was Chairman, then had the function of developing and formulating policies with respect to Japan primarily, which had both military and political content.

I would therefore say that it was the original source of all of the ultimate decisions that were made in the field of policy respecting Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Dooman, can you recall that Owen Lattimore was proposed at one time as a consultant to the chief of the China desk of the Department of State?

Mr. DOOMAN. I can; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us your recollection with respect to that particular incident, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. At that time, which must have been early in 1945, I was, as I have just said, acting as Chairman of this Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and I was therefore not primarily interested in the functions and operations of the Far Eastern Division, or the Far Eastern Office, as it was then called.

But one of the men in the office told me that papers were going through the State Department calling for the appointment of Dr. Lattimore as adviser to the China Division, the papers having been initiated by the Chief of the China Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Mr. DOOMAN. That was Mr. John Carter Vincent.

I discussed the matter with Mr. Ballantine, who was then Director of the Far Eastern Division, and pointed out that Lattimore at that time, and for several months previously, had been using every opportunity to discredit the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Grew.

And I pointed out that it would be incongruous for a man who had expressed himself so freely on Mr. Grew to be occupying a position under Mr. Grew.

With that I reported the matter to Mr. Grew, and he then called up the administrative people who had charge of appointments and ordered that the papers be quashed.

Senator EASTLAND. What did Mr. Lattimore have to say against Mr. Grew? What was the complaint against him?

Mr. DOOMAN. That would take a long time.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it because he had been opposing communism in the Far East and because he wanted a peace treaty that would prevent the Communists from getting Japan?

The CHAIRMAN. By "he," you refer to Mr. Grew?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOOMAN. The principal cause of complaint was that Mr. Grew had advocated an attitude on the part of the United States of noninterference with the Japanese themselves in the form of government which they wanted to institute.

In other words, if they wanted to keep the Emperor, by all means let them keep it. If they wanted to disestablish the monarchy, by all means let them disestablish it.

Senator EASTLAND. Why would the Communists want the Emperor overthrown?

Mr. DOOMAN. The point which you have mentioned, Senator, was one of the cardinal points of the Communists not only in the United States but also throughout the world. They knew perfectly well, of course, that communism and a monarchical system were incongruous.

Therefore, the first thing was to get rid of the monarchical system.

They knew also that the communalistic type of society which has existed in Japan for 2,000 years existed largely because of the Emperor being a sort of an element which brought the Nation together.

Now, this is the type of thing which I do not understand myself, and I do not believe any occidental can, but nevertheless, it is a fact.

Senator EASTLAND. Lattimore understood that fact?

Mr. DOOMAN. Lattimore understood the fact that it was the Emperor who did bring it together.

Senator EASTLAND. His opposition to Grew was that Mr. Grew was favoring a policy after the war was won that would prevent the Communists from getting Japan. That is it in a nutshell, is it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. That would be—if I were to answer your question, Senator, it would be largely question of opinion.

Senator EASTLAND. That is your judgment?

Mr. DOOMAN. That is my judgment.

Senator EASTLAND. And Mr. John Carter Vincent was urging the appointment of Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a question?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Eastland's proposed question was: Was Mr. John Carter Vincent urging the appointment of Owen Lattimore at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

As I mentioned in my testimony, the papers calling for the assignment of Lattimore as adviser to the China Division were initiated by Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point, since we have gotten into the subject, I think it is appropriate that we should introduce into the record a resolution of the Communist Party at this juncture with respect to the policy toward Japan.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the resolution that has been discussed so far today?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a mimeographed copy of excerpts from a magazine called Political Affairs for July 1945, the official organ at that time of the Communist Political Association.

It is headed "The present situation and the next tasks."

The CHAIRMAN. That is published where?

Mr. MANDEL. In Political Affairs, July 1945, published in New York City.

These excerpts are taken from a draft resolution of the national board of the CPA, which is the abbreviation for the Communist Political Association, as amended and approved by the national committee on June 20.

This draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the membership and for final action by the emergency national convention of the CPA on July 26-28.

The following excerpts are quoted [reading]:

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist Europe in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms of government and social system has been reflected in many of the recent actions of the State Department.

This explains why, at San Francisco, Stettinius and Connally joined hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital. * * *

It is this reactionary position of the American big business which explains why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; and why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East.

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist-militarist Japan, it is necessary that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese imperialism.

However, labor and other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact that, amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan, there are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are seeking a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war, at the expense of China and the other Far East peoples, and directed against the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings, including many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East. * * *

In the opinion of the Communist Policy Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

* * * * *

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials. * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record the excerpts of the extracts from Political Affairs of July 1945, which was read by Mr. Mandel. I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 234," and is as follows:)

[From Political Affairs, July 1945]

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE NEXT TASKS

Draft resolution of the National Board, CPA (Communist Political Association), as amended and approved by the national committee on June 20. This draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the membership and for final action by the emergency national convention of the CPA on July 26-28 (p. 579):

* * * * *

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist Europe, in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms of government and social system, has been reflected in many of the recent actions of the State Department. This explains why, at San Francisco, Stettinius and Connally joined hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital * * * (p. 580).

It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East * * * (p. 581).

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist militarist Japan it is necessary that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese imperialism.

However, labor and the other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact that, amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan, there are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are seeking a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war, at the expense of China and the other Far East peoples, and directed against the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings, including many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East * * * (p. 583).

In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

* * * * *

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials * * * (p. 584).

Mr. DOOMAN. May I add something to that story about the papers for appointment?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Dooman.

Mr. DOOMAN. I just recall now that about 2 weeks after this episode Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of the Johns Hopkins University, came to see the President. That must have been then, I think it was, along about February of 1945. He came to see the President and asked the President to intervene on behalf of Dr. Lattimore with the State Department. And the matter was brought to the attention then of the State Department and no further action was taken.

May I correct it again? This must have been about April of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did John Carter Vincent hold at that time, Mr. Dooman, at the time these papers for employing Mr. Lattimore as consultant were submitted?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was Chief of the China Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he hold any other position in the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. Not at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he associated with one of the area committees?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, yes. The far-eastern area was an intradepart-

mental committee at which there was an attempt made to get a consensus of opinion about various policies concerning the Far East. And the composition of that committee varied with the problems that were discussed.

But, generally speaking, the standing members of that were Dr. Blakeslee, who was chairman, Dr. Hugh Borton, who was secretary, and then the Chief of the Japan Division, Mr. Earl Dickover; Mr. Ballantine, Director of the Far Eastern Office, and myself as chairman of this far eastern subcommittee.

And then, depending on the problems to be discussed, there was representation from other divisions of the Department who were interested in that particular problem.

For example, if we were discussing the question of the mandated islands, we would have representatives from the Legal Section and from, we will say, the European Section, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you say this was a policy-making committee, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was a policy-developing committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Was John Carter Vincent a member of that committee?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; he could come in whenever he wanted to. As a matter of fact, he chose not to come very often. He was usually represented by a man from his office called Julian Friedman.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked the question: Was John Carter Vincent a member of that committee.

I would like to have an answer to: Was he a member of that committee?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, as I tried to explain, the membership in that committee was a fairly loose thing, because it varied with the subjects to be discussed. There were no officially appointed members of the committee. There were certain standing members, those primarily concerned with Japan.

And then the composition of the committee was extended, depending upon the character of the subject to be discussed. Naturally, China would be very much influenced by whatever policies we set up for Japan, and, therefore, it was quite right and proper that the China Division should be fully familiar with whatever was going on in the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. When John Carter Vincent did attend, did he have full authority the same as any other member of the committee both to speak, act, and vote?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify, Mr. Dooman, that when Mr. John Carter Vincent did not attend he sent a representative?

Mr. DOOMAN. Sometimes they both came.

Mr. MORRIS. Sometimes both Julian Friedman and John Carter Vincent came?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Julian Friedman take a position and express himself at these meetings?

Mr. DOOMAN. Not very often.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever make any charges against Julian Friedman at that time in connection with his attendance at the area meetings?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; I did not make any charges because that implies that I complained to somebody else, some higher authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt again. I may have lost track of this.

Who was Julian Friedman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Julian Friedman was a member of the China Division of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time a letter which indicates Julian Friedman's association with the State Department, and at the same time his connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, which composition is being considered by this committee.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate both of those documents?

Mr. MANDEL. The first is a letter from the State Department to the Honorable Pat McCarran, dated April 23, 1951, signed by Eldridge Durbrow, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.

The letter reads as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman, has been referred to me for reply.

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was effective November 13, 1946. Consequently, it had been decided to abolish the Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or Auxiliary officers, including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that his services were terminated without prejudice.

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.

Sincerely yours.

The Biographical Register of the State Department, dated October 1, 1945, on page 106, lists the positions held by Julian Friedman, which I would like to put into the record.

I can read them, if you desire.

Mr. MORRIS. I do not think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. I also submit Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the ninth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, on page 1061, which shows that Julian Friedman was a member of the conference secretariat.

And further I submit a circular distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations showing a meeting held announcing a new IPR study, Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein, with a supplement called Labor in Nationalist China, 1945-48, by Julian R. Friedman.

Introduce that circular into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record, to have marked as the next consecutive exhibits, the four documents just described and read by Mr. Mandel.

The first is a letter from the State Department to the chairman on Julian Friedman's position in the State Department.

The second is the Biographical Register excerpt.

The third is the record from Security in the Pacific, the Institute of Pacific Relations publication, showing that Julian Friedman was a member of the conference secretariat, and the fourth being a throw-away indicating that Julian Friedman had written the publication under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record and properly identified.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 235, 236, 237, and 238," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 235

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 23, 1951.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman has been referred to me for reply.

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or auxiliary officers including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that his services were terminated without prejudice.

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.

Sincerely yours,

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW,
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.

EXHIBIT No. 236

JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN: App. div. asst. in the Dept. of State, Sept. 2, 1943; asst. to chief Div. of Labor Relations, Sept. 1, 1944; divisional asst., Nov. 20, 1944; asst. sec. of comm., United Nations Conf. on Int. Org., San Francisco, 1945; research and analysis asst., May 17, 1945. (Biographic Register, Dept. of State, Oct. 1, 1945, p. 106.)

EXHIBIT No. 237

JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN

CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP

Conference Secretariat:

* * *

Julian Friedman

* * *

(Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., Jan. 6-17, 1945, p. 161.)

EXHIBIT No. 238

Announcing a new IPR study, Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein (159 pp. mimeographed), \$2.25.

With a supplement: Labor in Nationalist China, 1945-48, by Julian R. Friedman. Chapters: The War and Industry; Hours and Wages; Migrant Skilled Workers; New (Local) Workers; Women and Children in Industry; "Coolie" Labor; Conscript, Contract, and Slave; Kuomintang Labor Law and Decrees; Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement * * * with a documentary appendix with the text of important Nationalist and Communist labor laws and policy statements.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.

[Attached]

Please send me ---- copies of "Labor Notes on Nationalist China."

---- \$2.25 enclosed ---- Bill me (Postage added).

---- I am an IPR member entitled to \$1.80 price.

Name -----

Address -----

Mr. MORRIS. I think we have shown in past hearings the connection between Mr. Owen Lattimore and the Institute of Pacific Relations to a great extent, and John Carter Vincent.

I think we may as well at this point show the connection of John Carter Vincent with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter dated November 12, 1945, addressed to E. C. Carter, that was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read the first paragraph:

In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached hereto a list of the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the dates of their election, the amounts of their current contribution, and the largest amount they have ever contributed.

On this list we have the name of John Carter Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this shows that John Carter Vincent was in 1945 a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. From what source does this come?

Mr. MANDEL. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It may be marked and filed with the committee.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 239" and is as follows:)

NOVEMBER 12, 1945.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached hereto a list of the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the dates of their election, the amount of their current contribution, and the largest amount they have ever contributed.

The answers to your other questions can be summarized as follows:

The most active trustees in the New York area are those on the executive committee. Of these, Calkins, Barnett, Huggins, Jessup, and McConaughy have been the most active. Morris has regularly attended meetings, made a special gift to the library of some books in his father's collection, is available for advice, but is neither a large contributor nor will he assume any responsibility for fund raising. Seymour regularly attended meetings the first 6 months after my arrival but has been reorganizing a new company and so has been unavailable for anything more than telephone comment for some months. He is more allergic to Kohlberg's charges than most members of the committee, but is unquestionably of value in money raising, as he is well known downtown and generally well liked. The most important person to rely upon Seymour's judgment currently is E. B. Kilner of the Associated Telephone Services, who has repeatedly told me that his company is on the verge of supporting us by a contribution of \$1,000 to \$5,000 or withdrawing their current \$250 support entirely.

In Seattle, the most active members of the board are Martin and Allen. Other active people in Seattle are Greenwood, Baillargeon, and Fuller, although Reginald Parsons has renewed a good deal of his old interest. Allen is a potential troublemaker but I find he can be handled by talking as tough to him as he talks to you. If the current plans for a National Conference of Amco go through and Allen is completely sold on our bona fides, he will be of considerable use in money raising in the Northwest. It would be unwise to rely on Ben Kizer in that area as many of the Seattle businessmen, although close friends of Ben, regard him as an outsider by virtue of his Spokane connections.

The most active members of the board in San Francisco are Greenslade, Allen, Emma McLaughlin, Hunter Galen Fisher, Brayton Wilbur, and Wickett. Of these, Brayton Wilbur and Wickett are the most important in money raising. Galen Fisher has contributed articles to the Far Eastern Survey. Mrs. McLaughlin, Mrs. Dorothy Rogers (not a national board member), and Lynn White, Jr., president of Mills (not a national board member) have been most active in the school program and in general membership activities.

In Los Angeles, Rosecrans, although technically chairman of the now defunct Los Angeles committee, has done little more than make his annual contribution. Arthur Coons is the spearhead in that neighborhood and, if Rosecrans can be persuaded to give Coons a go-ahead signal, a Los Angeles committee can very easily be reconstituted. Harvey Mudd is interested—almost entirely in research—but would probably be available for financial support if a research program centered at the Huntington Library were undertaken. Dr. Millikan is interested in such a program and would put on a meeting in Huntington Library for discussion of such activities.

In Chicago, an entire new slate of trustees is required with the exception of the Quincy Wrights. Edward Embree freely admits that he has only a small portion of his time available for the IPR and would like to be relieved of responsibility. The same is true of McNair; and, Colegrove, although willing to talk, is carrying a torch against us because of our handling of India and the use of people like Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal.

In other sections of the country, the most interested trustees, as shown by correspondence, are Jerome Green and Mortimer Graves, both of whom have written comments on articles in the Survey and are interested in activities generally.

Apart from the executive committee, Fisher, Ned Allen, Mortimer Graves, Arthur Coons, Brayton Wilbur, and Morison represent the only individuals on the national board of trustees with whom there has been correspondence on anything other than renewing their contributions.

EXHIBIT No. 239

AMCO board of trustees

	Year elected	Present contribution		Highest contribution	
		Date	Amount	Date	Amount
Greene, Jerome D.....	1923..	Nov. 15, 1944.....	\$10	1930.....	\$10,000
Wild, Payson.....		Aug. 7, 1945.....	5		
Chapman, Mrs. Ralph.....		Nov. 2, 1944.....	10		
Embree, Edwin R.....	1943..	Mar. 19, 1945.....	10	Jan. 23, 1943.....	25
Wright, Mrs. Louise.....	1924-37	June 18, 1945.....	10		
Allen, Riley H.....		1943.....	25		
Atherton, Frank C.....		1943.....	650		
Dillingham, W. F.....		1943.....	100	1941.....	250
Loomis, Charles F.....		Dec. 16, 1944.....	250		
Morison, George Abbot.....		June 5, 1945.....	10		
Barnett, Eugene E.....		Dec. 21, 1944.....	10	Dec. 21, 1943.....	25
Calkins, Robert D.....	1943..	Mar. 12, 1945.....	10		
Chamberlain, Joseph P.....	1929..	Aug. 4, 1944.....	500	July 26, 1943.....	1,000
Field, Frederick V.....	1932..	1944.....	760	1938.....	12,600
Gilchrist, Huntington.....		Dec. 29, 1944.....	25		
Huggins, G. Ellsworth.....	1937..	1944.....	650		
Jessup, Philip C.....	1933..	July 20, 1945.....	10		
Luce, Henry R.....		Dec. 16, 1944.....	2,500		
McConaughy, James L.....	1943..	Jan. 12, 1945.....	10		
McCoy, Frank R.....	1943..	Oct. 13, 1944.....	25		
Morris, Lawrence.....		Oct. 20, 1944.....	25	Oct. 23, 1943, WPF, 3 years.....	300
Parker, Philo W.....	1937..	Aug. 7, 1945.....	25	Feb. 24, 1942.....	50
Seymour, Lawrence D.....	1943..	July 13, 1945.....	25		
Kizer, Benjamin H.....	1935..	Dec. 15, 1944.....	50	Aug. 17, 1943, WPF.....	10
Martin, Charles E.....	1927..	Jan. 30, 1945.....	10		
Allen, Captain.....		Feb. 12, 1945.....	10		
Charles, Allan E.....		Jan. 20, 1945.....	15		
Davis, Joseph S.....		Dec. 1, 1944.....	5		
Fisber, Galen M.....	1927..	July 3, 1945, New York.....	25	1940, New York.....	275
Do.....		Mar. 6, 1945.....	50	1940, San Fran- cisco.....	315
Grady, Henry F.....		Oct. 31, 1944.....	100		
Greenslade, Admiral.....		Feb. 7, 1944.....	10		
Do.....		Dec. 6, 1944.....	50		
McLaughlin, Mrs. A.....	1927..	Dec. 6, 1944.....	75	1940.....	450
Rowell, Chester.....	1927..	Feb. 8, 1945.....	10	December 1929.....	500
Sproul, Robert G.....		Apr. 6, 1945.....	10	June 30, 1941.....	25
Wickett, F. A.....		Jan. 26, 1945.....	40	Mar. 29, 1944.....	5
Do.....		Jan. 26, 1945.....		Sept. 21, 1944.....	100
Do.....				Dec. 14, 1944.....	350
Wilbur, Brayton.....				1942.....	100
Wilbur, Ray Lyman.....	1934..	Mar. 14, 1945.....	150	1940.....	300
Rosecrans, W. S.....		May 2, 1944.....	100		
DeCaux, Len.....	1943..	Jan. 5, 1945.....	10		
Fairbank, John.....		Feb. 26, 1945.....	5		
Graves, Mortimer.....	1943..	Mar. 8, 1937.....	5		
Lattimore, Owen.....		Nov. 20, 1944.....	10	June 8, 1938.....	20
Thomas, Elbert D.....		Mar. 6, 1945.....	10		
Vincent, John Carter.....		Complimentary.....			
Buck, Pearl S.....		Dec. 26, 1944.....	25		
Emeny, Brooks.....		Oct. 25, 1943.....	500		
Emeny, Brooks and Mrs.....		WPF.....	2,500		
Hoffman.....	1943..	Mar. 28, 1945.....	100		
Notestein, Mrs. A.....	1927..	July 18, 1945.....	100		
Trippe, Juan.....		Dec. 30, 1944.....	2,500		
Yarnell, Admiral H. E.....		Nov. 6, 1944.....	25		

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, could you describe for us Owen Lattimore's position with respect to Japan at the time of the episode we have just had testimony concerning?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Morris, may I remind you that I have not answered the last question that you put to me?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to draw that to your attention. I did not think the last question had been answered. You interrupted him with the insertion of some material.

Mr. DOOMAN. You asked me whether I had made any charges against Julian Friedman, and I said I had not made any charges because that implied that I had complained to some higher authority.

The fact was that a very short time after statements had been made in secret meetings of this Far East Area Committee, the proceedings and the statements made by various individuals immediately were quoted in various left-wing periodicals and newspapers. There were literally dozens of such occasions.

Senator EASTMAN. Such at PM?

Mr. DOOMAN. That would include PM.

It so happens that among all these instances that actually occurred, I happened to keep one, and that was in the Nation of February 3, 1945, where there appears an article by one Pacificus, entitled "Dangerous Experts."

Among other things here is the following paragraph which I would like to read, if I may. I might say that Dangerous Experts refers among others to myself.

Mr. Dooman not only believes in retaining the emperorist system minus some of the more militaristic forms of emperor worship, but also thinks that the only elements we can rely on in Japan are the business leaders, court circle aristocrats, and bureaucrats.

It so happened that at one of the meetings of the Far Eastern Area Committee, a few days before this article was published, we were discussing the question of education, and I pointed out that the big business leaders, members of the aristocracy, the people in the professions in the higher levels, included by far the largest majority of those who had been educated at Yale and Harvard and Cambridge and Oxford, and other universities, both in England and the United States.

If there was any value whatsoever in reeducation along our lines it was obvious, then, that either these people had enjoyed the benefits of our educational facilities and were, therefore, the most progressive elements, or there was no value whatever in reeducation. You could not have both.

Now, I did make that statement. This is a garbled version of what I said. But the important thing is that it appeared a few days later in The Nation.

Well, by a process of elimination in a number of instances of this kind, I found that outside of those who were more or less standing members of the committee who appeared every time and who were completely reliable, that Friedman was the constant element.

I therefore went to Friedman and I taxed him with being the source of information for these articles that appeared in Amerasia, in PM, The Nation, New Republic, and so on. He denied that he had given any of this information to unauthorized persons.

He said that he reported only to his chief, who was then Mr. Vincent.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. who?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. That being John Carter Vincent?

Mr. DOOMAN. John Carter Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, would you tell us to the best of your ability the position that Owen Lattimore took at that time with respect to Japan? This is in 1945.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, there is a whole library that could be made up of statements made by Mr. Lattimore during that period. I suppose the best known, the one most frequently quoted, is a book called *Solution in Asia*, which was published, I think, in about February 1945, and was very widely circulated during the spring and early summer, in fact until the surrender of Japan.

In general, he took the position that the Japanese people, when they were defeated, would rise in rebellion against the system and overthrow the monarchy; that there were elements in the State Department, the so-called reactionary Fascist elements, who knew nothing whatever about Japan except what they had picked up from people in high social levels in Japan, and that these elements were intended to use the prestige and the force of the influence of the United States to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people.

Another point which he made was that the chief militarists were not the war lords, General Tojo and others, but the big industrial leaders. That these, the army and the navy, were merely puppets and instruments of the big industrialists.

Therefore, his position was that we should allow the Japanese people to have their revolt and disestablish the monarchy and that we should then try these industrialists as war criminals and put them out of the way so that they would never be in a position of influence.

And, third, that the Japanese system, economic system, should be completely broken up and a highly developed competitive economic system should be instituted.

Now, as I say, these statements can be found in a great many places.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us whatever documentation you can?

Mr. DOOMAN. I have here, for example, a radio discussion, a round-table discussion that was carried out, I believe, under the auspices of the University of Chicago. It was along about July 8, 1945.

Now, I notice that the press recently quoted Dr. Lattimore as having said that his position had been consistently one of urging that we do not interfere in the event that the Japanese wanted to disestablish the monarchy. That is not the whole story.

In *Solution in Asia*, he makes this statement, which I cannot quote textually, but it runs somewhat along these lines. He says:

I will venture the political prophecy that the Japanese people will themselves revolt and disestablish the monarch.

Now, the suggestion at the same time, at that time—that is, before the surrender—that people like Mr. Grew and myself were intending to keep the Emperor in power implied, then, that we proposed to use the influence and the position of the United States to prevent the exercise by the Japanese people of their own will.

Well, let me say at this point that this whole discussion about the Emperor carried on by the leftist press at that time was a piece of sheer lunacy. If the Japanese people wanted to get rid of the Emperor there was obviously nothing we could do to keep him in; if, on the other hand, the Japanese people wanted to keep the Emperor it would have been a piece of folly on our part to have disestablished a monarchy.

Senator EASTLAND. Did John Carter Vincent endorse those views of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. DOOMAN. I never heard him express that opinion, except probably indirectly through—and this is only an assumption—no, Senator; if I may correct my statement, I will say no, I have never heard him express it.

Senator EASTLAND. When Mr. Grew resigned, what place in the Department did Mr. Vincent get?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Grew retired, or at least presented his resignation on or about the 14th of August. I may be off a matter of a few days or so. But the day he retired, or presented his resignation, it was announced in the papers that Mr. Dean Acheson has been appointed as Under Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson having previously retired as Assistant Secretary of State with the announcement that he was going to resume private practice.

Mr. Acheson then returned to the State Department somewhere around the 25th of August 1945. And the day after he returned there he announced that I would be replaced as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of Swink by Mr. Vincent.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like also to know, if I am not getting too far afield—

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right.

Senator EASTLAND. The difference in what was advocated by John Carter Vincent for Japan and the policies that the Communists put over in Eastern Europe. I would like to know the difference between the policies that he advocated for Japan and the policies that the Communists put over in Eastern Europe.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, sir, I am not competent to discuss authoritatively what the Communists put over in Eastern Europe, but I can tell you what was done in Japan.

And it may, perhaps, occur to you that there are certain very distinct analogies between what was done there and what was done in Eastern Europe.

Senator EASTLAND. They were practically the same; were they not?

Mr. DOOMAN. I would prefer, if I may, Senator, to describe—

Senator EASTLAND. What is it? You have discussed it, in executive session. Is it not your judgment, now, that the policies that Mr. Vincent attempted to put over in Japan were the same as the policies that Russia dictated for the satellite countries?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I am trying to be as accurate—

Senator EASTLAND. What is your judgment?

Mr. DOOMAN. My judgment is it is the same.

Senator EASTLAND. They were the same?

Mr. DOOMAN. Obviously the same. But I would like to amplify that, if I may.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to. I want you to explain what our State Department attempted to do in Japan, and the similarity with what Russia did in the satellite countries.

Mr. DOOMAN. On September 22, 1945, the White House released a paper, which was entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." That paper was the work of our committee, the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, for a period of about 7 or 8 months, except for certain important changes which I will refer to.

As I was to retire from the State Department on the 31st of August I asked Mr. Dunn, as chairman of SWINK, to call a meeting for the express purpose of adopting this paper that we had been working on for a long time; namely, the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan.

That paper was adopted by SWINK on the 29th of August, and on the 29th of August that was telegraphed out to General MacArthur as a firm United States policy for Japan.

However, in this release that was issued on the 22d of September, it was pointed out, or it was clear, that the paper had been reopened.

On September 6—mind you, on September 6—by September 6, Mr. Grew had retired as Under Secretary, and had been replaced by Mr. Acheson. I had retired and had been replaced as chairman of the far eastern subcommittee by Mr. Vincent.

Well, I was very much interested in seeing whether there had been any changes. And I found these, which I will quote. These were among the changes that had been made in the paper after it had been adopted on the 29th of August [reading]:

Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander—

(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

Please do not ask me to explain what that means.

(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan's trade and industry.

It is on the basis of these two clauses that work was undertaken to destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalist class in Japan.

Senator EASTLAND (presiding). Who attempted to eliminate the capitalist class in Japan?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Who attempted to eliminate it?

Mr. DOOMAN. These were the instructions sent from Washington.

Senator EASTLAND. That was the American State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. With the concurrence of the Navy Department and the War Department.

These were the instructions sent to General MacArthur through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator EASTLAND. That was the work of John Carter Vincent, was it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was chairman at that time of this Far East subcommittee.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead. Excuse me.

Mr. MORRIS. May I just keep the record straight. It may be unnecessary, but may I point out that Mr. Dooman is testifying that this is the promulgation of American policy, and it represents a document that Mr. Dooman worked upon while he was officially connected with the State Department.

And he noticed that when the program was finally promulgated these were the changes that had been made by his successors from the program that had been adopted by Mr. Dooman and Mr. Grew prior to that time.

Mr. DOOMAN. That is so.

Senator EASTLAND. That was the Acheson-Vincent program there?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. What did they attempt to put over under that program?

Mr. DOOMAN. The first thing that was done, and this was in 1946, was to levy a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent on all property in excess of \$1,000.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Russia do that in the countries of Eastern Europe?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, that is why I hesitate to answer your questions directly, Senator, because I do not know whether they did, or not. I know that the end means was achieved by perhaps the same means, or by other means; I don't know.

Senator EASTLAND. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. DOOMAN. You can imagine what that meant. That is, a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent of all property above \$1,000. That almost at one stroke wiped out the capitalist class.

The excuse for that was that it was necessary to prevent an inflation.

At that time, if I am correct, in my recollection, the Japanese yen was pegged to the dollar at 15 yen to the dollar. And this was a measure purportedly to prevent any further inflation.

It was not more than a month or two after this thing was carried out that the yen then was pegged at 50 to 1. In other words, it had declined by more than a third. That was the ostensible reason given.

Of course, as anybody could see, it would not have been an effective one. But it did have the effect——

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead. What were the other things that were proposed?

Mr. DOOMAN. The next thing was, and this is somewhat controversial, but perhaps a good case might be made out for it, but as everybody has seen today, after this thing has been in effect for some years, the thing is not working.

The next thing was to expropriate all land in excess of 5 acres held by any one owner.

Senator EASTLAND. That was a Communist system, was it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put the limit at 200 acres at that time. But in Japan, where 85 million people are trying to make a living off an area——

Senator EASTLAND. I understand, but they were following now the Communist system, were they not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Senator SMITH. May I ask him one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I understood you to say just now the yen was first pegged at 15 to 1.

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Later on at 50 to 1. And then you made the observation that that was a decline of one-third. It would decline 300 percent, would it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; that is right.

Senator SMITH. You were in error about the one-third?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Well, all land was expropriated in excess of 5 acres. There was an ostensible effort to pay them compensation for this land, but by this time they were paying for land in yen which had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the nominal value of the land.

For example, if the land had been valued in 1920, as it was—that was when the financial panic was taking place—if the land was valued at \$1,000 an acre, they paid the owners of the land at \$1,000, but in currency that had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the value.

In other words, if a man had \$1,000 in land, he was paid one-one-hundred-and-eightieth.

There was virtually confiscation of all land above 5 acres.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead and describe what else there was.

Mr. DOOMAN. Then all holdings by any one individual in any large corporation in excess of 3 percent were confiscated. There were more polite terms used. That is, they were transferred to a government pool.

And then the Japanese Government was ordered to sell those shares in a certain order of priority to farmers' cooperatives, labor unions, and shopkeepers, at whatever price might be offered.

And, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to disregard any relationship between the price offered and the real value; and, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to finance any bids for the shares by farmers' cooperatives and labor unions.

So that the net result was then to destroy the previously existing capitalist class. As a capitalist class they no longer exist. Their places have been taken by hordes of black marketeers and Chinese and Formosan thugs of various kinds who have been engaged in illicit trade of various kinds and have then amassed this enormous fortune.

The net result was then to replace people who had traditionally had property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of various kinds.

Senator EASTLAND. Were those recommendations favored by General MacArthur?

Mr. DOOMAN. Let me cite in reply to that the statement made by Mr. Acheson in reply to General MacArthur's pronouncement to the Japanese people. I think it was on the first anniversary of the occupation where General MacArthur had indicated that he looked forward to the time when the American occupation in Japan could be reduced to some figure below 200,000 soldiers.

That aroused great resentment in the State Department, and at that time Mr. Acheson issued the statement that General MacArthur or the military occupation were there merely to carry out the orders of the executive in Washington; that they were not the formulators of policy.

By implication policy was formulated in Washington.

Therefore, in general, one would say that it didn't really make—I don't know whether General MacArthur approved or disapproved. Senator EASTLAND. What other policies were there?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, in the draft of this initial policy paper, which had been prepared under my chairmanship, with regard to people who were suspected of being war criminals or being militarists, it was provided that they should be purged; that is, removed from any position of authority, in the light of their own personal record, as brought out by some form of judicial investigation.

In other words, a man would stand or fall on his own personal record.

As you will see from that statement that I just read out, people were removed from office on the basis of their occupation. Practically the whole executive branch of Japanese business, from chairmen of boards down to section chiefs, practically the whole white-collar element in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke. Not because there was any record against them, but because they occupied certain positions. They destroyed it.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it not an attempt to destroy Japanese capitalism?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was an attempt to destroy and eliminate the brains of Japanese business.

Senator EASTLAND. If you destroy the brains, you destroy—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Let us see if we can get the question and answer together. The question was: Was this not an effort to destroy Japanese capitalism, and you converted that into saying Japanese brains. Let us get them together.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I am saying—

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the Senator's question.

Mr. DOOMAN. In my opinion it was. I would like to stress that in my opinion it was.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

What else did they attempt to put over?

Mr. DOOMAN. Just following that question, following that point, I want to quote from this round-table discussion of the University of Chicago on July 8, this statement attributed to Mr. Lattimore [reading]:

That includes a lot of economic and political action as well because we cannot forget that the civilian warmakers, that is the big industrialists and financiers of Japan, are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and navy are only the striking instruments and the tools.

Now, after the occupation about 12 of the leading Japanese industrialists were put in prison, and they were held in prison for 18 months while every effort was made to dig up evidence which would warrant their being put on trial, just as the military and political people were put on trial and later condemned.

They were held, as I say, for 18 months, and released because there was no evidence.

Now, if we are then to follow Mr. Lattimore, we obviously did a great injustice to General Tojo in hanging him, because according to Mr. Lattimore, we released his lords and masters and hung the tool and the instrument.

Senator EASTLAND. What other things were in the policy for Japan?

Mr. DOOMAN. I have with me a copy of a paper known as Far East Commission 230. This is a paper of considerable length, Senator, in which all of the principles are laid out for the atomizing of Japanese industry.

Senator EASTLAND. The what? I did not understand.

Mr. DOOMAN. The atomizing, the fragmentation of Japanese industry. It is a very long paper.

The general purport was to see to it that the Japanese economy, not only in industry but in banking and in every other field, should be reduced to the smallest possible element.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that tied in here? Who is the article by?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, it was a paper. It was introduced as follows: To the Far Eastern Commission by the Secretary General, Mr. Nelson T. Jonathan, under a paper which reads as follows [reading]:

The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far East Commission and is referred to Committee No. 2, economic and financial affairs.

Who prepared this paper, I have no means of knowing.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it an official publication of the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. This has been released——

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that yes or no.

Mr. DOOMAN. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it an official publication of the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. I do not know.

This is a privately printed paper I have before me.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you obtain that, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. This was obtained, and given to me by a friend of mine, Mr. James Lee Kaufman, an American lawyer in New York, who went out to Japan and discovered the existence of this paper, and he had it privately printed and distributed among his friends, and he also had a copy of it reproduced, or summarized in an issue for News Week 2 years ago.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did he get the paper in Japan?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was told of the existence of this paper, and was told if he went to a certain office he could find it. So he went to this—I don't know where—some repository of documents and asked a young lady——

Senator EASTLAND. It was there to guide the occupation forces, was it not? It was a policy to guide our occupation, was it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. I was getting around to that in just a second, Senator, if I may. I am answering the question.

The CHAIRMAN. The question has been propounded to you. Was it or was it not there to guide our occupation forces?

Mr. DOOMAN. This paper was submitted through the Far Eastern Commission for consideration, and it was never adopted by the Far Eastern Commission.

However, in draft form, it was sent out to Tokyo to the occupation authorities in the economic section and they acted on it.

Senator EASTLAND. It was sent by our State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. Sent by whom, I do not know. But it was sent to the occupation authorities and they acted on it.

And when the disclosure was made by my friend, Kaufman, that this paper had been acted on, it was then disavowed as merely being a draft and merely presented to the Far Eastern Commission for consideration.

But the point I want to emphasize was that it was, for all practical purposes, an official document, because it was on the basis of this that various instructions were sent to the Japanese Government.

Senator EASTLAND. As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly, there is a striking similarity between the American policy toward Japan and the policies laid down by Russia to the satellite states in Eastern Europe, is there not?

Mr. DOOMAN. I think that would be a fair statement to state.

Let me amplify that, if I may. You may remember that there had been, before this establishment of this Far Eastern Commission, in existence in London, the so-called European Commission of which the members were representatives of the United States, England, Russia, and, I believe, France. And it was pretty well known in the discussions before the Far Eastern Commission what the ideas of the Russians were with regard to Germany, with regard to the treatment of Japan.

Therefore, when it came to the question of Japan, there were those elements who, knowing what the Russians wanted in Germany, assumed that they would be satisfied with parallel policies in Japan.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, what Russia wanted was to set up a chaos and a system by which they could move in; was that not it?

Mr. DOOMAN. I think so.

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Are there now in positions of power and trust in the American Government any of the men who were responsible for the enunciation of this policy you have described to us?

Mr. DOOMAN. Oh, yes.

Senator SMITH. Who are they?

Mr. DOOMAN. Some, I say are responsible, from the chain of command.

Senator EASTLAND. Name them, please.

Mr. DOOMAN. In 1945 when this initial post surrender policy was promulgated, the responsible people were, from the top, Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Byrnes.

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State; Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary of State; John Carter Vincent, as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and also Director of the Far Eastern Division; Mr. Edward Barton, who is still an economist, I believe; he is the economist in charge of economic affairs for the occupation of this area; James Pennfield, and then—

Senator SMITH. What position is he in now?

Mr. DOOMAN. I believe he is in Yugoslavia as counselor of the Embassy, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. He had just returned from the Far East and was assigned as deputy to Mr. Vincent in the Far East Subcommittee of SWINK.

Now, subsequently—and this is hearsay—the people who have been busy on Japanese affairs, Japanese policies, in addition to those I have named, would include Mr. John Allison, and—what is his name now—an economist, Barnett. I don't know what his first name is. Barnett.

I think those are the principal ones.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, is there any indication of any activity by the top two men you mentioned in the furtherance of this policy, Mr. Byrnes or Mr. Acheson? Is there any evidence at all, indication of activity on their part toward favoring the carrying out of that policy?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, in my personal knowledge, and this requires—well, my personal knowledge, I can recite one case.

In the spring of 1945 there was a meeting of the full Committee of SWINK, the chairman at that time for that day being Mr. McCloy, John McCloy, who was then Assistant Secretary of War. And the committee as a whole had been discussing some European matter with which I was not concerned, and, therefore, I came into the room when they had completed their discussion of this European problem.

And I noticed among the people present was Mr. Dean Acheson. Now, he had been called in, apparently, for consultation on the European problem, and he had nothing whatever to do with the problem that I was to discuss, which was the question of the Japanese political system.

However, he stayed on. He was then Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. He had nothing to do with this officially.

And I made my report to the committee, and at the end of that report Mr. McCloy said, turning to Mr. Acheson:

Dean, you are a great authority on far eastern matters. What do you think of what we have just heard?

And the reply was:

I have discovered that far eastern experts are a penny a dozen. And you can find some experts which will support any point of view that you care to have. And I, myself, do not go along with what we have just heard. I prefer to be guided by experts who think more along my point of view.

From then on he quoted virtually textually from this Solution in Asia by Dr. Lattimore.

Senator SMITH. Do you mean he quoted from this paper that you mentioned?

Mr. DOOMAN. Where Dr. Lattimore had said that the Japanese people, he predicted that the Japanese people would rebel and disestablish the monarchy, and that if the monarchy existed it would be only because there are certain Fascist groups in the State Department who used the prestige of the United States.

Senator SMITH. Did he approve of this policy that was enunciated about practically confiscation of property?

Mr. DOOMAN. Oh, yes; he was Under Secretary of State.

And, as I say, I don't know, except from the fact that he would have been in the chain of command. That paper could never have gone through.

Senator EASTLAND. Who appointed Vincent?

Mr. DOOMAN. I think I testified that the day after Mr. Acheson returned as Under Secretary of State—

Senator EASTLAND. Just name him. Who appointed Vincent? Just name the man.

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Acheson.

Senator SMITH. Is there any indication that Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of State, knew about this at all?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; there is no indication.

Senator SMITH. That surprises me that that had developed, and I ask you specifically was there any evidence that Mr. Byrnes himself knew about this promulgation or enunciation of policy?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; there is no indication to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back to the episode you have just testified to. When did that take place?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was in the spring of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you thoroughly conversant with Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. Thoroughly.

Mr. MORRIS. When you heard Mr. Acheson enunciate his views on Japan, is it your testimony that they coincided with the views expressed by Owen Lattimore in Solution in Asia?

Mr. DOOMAN. Exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Did his view on experts being a dime a dozen coincide with the views of Owen Lattimore at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; his opinions about certain types of experts; yes. He had a very dim view of experts who did not agree with him.

As a matter of fact, he said, in effect, in his book, Solution in Asia, that people like myself had spent a long time in Japan, but we were spending all of our time with very polite people, and we really didn't know very much about what was going on.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back to some previous testimony that we have not completely finished.

I asked you earlier if you would document as much as possible your expression of Owen Lattimore's views at that time. You had given a rather precise summary of what his views were, and then I asked you if you had any documentation to support that.

I also offer you just by way of assistance in connection with that extracts from Mr. Lattimore's Solution in Asia that may aid you in answering the question I have just put to you.

Mr. DOOMAN. Here is a very reminiscent phrase.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. What are you testifying from?

Mr. MORRIS. These are extracts from Owen Lattimore's book, Solution in Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DOOMAN (reading):

Washington is full of experts who will tell you that the Japanese are mysterious, fanatical, and not to be understood by any ordinary use of the intellect. The same experts are also addicted to citing bits of lore which, they tell you condescendingly, explain why the Japanese always do this or never do that.

Here is an example of the attempts on the part of Dr. Lattimore to put into ridicule people who did not agree with his point of view.

There is missing from this that quotation to which I have just referred, and I think it runs:

As a political prophecy—
whatever that may mean—

As a political prophecy, the Japanese people will disestablish the monarchy unless there is interference on the part of people in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. You are attempting to quote now from Lattimore's—

Mr. DOOMAN. From memory, yes. I do not have a copy of the book.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a copy here, Mr. Chairman. I think we might ask Mr. Dooman if he would put the precise quotation in if possible.

Is it page 189, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, this is not the quotation I have in mind:

I assume that the Japan of the future will be a republic.

That follows another reference where he says, as a matter of political—will you give me just a minute?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Dooman.

Mr. DOOMAN. Here it is. It is on page 187 [reading]:

As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are likely to overturn the throne unless we prevent them.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Dooman. Will you proceed with your documentation of views of Owen Lattimore which you have testified to here today?

Mr. DOOMAN. Would you like further references to Mr. Lattimore's opinion about the Emperor?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I think if you would put in a few more of those, Mr. Dooman; those extracts are of no assistance to you, are they, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; on page 189, I quote as follows [reading]:

If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China, but under the supervision of a United Nations Commission to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaiatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy.

The CHAIRMAN. From what did you read that extract?

Mr. DOOMAN. I am reading from page 189 of *Solution in Asia*, by Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole of the *Solution in Asia* laid in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that book?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; as well as the document referred to by the witness on the Round Table Conference from which quotes have been taken.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we will put the book in the record. We will make it a part of the files of this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. I meant make it a part of the files of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The excerpts are from the book, are they not?

Mr. MORRIS. We have read the excerpts from the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They are from this?

Mr. MORRIS. Some excerpts are from *Solution in Asia*, Mr. Chairman, and others are from this publication of the Round Table Conference.

The CHAIRMAN. You want all of these put into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. So much of them as have been quoted by Mr. Dooman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Meanwhile, I would like both of these documents made a part of the file of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made part of the record so much as you select as having been testified to by the witness, but I may say that it all has not been testified to.

(The documents referred to were filed for the information of the committee.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, we have not finished the line of questioning before which concerns the official attitude or the attitude of John Carter Vincent with respect to these particular discussions.

Now, you said, to your own knowledge you have never heard John Carter Vincent give expression to any views that coincided with those of Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. DOOMAN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any official publications of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department that would show that the views of the head of that Department coincided with the views expressed by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; I have already—I thought I made it clear that primarily this initial post-surrender policy for Japan was one for which Mr. Vincent would have primary responsibility, and I have tried to show that.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Because ipso facto he was an ex officio. He was chairman of this committee that produced that document.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was the working chairman of the committee?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was the working chairman of that committee.

Mr. MORRIS. The reason I ask that, Mr. Dooman, is that awhile ago you gave expression to the view that Mr. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, you did not know that he personally shared the views put forth in this publication?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; I did not.

The question was whether I knew the people who were responsible and I mention Mr. Byrnes as being responsible by reason of the chain of command, he being the Secretary of State and the person ultimately responsible.

Mr. MORRIS. But is it your testimony, then, that John Carter Vincent, in addition to being the nominal head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and your successor in SWINK, that he was an active member, working member?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes. May I say that he was more than the nominal director of the Far Eastern Office, he was the actual working director as of the 7th of September, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. It is your testimony that Mr. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, his work in that position did not necessarily coincide with the position taken by—

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Byrnes actually had very little interest in the Far East.

Senator SMITH. What I was trying to fix, Mr. Dooman, was that it was inconceivable to me that Mr. Byrnes had any such ideas.

Mr. DOOMAN. I tried to make it clear. I mentioned Mr. Byrnes among those responsible purely on grounds of chain of command.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The responsibility that you apply to Mr. Byrnes, if I understand it, stems from the fact that he was Secretary of State and that all mentioned in your testimony were under him; is that correct?

Mr. DOOMAN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of policy that you are acquainted with either directly or from your reading knowledge of them that you care to put into the record at this time?

Mr. DOOMAN. Very much.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you proceed, then, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is a fairly long story, and I hope you will bear patiently with me while I go into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want to know what the question is now, please.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the question back, please?

(The reporter read the pending question, as follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of policy that you are acquainted with either directly or from your reading knowledge of them that you care to put into the record at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. Promulgation of policies as to what?

Mr. MORRIS. Promulgation of far-eastern policy with respect to Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator SMITH. By whom? Anybody connected with the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. By the State Department, particularly the Far Eastern Division thereof.

Senator SMITH. That is all right.

Mr. DOOMAN. You will notice that all through my testimony I have referred constantly to this question of the Emperor.

In March or April of 1945, Colonel Dana Johnson, who was Chief of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, came to Washington and saw Mr. Grew and myself. His conclusion, drawn from interrogating high-ranking Japanese prisoners of war, was that the Japanese were ready to surrender but that the various statements and the trend of

public opinion with regard to the question of the monarchy was such that so long as the Japanese were left with the impression that the Emperor was personally to be tried as a war criminal and punished, that the monarchical system would be disestablished, so long as those ideas were assumed to be public opinion and would be implemented as American policy after Japan's surrender, that the Japanese would not surrender.

Shortly thereafter on, I think it was the 17th of April——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you that was his opinion?

Mr. DOOMAN. He did, sir.

On April 17, there was a change of government, a general retired as Prime Minister and there was a reconstitution of the Government at the head of which was Admiral Suzuki, who was then Chamberlain to the Emperor and who had been throughout his career a moderate. He took that as a very clear signal that the Japanese were ready to surrender, ready to talk about this matter.

Furthermore, we had the advantage of reading messages between the Japanese Government and their Ambassador in Moscow, and it was clear from these and other indications that the Japanese were ready to surrender if only it were made clear that this trend of opinion that had been developed by the leftist press in the United States, namely, that the Emperor would be tried as a war criminal and the monarchical system disestablished, it was made clear that those were not policies of the United States.

We then started on preparing a document. About the middle of May, Mr. Henry Luce came back from a visit to the Pacific, and he was very much aroused. He said that the failure of the American Government to persuade the Japanese to surrender was causing, was doing, great damage to the morale of the American forces who had fought through Saipan and Tarawa, and who were anticipating then the assault on Japan and were fearful of the losses that would have to be paid there.

Mr. Grew, who saw Henry Luce, explained to him that we were working on that effort, we were working on a plan along those lines.

It was, I think, on the 24th of May, if that happens to be, if my recollection is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. 1945?

Mr. DOOMAN. 1945. It was on a Saturday that Mr. Grew called me in and instructed me to have ready Monday morning a paper which he would then present to the President outlining the policies that the United States would follow if Japan surrendered.

I then prepared that paper and took it to Mr. Grew on Monday morning.

So far as the portion relating to the Emperor is concerned, my original draft reads as follows—this was paragraph 12 [reading]:

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives—

namely, those previously enumerated—

have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

Mr. Grew approved the draft and called a meeting of the Policy Committee of the State Department. The Policy Committee of the State Department at that time consisted of the Assistant Secretaries of State and the Legal Adviser. He read this document to them, and there was no dissent until he came to that paragraph which I have just read. There was then a violent reaction on the part of Mr. Acheson and Mr. MacLeish.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did both of those gentlemen hold at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. I was not present at the meeting but the whole idea of allowing the monarchy to remain was distasteful.

Mr. MORRIS. To Messrs. Acheson and MacLeish?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Dooman, if you were not present at the meeting, I think you ought to explain how you knew what took place.

Mr. DOOMAN. This was immediately told to me by Mr. Grew after the meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are describing, then, is Mr. Grew's description of what took place at the meeting?

Mr. DOOMAN. That is correct. Mr. Grew said that this committee was, after all, advisory to him, and that he was ultimately responsible, and that he would take the responsibility for presenting that document to the President with the recommendation that he include that document within a speech which he was to deliver at some appropriate occasion.

On the 28th of May, with Judge Rosenman, he went in to see the President. The President read it over and he said that he would approve, accept, the document, provided that it was agreeable to the armed services.

On the 29th of May, Mr. Grew, Judge Rosenman, and myself attended a meeting in Mr. Stimson's office.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose office?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Stimson, who was then Secretary of War.

This was at the Pentagon. There were present Secretary Forrestal, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Elmer Davis, who was then Director of the Office of War Information, Mr. Grew, myself, General Marshall, and I should say in addition about 10 to 12 of the highest military and naval officers—who they were I do not remember at this time.

We had prepared copies of this paper for distribution so that each member present would have a copy.

Mr. Stimson, who was in the chair at the meeting, said that he approved the document right along, he went right along with the paper. In fact, he thought, as a matter of fact, that we did not give sufficient allowance to the Japanese for their capacity to produce as they had in the past such progressive men as Baron Shidihara, Hama-guchi, and Wakatsuki, and others. These are former Japanese Prime Ministers.

Mr. Forrestal read it over and he agreed. Mr. McCloy agreed also.

The CHAIRMAN. Agreed, or approved?

Mr. DOOMAN. Approved. Mr. Elmer Davis reacted very violently and would have none of it.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did he hold at this time?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was, as I said, Director of the Office of War Information. Various other officers approved of it, but there was a feeling that the publication of that document——

Mr. MORRIS. Vincent was not present?

Mr. DOOMAN. No. As a matter of fact, information on this was restricted to a very small number of people, those people that I have just indicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were present at this conference?

Mr. DOOMAN. I was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you speak of Mr. Davis having reacted violently, you were there and saw the reaction?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did Mr. Davis react, what was the nature of his violent reaction?

Mr. DOOMAN. He did not approve, he did not approve of anything which might be construed in any way as forming a basis for a negotiated surrender.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what he said?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; that was, in effect, what he said. However, the thing was pigeonholed because of the view among the military people that the publication of this document at that time would be premature.

Mr. MORRIS. What military people?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, principally, General Marshall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did not General Marshall express disagreement?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; he went along with the paper but his statement was that the publication of the document at that time would be, and this word I remember textually, "premature." With that, the paper was set aside for the time being. However, a very short time after that, it was a matter of perhaps 2 or 3 weeks——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the time again, the week and month, if possible?

Mr. DOOMAN. The 29th of May 1945, that this meeting took place in Secretary Stimson's office. Within a very short time, I should say a matter of a fortnight, information was available in the State Department that Dr. Lattimore had called on the President and had remonstrated very strongly against any position or decision taken by this Government which would enable the monarchy to remain in Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean "information was available in the State Department," Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, you understand, Mr. Sourwine, that so far as Japan was concerned, I was in a rather key position, and there was information passing back and forth between the State Department and the White House which was very closely guarded.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean official information?

Mr. DOOMAN. Official information.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you learned of Mr. Acheson's protest to the President from official——

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Lattimore's

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore's protest from official papers which came across your desk?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; word of mouth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Grew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone else tell you?

Mr. DOOMAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you meant by information becoming available was that Mr. Grew told you?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was Mr. Grew who told me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. DOOMAN. Now, Mr. Lattimore had been using every opportunity for a period of a year or more to propound the doctrine that the Japanese people would overturn the monarchy and that there were a group of people in the State Department, Fascists and reactionaries, who were going to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people.

But, to me, it was very queer that once a decision—now, mind you, up to that time, there had been no decision within the State Department on the question of the Emperor. There was a trend of thinking but there was no decision until the recommendation was made to the President. To me, it was very queer that immediately, well, within a matter of weeks, 2 or 3 weeks after that decision was made, that Mr. Lattimore went to the President and remonstrated with this decision.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, are there any other incidents or episodes or official reports that you know that would document your views on Owen Lattimore, which you are now testifying to?

Mr. DOOMAN. I would like to identify this document that I have been talking about if I may.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we should put that into this record, too, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DOOMAN. This document, as I say, was put aside.

The CHAIRMAN. You say "this document," and we have been dealing with a number of documents. Is this the document which you prepared at the instance of the Secretary?

Mr. DOOMAN. As the Acting Secretary of State.

I am proceeding now to identify the document.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DOOMAN. This paper, then, was taken by Mr. Stimson to Potsdam. I arrived myself at Potsdam on the 13th of July, and I was told by Mr. McCloy, who was then there, that Mr. Stimson was in active discussion with Mr. Churchill with regard to that document and I heard later, I believe also from Mr. McCloy, that there was an agreement between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Churchill, and that they had then gone to Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes and had received an acceptance of the document. It was then telegraphed to General Chiang Kai-shek, and on May 29, it was promulgated then as the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan, and it was on the basis of that document that Japan surrendered.

May I also add, for the benefit of—I do not want to take credit that really belongs to somebody else, but I would like to put on record here that the preamble to the Potsdam Proclamation was taken from a document prepared by Douglas Fairbanks, who was then in the Navy Department in the Psychological Warfare Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Douglas Fairbanks?

Mr. DOOMAN. Douglas Fairbanks.

I would like to make acknowledgment, if I could, of his contribution

to a paper which, after all, is part of history.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are referring to the movie actor?

Mr. DOOMAN. The movie actor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Father or son?

Mr. DOOMAN. Son.

Mr. SOURWINE. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished with that episode, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand now that he started out to identify this instrument and he does not identify it?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe in detail so that we might make that a part of our record if the chairman deems it necessary?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes. This was entitled when prepared: "Draft Proclamation by the Heads of the State, U. S.-U. K.-China," and it was then ultimately issued on the 29th of July at Potsdam, by Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Truman, and General Chiang Kai-shek, and when Russia came into the war, the Soviet Union then adhered to this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back and get the document straight again, please.

Is this the document that you are now testifying to the same document that you prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the one that was rejected at the instance of General Marshall?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was later signed.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean, but temporarily, at least, laid aside?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the document that afterwards was adopted at Potsdam?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the preliminary to that, the preamble to that was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir. I would like to mention this thing that the only portion of my draft which was changed, not in substance but in text, was that paragraph 12 which I have just read; that was cut down to read that the Japanese might have such form of Government as they desired.

The CHAIRMAN. Had your document set up or attempted to set up the continuation of a monarchy?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I haven't read it; that the occupation of Japan should cease—

when a responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people had been set up. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

As I say, that particular paragraph was cut down to the effect that such type of government as they pleased, in accordance with the wishes of the Allies, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this now.

MR. DOOMAN. Excuse me, that includes some other papers.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced into the record in its entirety, it is only three pages and I would like to have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. It reads: "Draft Proclamation by the Heads of State, U. S., U. K., USSR-China."

THE CHAIRMAN. Now, this instrument that I now hold in my hand, consisting of three pages, was that the entire instrument that you prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of State?

MR. DOOMAN. That was prepared at the direction of Mr. Grew, then Acting Secretary of State.

THE CHAIRMAN. Acting Secretary of State.

MR. DOOMAN. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN. Was this the entire instrument?

MR. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. Going back a little bit, this was the instrument which was discussed in the Pentagon at the time Mr. Marshall was present, and it was at his instance, laid aside?

MR. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. This is the instrument that was shown to the President in the White House?

MR. DOOMAN. As I recall, on the 28th of May.

THE CHAIRMAN. This may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 240" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 240

DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF STATE U. S.—U. K.—[U. S. S. R.]—CHINA

[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war]

(Completed in Department of State May, 1945)

(1) We,—The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this war on the terms we state herein.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Are the Japanese so lacking in reason that they will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? The time has come *for the Japanese people* to decide whether to continue on to destruction or to follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes, with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies among the Japanese shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as are determined to offer no potential for war but which can produce a sustaining economy and permit the Japanese to take their part in a world economic system, with access to raw materials and opportunities for peaceful trade.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established beyond a doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

(13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back again for a question or two. What part of that was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was the preamble.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the preamble?

Mr. DOOMAN. The preamble consists of those paragraphs preceding the numbered paragraphs in that paper.

The CHAIRMAN. Preceding?

Mr. DOOMAN. Preceding the numbered paragraphs.

Mr. MORRIS. The first paragraph here is a numbered paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct, the first paragraph is a numbered paragraph.

Mr. DOOMAN. My recollection was faulty. It consists of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. In other words, paragraphs 1 to 4, inclusive, were prepared by, largely by, Mr. Fairbanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was Mr. Fairbanks at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was in the Psychological Warfare Section of the Navy Department at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, when you testified in executive session on July 11, 1951, at the beginning of your testimony with respect to a conflict of views between yourself and Mr. John Carter Vincent, you said then:

My view was then that a country such as Japan with a population far in excess of what it could support without colonies was in very grave danger of being communized unless certain of the natural resources available on the continent could be made available to the Japanese. Vincent's position always was that the opportunities for these 70- or 80-million Japanese to make a livelihood should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on their own metropolitan area of Japan, the four main islands.

Senator EASTLAND. Whose policy was that?

Mr. DOOMAN. That was the general policy, Vincent's.

Senator EASTLAND. Vincent's?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Now, I wonder, Mr. Dooman, if you would, either from your own personal experiences or from your reading of official documents published by Mr. Vincent or Mr. Vincent's division, support that testimony.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, those views were set forth in a broadcast under the auspices of the State Department. I think it was carried on in D. C. on the night of October 6, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection of that broadcast? Did you hear the broadcast, or did you read a transcription of it?

Mr. DOOMAN. I read a transcription of it in the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom was the broadcast made?

Mr. DOOMAN. There were several people who participated in it, General Hilldring, who was a member of SWINK for civil affairs matters, Captain—I can't remember his name now, but he is now the President's naval aide—Captain Davidson.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy of that transcription with you, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection of what took place on that broadcast?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, it was substantially along the lines testified to previously by me in the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Namely, that Vincent's position always was that the opportunity for these 70 or 80 million Japanese to make a livelihood should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on their own metropolitan area, the four main islands?

Mr. DOOMAN. That's right. In other words, emphasis was to be laid on agriculture and fishing and such minor industries as they could support.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that transcription inserted in the record because of its considered importance.

The CHAIRMAN. What transcription?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the transcript.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is headed "Department of State Bulletin, Our Occupation Policy for Japan." The date of the bulletin is October 7, 1945, and it gives the participants in this broadcast to which Mr. Dooman has referred.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are any particular passages you would like to underscore in that transcript.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to introduce the whole transcript into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a photostatic copy of the original?

Mr. MORRIS. Pardon, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostatic copy of the original?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has so identified it.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is taken from the files of the State Department?

Mr. MANDEL. That photostat was made at my direction by the Library of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 241" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 241

[From the Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945]

OUR OCCUPATION POLICY FOR JAPAN

Participants

JOHN CARTER VINCENT: Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.

Maj. Gen. JOHN H. HILLDRING: Director of Civil Affairs, War Department.

Capt. R. L. DENNISON: U. S. Navy, Representative of the Navy Department on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.

STERLING FISHER: Director, NBC University of the Air.

[Released to the press October 6]

ANNOUNCER: Here are *headlines from Washington*:

General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken Up; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines; Promises Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military Fanatics.

John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto; Says That the Institution of the Emperor Will Have To Be Radically Modified, and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free Assembly and Free Discussion.

Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil Aviation; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan.

ANNOUNCER: This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan". Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. Mr. Fisher—

FISHER: No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much of the confusion surrounding this debate.¹ But it also raised many questions—questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to interpret further our Japan policy.

General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that policy is determined.

HILLDRING: Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will try to explain how it is made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee—

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 23, 1945, p. 423.

"SWINC", we call it—formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we think he is doing it very well.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chairman does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.

VINCENT: That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with which General Hilldring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and I sit in an advisory capacity.

HILLDRING: The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, I'd like to know whether there is a—shall we say—strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.

VINCENT: No, there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.

FISHER: There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian advisers.

VINCENT: That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to send more and more such people out.

FISHER: As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee, Captain Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and *voice* in, the policy for Japan.

DENNISON: We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000 vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played in the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always present a naval problem.

FISHER: What part is the Navy playing now in that control?

DENNISON: Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil-affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.

FISHER: Does that include Okinawa?

DENNISON: Yes.

FISHER: That's not generally known, is it?

DENNISON: No, I believe not. I'd like to add—besides these immediate duties the United States Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan long after our troops are withdrawn.

FISHER: Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcommittee which drafts our occupation policy, can you give us a statement of our over-all objectives?

VINCENT: Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to *democratize* Japan—to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

FISHER: And how long do you think that will take?

VINCENT: The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic tendencies.

FISHER: General Hildring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?

HILLDRING: To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish our aims. We *must* stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.

FISHER: To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy?

HILLDRING: That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.

FISHER: Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?

VINCENT: Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies for the control of Japan.² In addition to the four principal powers in the Far East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the Commission.

FISHER: Coming back to our first objective—General Hildring, what about the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?

HILLDRING: Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.

FISHER: And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?

HILLDRING: It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated; the return of Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.

FISHER: Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the Japanese forces scattered through Asia?

DENNISON: It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.

FISHER: And what is being done with the Japanese Navy?

DENNISON: The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed.

FISHER: Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military system—the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecuting liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be done about that?

VINCENT: That vicious system will be abolished, Mr. Fisher. Not only the top chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have to be substituted for it.

DENNISON: We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and not an army in the guise of police.

HILLDRING: As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already abolished the Kempai and political police.

FISHER: It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government, from the Emperor on down.

VINCENT: Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the people of Japan must be removed.

FISHER: Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?

VINCENT: The institution of the Emperor—if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it—will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher.

DENNISON: The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.

² See p. 545.

FISHER: Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point, Captain Dennison?

DENNISON: I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur said:

"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force."³ That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

FISHER: That's clear enough. . . . Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference between them?

HILLDRING: Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Reduced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Government, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.

FISHER: Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of the national Government in Japan?

HILLDRING: The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.

FISHER: But some people argue, General, that by utilizing the Japanese Government we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?

HILLDRING: Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japanese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.

DENNISON: Our policy is to *use* the existing form of government in Japan, not to *support* it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to feel out the situation.

FISHER: Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?

DENNISON: In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has correspondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.

FISHER: He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me.

VINCENT: Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out.

FISHER: Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war criminals?

VINCENT: We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection.

³ BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480.

HILLDRING: We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is applying in Germany are being used in Japan.

DENNISON: Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they are punished—not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.

FISHER: All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu—the big industrialists—who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, among the guilty?

DENNISON: We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

FISHER: General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?

HILLDRING: Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos—militarists—will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines *must* be broken up. There's no other way to accomplish it.

FISHER: What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT: Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

FISHER: And the financial combines as well?

VINCENT: Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

FISHER: Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu." Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

DENNISON: There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war criminal.

FISHER: General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in Japan. What about that?

HILLDRING: I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are *not* rebuilding the big trusts in Germany, we *have not* rebuilt them, and we are *not going* to rebuild them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only will we not *revive* these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans or the Japanese to do so.

FISHER: And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?

HILLDRING: The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.

VINCENT: This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT: Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

FISHER: What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

VINCENT: They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

FISHER: They'll have to have *some* foreign trade of course to keep going.

VINCENT: Of course, but not the unhealthful sort they had before the war. A large portion of Japan's pre-war foreign trade assets were used for military preparations, and not to support her internal economy; after all, scrap-iron and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign trade far below the pre-war level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war.

FISHER: There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hildring, what will our policy be on food?

HILDRING: General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.

FISHER: They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

DENNISON: We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy—that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming—and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

FISHER: Then, Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transport planes to resume operations.

DENNISON: That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, *no civil aviation* will be permitted in Japan.

VINCENT: Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

FISHER: In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

VINCENT: Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—and will, we expect.

FISHER: And the labor unions? What about them?

VINCENT: We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

FISHER: I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

VINCENT: General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

FISHER: That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

DENNISON: Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

VINCENT: All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.

FISHER: I take all this to mean that the democratic and anti-militarist groups will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

VINCENT: It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan". It

also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored".

FISHER: And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain *their* objectives?

VINCENT: In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON: We are *not* interested in upholding the *status quo* in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

FISHER: One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party—a Socialist party. What stand will we take on that, General Hilldring?

HILLDRING: If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military fanatics.

FISHER: You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILLDRING: We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result—so long as our troops and our over-all objectives are not endangered.

FISHER: I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion of nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"?

VINCENT: Shintoism, in so far as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, as a state-directed religion is to be done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools.

FISHER: That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT: Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed.

FISHER: And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT: Yes, but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic learnings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON: That's where the real change must stem from—the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER: And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON: How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels—school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER: What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON: Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER: What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON: Simply that they *like* the American way of life better. At seven, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like, but as they get older they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a taste of them—of real civil liberties—they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING: I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack—they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT: Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if there's to be a real, working democracy in Japan.

HILLDRING: I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT: The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East", or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

FISHER: Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hilldring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy—one that's aimed at giving *no* encouragement to the imperialists and *every possible* encouragement to the pro-democratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

ANNOUNCER: That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy," presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send \$1 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program. . . . Kennedy Ludlam speaking from Washington, D. C.

Mr. DOOMAN. Will you give me just a minute? Here is one quotation.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me have the question now, please.

(The record was read by the reporter as follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are any particular passages you would like to underscore in that transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the counsel handed the witness the photostatic copy of the transcript of a radio speech.

Mr. DOOMAN. I will have to read several quotations from other people here.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. DOOMAN. This is General Hilldring speaking [reading]:

HILLDRING. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.

VINCENT. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under

our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

That, I think, is indicative of the thinking of Mr. Vincent, in other words, that the Japanese would have to subsist primarily on the resources that they found within their own islands, main islands, and confine their efforts largely to agriculture and fishing and the development of consumer goods.

As I remarked previously, here were today 85,000,000 people supposed to be able to make a living off an area equivalent, roughly, to one-quarter of Pennsylvania, and with no natural resources in the way of iron, steel, coal, cotton, wool, or any of the primary raw materials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, are there any other documents that you care to introduce into the record at this time to support the conclusion just arrived at, your conclusion?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I refer to a statement made by General MacArthur, I think it was on the 1st of September, in which—

Mr. MORRIS. What year?

Mr. DOOMAN. 1946, excuse me. This was the first anniversary of the setting up of the occupation in Japan. At that time, he issued a statement to the Japanese people warning them of the dangers from the left as well as from the right.

In other words, he was warning them of the dangers of communism. As a matter of fact, a short time after that, in February 1947, the Communists tried to take over the country by means of a general strike which was prevented only by General MacArthur preventing it. However, the Herald Tribune, as of September 3, 1946, publishes a dispatch from Mr. John C. Metcalfe, its correspondent in Washington, stating that there was in effect, that there was considerable unfavorable reaction in the State Department to General MacArthur's pronouncement to the Japanese people.

It quoted at that time, this article quoted, as follows; if I may read:

State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General MacArthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the cry of "communism" in Japan. The source said they were taken completely by surprise by comments in the MacArthur statement, such as that the Japanese islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard for war."

The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world.

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establishment of a just and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at "building a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up "a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources added.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what year?

Mr. DOOMAN. September 3, 1946.

The CHAIRMAN. 1946?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And published in what publication?

Mr. DOOMAN. The New York Herald Tribune.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who the sources referred to in that article are?

Mr. DOOMAN. I do not know first-hand, I only know from rumor.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that writer, byline writer?

Mr. MORRIS. John C. Metcalfe?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; I do not know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, introduce it into the evidence, for whatever probative value it may have.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document marked "Exhibit No. 242" is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 242

[From the New York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1946]

MACARTHUR BLAST AGAINST REDS DRAWS STATE DEPARTMENT'S FIRE

(By John C. Metcalfe)

WASHINGTON, September 2.—General Douglas MacArthur, Allied Supreme Commander in Japan, was charged by State Department sources today with having launched on his own initiative an anti-Communist campaign in violation of American policy directives to him from President Truman.

The charge, unofficial in character, was based on General MacArthur's published statement yesterday on the first anniversary of Japan's formal surrender. In the statement, he suggested that in certain circumstances the Japanese people might fall prey to those seeking to impose the "philosophy of the extreme radical left."

It was stated bluntly at the State Department today that General MacArthur made public his statement "without any consultation" in advance with American officials directly responsible for the foreign policy of the United States.

CONTROVERSY THREATENS

The development threatened to revive an old controversy between General MacArthur and Washington policy makers. President Truman made it clear 6 months ago that he, in consultation with James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, is responsible for policy and that General MacArthur's job is solely to carry out that policy under White House directives forwarded to him by the War Department.

State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General MacArthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the cry of "communism" in Japan. The sources said they were taken completely by surprise by comments in the MacArthur statement such as that the Japanese islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous spring-board for war."

The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world.

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establishment of a just and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at "building a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up "a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources added.

STATEMENT HELD UNWARRANTED

"There is nothing which the Japanese have done since their surrender to warrant the statement issued by General MacArthur," one official commented.

General MacArthur's task is to "neutralize Japan" and to get along with the other interested Allied powers, it was explained. If the United States holds any fears about its security, it will counter any Soviet threat with a strong Navy and Air Force, it was said.

Private advices from Tokyo gave the following information today:

"The emphasis on important developments in Japan has shifted from General MacArthur to the doings of the Japanese. One is apt to get (from headquarters) a completely false view of what is going on in this country. Listening to the

military authorities one wonders why the occupation is not ended right now. Actually, however, the Japanese are no more ready to govern themselves on a democratic basis than they were a year ago. The Conservatives are firmly in the saddle and are doing all in their power to preserve the status quo.

"Everyone must be aware by now that the Allied Council here is a farce and that the Far Eastern Commission seems to us out here like something on another planet."

DEMOCRACY PREFERRED

At the State Department it was said that if the Japanese have a tendency to go anywhere they will "most likely turn toward democracy" as the preferred type of government. But it was also pointed out that the Japanese, like the Germans, are primarily interested in extricating themselves from their unhappy situation and will take any course that might lead to a way out. They are playing off democracy against communism, it was said, and statements like those by General MacArthur are extremely helpful to them.

Department officials, moreover, were particularly annoyed by the MacArthur statement because of the disturbing situations in Korea and China.

"Maybe General MacArthur thinks he is bolstering Mr. Byrnes at the Paris Peace Conference, but he is not helping the situation in the Far East with his comment," a State Department official said.

Diplomatic observers also pointed out that American-Soviet relations at the Paris Conference, in Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, and at the United Nations Security Council are none too calm. They were, therefore, particularly disturbed by anything resembling a move to launch an anticommunist campaign in Japan.

State Department sources considered the whole incident as "undoubtedly especially embarrassing" to Maj. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko, Soviet representative on the Allied Council for Japan, which meets at Tokyo.

There was no indication tonight whether the State Department would make any official comment, since most officials were away for the Labor Day week end.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other incidents or episodes concerning this part of the testimony that you care to add at this time? If there are, we ask you to do so.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I can't recall any, offhand, bearing on this particular point.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, do you know what the attitude of the State Department, or any individuals in the State Department, was with respect toward Japanese Communists?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any personal experience with Japanese Communists?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain those to the committee, Mr. Dooman?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any personal experience with Japanese Communists, that is your question?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Did you experience the State Department's policy with respect to Japanese Communists first hand?

Mr. DOOMAN. May I submit that the question is perhaps not relevant to the situation as it existed, because the State Department had no policy at that time with regard to—

Mr. MORRIS. Any individuals in the State Department, Mr. Dooman.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, some time in May I believe it was, May or June, I think it was May, there returned—

Mr. MORRIS. 1945?

Mr. DOOMAN. 1945.

There returned from China a Foreign Service officer named John K. Emerson, who, before the war, had been one of my subordinates

at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I understood that he had been sent to Yen-an. Yen-an in China then was the capital of the Chinese Communists. There were present at that time in Yen-an a Nosaka, the leading Japanese Communist, and other leading Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Nosaka the same as Susumo Okano, head of the Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. DOOMAN. I believe the latter is a pseudonym. I believe that Emerson had been sent to Yen-an to study methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yen-an in indoctrinating Japanese prisoners of war taken by the Chinese. As I said, he returned to Washington in about May of 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did?

Mr. DOOMAN. Emerson. He brought back a report describing at considerable length the method used by the Japanese Communists with respect to Japanese prisoners of war, and as I recall, he recommended that Japanese prisoners in American stockades be then turned over to Japanese Communists in the United States for indoctrination along methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yen-an.

At that time he was also invited to come over to OSS, the Office of Strategic Services, where I was helping with my own services in the field of psychological warfare to address a group on what he had found in Yen-an. At that time he displayed a large number of posters and papers of various kinds and he also showed me a number of letters that he had brought from Yen-an. These letters were written by Japanese Communists in Yen-an to certain Japanese Communists who were then employed by OSS in psychological warfare against Japanese.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the episode, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with a publication that is entitled "Eighteen Years in Prison" by Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; I have a copy of that book. The title in Japanese is "Gokuchi juhachi-nen" which means Eighteen Years in Jail.

Mr. MORRIS. That publication, which is in Japanese, which you understand, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the Japanese Communist Party? A translation here from the Library of Congress, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948.

Mr. DOOMAN. Oh, yes. I see. It was published by the Japanese Communist Party, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, on page 159 to 161, there is described an episode which involves individuals concerned with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I ask you if you have any supplementary or corroborative knowledge of the facts described by these two Japanese Communists in the publication that you have in your hand.

I think it would be best if I read the episode referred to, Mr. Dooman, and ask you if you had read it in the book and whether you know of any corroboration of it.

Mr. DOOMAN. All right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you describe what this is, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a translation from the book entitled "Eighteen Years in Prison," the last chapter written by Yoshio Shiga, pages 159 to 161, published by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948 and translated by Andrew Y. Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orientalia Division, the Library of Congress.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the episode to which we are referring, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

THE DOOR OF FREEDOM

At last the day came when we could become active again. That day came after those who called us traitors had turned Japan into a ruined wasteland, had taken the lives of a million people and had destroyed all peace and happiness.

On August 15 (1945) all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, assembled around a radio speaker, to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called August Voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but I caught the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure that Japan had lost the war.

The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail. We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, however, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners, and that settled the situation.

By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three times to investigate. He asked the warden if he still kept political prisoners in his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however, Mr. Isaac of Newsweek, and M. Marukiyusu and M. Giran of a French news agency came to the prison. They did not ask about the political prisoners. Instead, they merely requested to see the prison. The prison authorities reluctantly showed them first the work shop. Next they requested to see the wards. After they went through the wards, they requested next to see the solitary cells. The Fuchu Prison is an American style cross-shaped building, with the solitary cells at the center. As they came to the section which contained the solitary cells, the three newsmen asked the prison authorities point-blank: "You have political prisoners here, don't you?" The officials, taken off guard, tried to evade the question and replied, "No; we don't." They told them, "Then we will bring in American soldiers and see. Is that all right?" So finally the prison officials admitted holding such prisoners and said, "That over there is their detention quarters." The three newsmen came rushing to our section, M. Marceuse shouting aloud, "Where is Mr. Tokuda? Where is Mr. Shiga?" That was the first voice of the outside world we heard for those long years.

From that day on, until we came out of the jail—about 10 days—war correspondents of various newspapers came to see us. From SCAP also came Mr. Emerson, Dr. Norman, and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. They asked, "What are you going to do after your release?" They also told us about the policies of SCAP. "On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the prison. It was raining. The great iron doors were swung open and we comrades arm-in-arm stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment of 18 years. We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those comrades who, with red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some of them had been there since the previous night.

"Then we plunged into our new activities with renewed spirit."

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Dooman, this committee is interested in the episodes that are reported in that book.

I ask you if you will supplement the facts presented in this book from whatever knowledge you have of the episode.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, what knowledge I have is derived largely from—is largely second-hand. I was not there, naturally, and I have no first-hand information.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard about these episodes from State Department officials?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about it from the sources that we recognize are second-hand?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, there are two categories. I have heard from State Department people, other State Department people, who were there at that time. Also I have heard of this from a large number of Japanese whom I met in New York since the war, because this thing became a sensation among the Japanese people, it was talked about from hand to mouth, it was talked about from person to person, although there was no reference to this in the papers. It was a matter of general discussion among the Japanese.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a matter of common knowledge among the Japanese?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was a matter of common knowledge among the Japanese. I gather so from the fact that perhaps a dozen people, dozen Japanese, with whom I have talked of the matter since the war in New York were quite familiar with the story.

Now, combining these two sources, that is, from State Department officials who were there and from what the Japanese themselves said, this was in effect the substance of what I heard; that Harold Isaac and a French correspondent who was known to be a Communist went to this prison, Fuchu Prison, and the events took place pretty much as described by Shiga, in his book.

The story then continues that they came back, Isaac and this Frenchman came back and reported their experience to John Emerson in SCAP headquarters.

A few days later, Emerson and, I believe, Herbert Norman——

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Herbert Norman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Herbert Norman was a Canadian, member of the Canadian Foreign Service, who had been in Tokyo before the war, and who had been sent back by the Canadian Government to Japan as soon as the occupation started to undertake the repatriation of Canadian citizens left in Japan during the war. When he got through with that, he was assigned to Counter-Intelligence under SCAP. The story goes on to say that Emerson, and I believe they weren't quite certain whether Norman went with Emerson or not, a few days later went back to this prison and demanded to see Tokuda and Shiga and the other Communists.

The story further continues, and this was a matter that was generally talked about by the Japanese in Tokyo at that time, was that on the day they were released, apparently October 10, following the order by General MacArthur for the release of political prisoners, that Emerson and Norman went in a staff car to the prison and brought Shiga and Tokuda back to their homes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are Shiga, and Tokuda?

Mr. DOOMAN. Shiga was one of the top leaders of the Japanese Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the effect of that on the Japanese population from what you know, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. The effect of that, as said by one of the Japanese to me, was to add 100,000 new members to the Japanese Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the prestige accorded by the American and Canadian officials in transporting Japanese Communists in

an official limousine afforded the Japanese Communists a certain amount of reputation?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, a substantial increase in prestige and standing, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, do you know from your own knowledge anything of the report prepared by Ambassador Pauley on Japanese reparations? Are you acquainted with that document?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about that document with respect to the policy he enunciated therein?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Pauley, who was sent out as Reparations Commissioner or Ambassador, made a survey, was supposed to make a survey, of the Japanese industry potential and needs and what could be removed for reparation purposes. He took with him, as his economic adviser, Mr. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore; and, without knowing first-hand, the belief is quite general that Mr. Lattimore wrote the report which Mr. Pauley submitted when he returned to the United States.

Well, the report, which I believe, is readily accessible, in effect provided for the "pasteurizing" of Japan—that is, the reduction of Japan to, as has been previously indicated in that broadcast by Vincent, to a very simple economy; that is, one of primarily agriculture and fishing, plus small consumer industries.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to press Mr. Dooman as to his knowledge that Mr. Lattimore did write the Pauley reparations report inasmuch as Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged in executive session, his connection with that particular report.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged?

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you propose to offer that to the committee in open session?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I will do that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DOOMAN. I may add that, in general, the report reflects the view set forth by Mr. Lattimore and others and the Nation, and so on: the general concept that Japan should be reduced to a very simple type of economy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention so much to introduce, although I will do that since you ask, any of the executive session we had with Mr. Lattimore, but I was making that suggestion to account for the fact that I was not going to press Mr. Dooman as to how he knew that Mr. Lattimore wrote that particular report.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no desire to direct you as to how you present the evidence, but I just thought, if you had it available for the open session, it would probably clarify some things because Mr. Dooman testifies largely from hearsay in that regard.

Mr. DOOMAN. On that particular point.

Mr. MORRIS. In that particular point.

We have sat for it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dooman, did you have any dealings with John K. Fairbank?

Mr. DOOMAN. No. Only periodically.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, you did encounter John K. Fairbank in your official capacity; did you not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe your connections with John K. Fairbank, whatever they were?

The CHAIRMAN. Who is he?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had John K. Fairbank's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations set forth in the record at great detail.

We have also had testimony on the part of three witnesses in connection with his association in connection with the Communist Party.

I am asking Mr. Dooman if he had encountered at all Mr. John K. Fairbank in his associations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DOOMAN. I understood Mr. Fairbank was in that section of the Office of War Information which dealt with psychological warfare against Japan.

Now, the practice was that—I believe it was—once a month a group would come over from the Office of War Information with a draft program of the propaganda that was to be directed against Japan for the ensuing month, and the various targets and subjects which were to be dealt with were set forth on a piece of paper, and the purpose of their visit to the State Department was to get clearance on these targets.

As I say, my contacts with Mr. Fairbank were limited primarily to those visits to the State Department when he brought over these programs of proposed psychological warfare.

Mr. MORRIS. From your association, what was his view toward these—

Mr. DOOMAN. I don't know what responsibility or what part Mr. Fairbank played in the formulation of these programs—that is, the setting up of the targets—but I found that invariably in these programs there would be found an item directing the psychological warfare toward creating in the minds of the Japanese an attitude of resentment and opposition to the Emperor and to the monarchical system.

At that time we had not come to any decision as to what our policy should be in that respect, and I invariably red-penciled these items referring to the Emperor. However, they would always appear either overtly or covertly in the next program that would be presented.

There was, in other words, a persistent effort on the part of the Office of War Information to get our approval toward psychological warfare directed at the relationship between the Japanese people and the Emperor.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you underscored it in red?

Mr. DOOMAN. I crossed out with a red pencil.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I made reference to the executive session that we had with Mr. Owen Lattimore here on the 13th of July 1951; and from the executive minutes, on page 15, I would like to read the following excerpt.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the witness testifying under oath at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. The witness, Mr. Owen Lattimore, was testifying under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. After you returned, Mr. Lattimore, what was your next assignment as far as the Government was concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was a member of the American Mission to Japan on the subject of reparations.

Mr. MORRIS. In that assignment, you were on the payroll of the State Department; were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understand that it was a White House mission; that all or some of the members including myself were on the State Department payroll.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you on that payroll, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Four or five months, from about October 1945 to about February or March 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. What part did you play in the preparation of the report of that mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I helped to draft the report in Tokyo.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you help?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Quite largely.

That is the acknowledgement I referred to.

Mr. Chairman, I may as well finish the paragraph, however. [Continues reading:]

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe that for us, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, when we were in Tokyo, we had a number of experts with us, economists, engineers, and so forth; each expert was given access through General MacArthur's headquarters to figures and data on Japan. Each person assembled his own material, and I was largely responsible for the continuous writing of the report. Each expert was responsible for his own figures.

I would like to have that incorporated in the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the record now; you have read it.

Mr. MORRIS. I think with respect to the extracts from the book *Eighteen Years in Prison*, inasmuch as it was read by Mr. Mandel, nothing more is necessary.

With respect to the book itself, I suggest that it be filed with the records of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The book referred to was filed for the information of the committee.)

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That instrument that you had there a minute ago, which is a transcript from this book, has not been admitted in the record; it was read by Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel read that. However, if you think it is necessary, I will introduce that into this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 243" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 243

[Translation ¹]

THE DOOR OF FREEDOM ²

At last the day came when we could become active again. That day came after those who called us traitors had turned Japan into a ruined wasteland, had taken the lives of a million people, and had destroyed all peace and happiness.

On August 15 [1945] all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, assembled around a radio speaker to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called august voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but

¹ Translated by Andrew Y. Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orientalia Division, the Library of Congress.

² Last chapter, written by Yoshio Shiga, pp. 159-161. From *Gokuchu juhachi-nen* (18 years in prison) by Kyuichi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published by the Japan Communist Party, 1948.

I caught the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure that Japan had lost the war.

The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail. We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, however, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners, and that settled the situation.

By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three times to investigate. He asked the warden if he still kept political prisoners in his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however, Mr. Isaac, of Newsweek, and M. Marukyusu [Marceuse?] and M. Giran [Gil-land?],³ of a French news agency, came to the prison. They did not ask about the political prisoners. Instead, they merely requested to see the prison. The prison authorities reluctantly showed them first the workshop. Next they requested to see the wards. After they went through the wards, they requested next to see the solitary cells. The Fuchu Prison is an American-style cross-shaped building, with the solitary cells at the center. As they came to the section which contained the solitary cells, the three newsmen asked the prison authorities point-blank: "You have political prisoners here; don't you?" The officials, taken off guard, tried to evade the question, and replied, "No; we don't." They told them, "Then we will bring in American soldiers and see. Is that all right?" So, finally the prison officials admitted [holding such prisoners] and said, "That over there is their detention quarters." The three newsmen came rushing to our section, M. Marceuse shouting aloud, "Where is Mr. Tokuda? Where is Mr. Shiga?" That was the first voice of the outside world we heard for those long years.

From that day on, until we came out of the jail—about 10 days—war correspondents of various newspapers came to see us. From SCAP also came Mr. Emerson, Dr. Norman, and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. They asked "What are you going to do after your release?" They also told us about the policies of SCAP.

On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the prison. It was raining. The great iron doors were swung open, and we comrades, arm in arm, stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment of 18 years. We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those comrades who, with Red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some of them had been there since the previous night.

Then we plunged into our new activities with renewed spirit.

Mr. MORRIS. The volume itself is in Japanese, which Mr. Dooman has translated for us.

The CHAIRMAN. It will become a part of the files of this committee.

Mr. DOOMAN. Just to bring that Pauley report into proper perspective, may I add that the following year—I think it was 1947—a mission was sent out by Mr. Strike, one of the leading consulting engineers in this country. He sent to Japan a large group of, I think, over 20 consulting engineers that went out to Japan, and they returned with a report generally overruling the Pauley report, and the report of the Strike committee in turn was then upheld by another mission consisting of Mr. Johnson, who was president of the Chemical Bank in New York or chairman of the board of the Chemical Bank, and Mr. Paul Hoffman, who, between them, submitted a report which virtually wiped out the recommendations of the Pauley mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, do you know Lawrence Salisbury, who was editor of Far Eastern Affairs, which was the publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DOOMAN. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever make any effort to change the personnel in the State Department, to your knowledge?

³ These names are difficult to identify from their transcription into the Japanese syllabary.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, he is the ringleader of a group of men in the Far Eastern Division, who protested against the assignment of Dr. Hornbeck as director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, when Secretary of State Stettinius organized, carried out, his reorganization of the State Department in, I believe, January 1944.

As a result of that rebellion, which was successful, Dr. Hornbeck was then, I believe, sent to the Netherlands as Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it was a successful movement?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was a successful movement.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say Mr. Salisbury was the ringleader?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. DOOMAN. I know that from personal knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I think not.

Have we neglected anything that we should know, Mr. Dooman? If you know of anything within the scope of our inquiry, the chairman and I ask that you present that knowledge to this committee.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, my purpose, Mr. Morris, has not been to give you any evidence as to whether this, that, or the other man was a Communist or not, because I am in no position to give you any such evidence.

My purpose in testifying here was to indicate in general that policies put forward by the left-wing press, from the Daily Worker right down through the line, were in effect substantially translated into United States policies and to indicate from personal knowledge how that operation was carried out.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that at no time was Mr. Dooman asked whether or not any particular person was a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. The record will speak for itself in that regard.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you identify for the record as much as you can, who Lawrence Salisbury was, with respect to his connection with the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Our files show that Lawrence Salisbury was at one time the editor of Far Eastern Survey, official organ of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a State Department officer, according to your files?

Mr. MANDEL. Editor of Far Eastern Survey, Official Organ of the American Council of IPR, former Foreign Service official, 12 years in Japan, 5 years in China, and 2 in Manila, and 5 in the Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from our records, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That comes from the biographical register of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he serving in the State Department while he was writing for that publication?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When is your next meeting, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Next Tuesday at 10 a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until that time.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., Friday, September 14, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Tuesday, September 17, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly stand and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. WIDENER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. WILLIAM HARRY WIDENER, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show the witness is here under subpoena.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, last Friday during the testimony of Eugene Dooman the name of Julian Friedman turned up. According to Mr. Dooman's testimony, Julian Friedman was John Carter Vincent's assistant. John Carter Vincent was then head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and Mr. Dooman would attend the Far Eastern area committee meetings for John Carter Vincent. Mr. Dooman testified in the course of the day that he suspected that Julian Friedman was the person responsible for leaks of classified information from those meetings to the left wing press and, according to Mr. Dooman's testimony, he made specific charges against Julian Friedman to Julian Friedman.

I thought it would be appropriate this morning to have someone here who had encountered Mr. Julian Friedman.

Mrs. Widener, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please.

Mrs. WIDENER. I am Mrs. William Harry Widener. My address is 829 Park Avenue, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your occupation, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. WIDENER. I am a writer and a housewife, a professional writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you qualified in any way as a writer for the United States Government, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes. I wrote free lance scripts on a WAE basis for the Voice of America from January 1, 1951, to the end of May 1951. I applied for classification as an information expert and I received such classification.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any record of that classification with you?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you mind letting me have it so I might put it in the record, please?

Mrs. WIDENER. Here it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify these papers for us, Mrs. Widener? What are these papers?

Mrs. WIDENER. They give a classification for me as an information specialist from the United States Civil Service Commission, a notice of rating from the Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your rating?

Mrs. WIDENER. They are dated June this year—radio, GS-12, radio, GS-11, radio, GS-11, periodicals and publications, GS-11.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like these in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to know what these signify and what the designations testified to by the witness signify. What does GS-11 mean?

Mrs. WIDENER. As I understand it, Senator, when I was taken into the Voice of America on a WAE basis, I filled out a civil service application stating my qualifications.

The CHAIRMAN. What is a WAE basis and what does it mean?

Mrs. WIDENER. I was on a purchase order basis. The Voice of America ordered from me eight scripts a month. They paid me \$40 per script. I was up for what they called classification under civil service and investigation by the security officers.

When I filed my papers, I had to state what qualifications I would have for such an appointment with the State Department. I happen to speak several languages. I had to give the entire history of my education, my background for security investigation and for professional qualifications a list of my publications in the writing field and my experience.

I was told to start out to be classified in that field; GS-12 was a very good classification. I believe it was not in the lowest category.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have those introduced in the record by way of describing the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Those instruments, are they from your own hand, or just what are they?

Mrs. WIDENER. Those were sent to me by the Department of State, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the object of this, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. To establish who Mrs. Widener is. They are just for a description of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. A copy of each will be inserted in the record by reference and filed with the committee.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 244 and 245" and filed in the committee's files for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man named Clark Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you known Clark Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. I first met Mr. Andrews, I believe, in 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions, approximately, have you met Mr. Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. A great many. He was a fiancé of a friend of mine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, can you recall an experience that you had regarding Clark Andrews in the spring of 1947 that would be of interest to this committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question again, please, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that you could pin that down more, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, would you tell us who Clark Andrews is?

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Andrews was a radio producer.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his occupation when you first met him?

Mrs. WIDENER. He had returned from China where he had been in radio, I believe, in Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this?

Mrs. WIDENER. In 1946 when I first met him. The pertinence would be in reference to Mr. Julian Friedman whom you mentioned to Senator McCarran.

Senator FERGUSON. Andrews had been in private radio work in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir; with the Armed Forces, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Working for the United States Government?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing in the spring of 1947?

Mrs. WIDENER. He was a radio producer for the American Broadcasting System.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that you had previously met him on numerous occasions?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall an episode that involved Mr. Friedman and Mr. Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us an account of what happened on that particular occasion?

Mrs. WIDENER. One evening in the spring of 1947 Mr. Andrews telephoned my home—

The CHAIRMAN. Where was this?

Mrs. WIDENER. In New York City—and asked if I would care to join him and his fiancée after dinner to meet a very special friend that he would like me to meet, a very brilliant man and a man who had been in China.

At that time I was not married to Mr. Widener, but I was married to a composer, and my husband was not really included in the invitation. He was busy with music and professional duties. I accepted the invitation to go along. When I reached the home of my friend, my friend didn't feel well and retired. I remained with Mr. Andrews.

We had a long talk and discussion. He said to me that his friend was expected but might be a little late. We chatted and waited. I should say certainly more than an hour later Mr. Andrews said to me, "Confidentially, I want to tell you that the man you are going to meet is absolutely brilliant. In fact, he is one of the top brains of the Communist Party."

At that moment the doorbell rang and the gentleman appeared.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he account for the delay in any way of Julian Friedman in arriving?

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Friedman accounted for the delay. Mr. Friedman came in. I didn't know his name at that moment. Mr. Andrews introduced Mr. Friedman to me as Mr. Julian Friedman. He said that he was very sorry to be late and to have kept us waiting, but that he had been occupied with a case that was being heard, a very important case, in arbitration in New York City before Mr. James Fly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that James Lawrence Fly?

Mrs. WIDENER. I don't know his middle name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it the Mr. Fly formerly with the Federal Communications Commission?

Mrs. WIDENER. I believe so.

Mr. Friedman said he was delighted that the case seemed to be going very well and that—

Mr. MORRIS. This is the case of which James Fly was the arbitrator?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir. And he said, "You see, I am conducting the defense from behind the scenes." I said, "May I ask what you mean by 'behind the scenes?'" He said to me, "It is an extremely complicated case. It is a case involving a worker"—I think he said social welfare worker or social service worker—"who was dismissed from New York City employ and who claimed she was unjustly dismissed because of her political beliefs."

I said, "What are her political beliefs?" He said, "Well, of course, she is a Communist but she is saying that she is not a Communist." I said that that struck me as very complicated indeed. Mr. Friedman said, "Of course, since she is a member of our party, I am defending her, but not out in the open."

Then Mr. Andrews interrupted the conversation and talked about me and my professional activities and what I had done. He and Mr. Friedman began to discuss China and international politics. I listened for quite a while. Mr. Friedman said to me, "I had a very interesting time in China." I said, "Well, when did you leave?" I remember I asked him what he was doing. He said that he was with the State Department. Prior to Mr. Friedman's arrival Mr. Andrews had told me that Mr. Friedman had graduated with the highest honors from Harvard University. I believe he graduated either with magna or summa cum laude.

Mr. Friedman took up the story of his going to China. He said to me that after he graduated from Harvard University he entered the State Department and that eventually he was sent to China where he was connected, I believe, with the Embassy in Shanghai, our Embassy there. He said, "I was able to do very useful work there, but eventually I got in a very tough spot." I asked him what he meant by a "tough spot." He said, "I really was on the spot. I was doing very good work for our cause, the Communist cause."

Mr. MORRIS. He said it was the Communist cause.

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir; "in China, but somebody must have gotten wise to me."

He was asked to write a report on the Communist Chinese labor movement.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me have that again, please. "He said——"

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Friedman said to me: "I was asked to write a report on the Chinese Communist labor movement." He said, "That put me in a tough spot. Naturally I wouldn't write anything against the party. If I did write what I wanted to write, it would tip my hand and destroy my usefulness. So I wrote a report that any 14-year-old boy could have written and got myself dismissed without prejudice."

Senator FERGUSON. Dismissed from the State Department, you mean?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Without prejudice?

Mrs. WIDENER. I asked him then what does "dismissed without prejudice" mean? He said, "It means exactly what it says."

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, may I interrupt at this time? Mr. Chairman, at our last session we introduced a letter from the State Department official indicating that Mr. Friedman had been dismissed without prejudice. That is a part of our record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that letter available now?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand that he was dismissed because he had written such a poor report?

Mrs. WIDENER. I understand Mr. Friedman told that he wrote a report that any 14-year-old child could have written.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tie that with his dismissal, the report? I mean what he said.

Mrs. WIDENER. He said to me that he got himself dismissed without prejudice.

Senator FERGUSON. Because of writing this report?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what he said?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir. That isn't exactly his every word.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is the substance of what he said?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir; that was my understanding.

Senator EASTLAND. Was Mr. Andrews in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. I have no knowledge of Mr. Andrews' activities in China whatsoever.

Senator EASTLAND. Was he in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He did show a sympathy and friendliness toward the Communist movement?

Mrs. WIDENER. He showed friendliness toward Mr. Julian Friedman.

Senator EASTLAND. Had Mr. Andrews been with the State Department?

Mrs. WIDENER. I do not know.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was he with in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. I only know that he said he had been with radio. He was in the Armed Forces and had been with our United States radio in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair interrupt here. The letter referred to is one dated April 23, 1951, over the signature of Elbridge Dubrow, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, and is addressed to me. It has "Exhibit No. 235" on it. It says [reading]:

Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary concerning Julian R. Friedman has been referred to me for reply.

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from August 5, 1945, until the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the auxiliary, it was necessary to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or auxiliary officers including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that his services were terminated without prejudice.

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.

Sincerely yours—

That is now an exhibit in this case.

Senator FERGUSON. Hasn't the State Department ever made an explanation as to what they mean "your services are terminated without prejudice"? Prejudice to what?

The CHAIRMAN. I take it to mean prejudice, but you may apply again and be reemployed. That is just a guess on my part.

Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened then, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. WIDENER. Up to that stage I had been listening very carefully to what Mr. Friedman had been saying. He stopped talking. I said, "Mr. Friedman, I would like to ask you a couple of questions if I might." He said, "Certainly." I said, "When you said to me before you were conducting a defense in an arbitration hearing for someone who claimed that she was being unjustly treated because of a charge against her political beliefs, you also told me that she was a member of the Communist Party. I can't understand the need for 'behind the scenes.' If she is sincere in her membership in the Communist Party and it is a legal party, why doesn't she say she is a member of the Communist Party and stand on her rights to belong to it, and why do you need to be 'behind the scenes' if you believe that she is right?"

He said to me, "Those things are very complicated and you have to go about them in the most suitable way."

I said, "I would like to ask you another question. When you joined the State Department, didn't you take an oath of allegiance to the United States Government?" He said, "Yes, I did." I said, "Well, you yourself say to me you graduated from Harvard with honors and you told me that in the performance of your duties you wrote a report that any 14-year-old child could have written. How do you reconcile that with your sworn duties?"

He said to me, "Well, I believe that the end justifies the means."

We got into a discussion of ends and means.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he say what his end was?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, he did not; not specifically in that way, but I think it came out what at least I believed his end was eventually. I said to him that I believed the use of the wrong means can preclude a right end. He went into further discussion, saying that to achieve the objective you have to use whatever tools were necessary to that objective. I said to him, "I think what you have just told me is the

most immoral story that I have ever heard, and I would like to ask you one more question: Do the means that you advocate to achieve an end include violence?"

The CHAIRMAN. Include what?

Mrs. WIDENER. "Include violence."

He said, "Yes, if necessary."

I stood up and I said: "Sir, it is my own belief that what you have just said to me is treason, and I cannot remain here." I said, "I want you to know that I don't consider myself bound by any confidence as to what I have listened to here and I want you to know that I am going to report you to the proper authorities."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you report him to anyone?

Mrs. WIDENER. Eventually I did.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom?

Mrs. WIDENER. To the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

But I would like your indulgence to continue, if I may.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not want to interrupt you, but I wanted to know what you did and whether you did report.

Mrs. WIDENER. I did eventually as the result of more knowledge, I would say, of that particular subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt you there.

At this interview that took place, who was present in the course of this conversation? The picture I have, it was your friend who had invited you there and Mr. Friedman and yourself; is that correct?

Mrs. WIDENER. There was Mr. Andrews, Mr. Julian Friedman, and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this to be a dinner party?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir. I was invited after dinner.

Senator FERGUSON. Just merely to come to the home?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it Mr. Andrews' home?

Mrs. WIDENER. It was the home of his fiancée.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she just retire to another room?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir. She was not feeling well.

Senator FERGUSON. She retired to another room in her home?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Which left you and Andrews and Friedman together talking?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir, Mr. Andrews and myself. Then after Mr. Friedman's arrival, Mr. Friedman, Mr. Andrews and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. The invitation came from Andrews and not your friend?

Mrs. WIDENER. Let's put it this way: Mr. Andrews telephoned me and I spoke to him on the telephone.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you gather they were trying to get you to do something for them? Was that the purpose of this visit?

Mrs. WIDENER. I didn't gather anything. I was simply—I went home alone. It was 2 o'clock in the morning. I am not accustomed to going home unaccompanied at that hour. I left.

Senator FERGUSON. What could you have done to help them in any manner? I am not clear as to the reason they would invite you and carry on this conversation. I can see part of the conversation, that part about his being late and he gave you that, and that started this

conversation; but he carried it on into China and how he got discharged and all.

Mrs. WIDENER. I suppose, Senator—I don't like to suppose——

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want you to suppose. I am trying to get a reason.

Mrs. WIDENER. I have a certain record as a professional writer. As a person during the war I had a radio show called Women of the World. It won a citation of merit from the Radio Institute of America for the promotion of international understanding in the women's field. I had a certain reputation. I think it was natural that anyone interested in politics might discuss them with me, especially foreign politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Particularly anyone who was desirous of carrying out propaganda would have a source through you to get certain propaganda carried out; is that correct?

Mrs. WIDENER. That would be a possible source.

Senator FERGUSON. If you took up their cause?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they in any way ask you to take up this cause of communism?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the cause for this worker that had been discharged?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir. Most of the conversation that took place was between Mr. Friedman and me after Mr. Friedman's arrival.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say your success with your radio show Women of the World marked you in circles familiar with that production as a liberal?

Mrs. WIDENER. I think, Mr. Sourwine, perhaps the fairest way to answer is to say I think if anyone is in professional activity and field of public information they speak out in public. They say what they think out in public and the public, the press, and the critics judge them.

I had had favorable press notices and favorable comment. I feel that I would have—in general, people like to discuss politics with you or any professional activity if you are in that field. I was in that field.

The CHAIRMAN. The query naturally arises, as has been evinced by the questions of Senator Ferguson, and it is in my mind, as to why would one in Mr. Friedman's position open up the whole subject to you without first having known what your turn of mind was on that subject. In other words, he disclosed to you his communistic leanings and his communistic attitude, according to your statement, without having first determined, so far as we know now, what your turn of mind was.

Mrs. WIDENER. I would like to say this: I think Mr. Andrews on several occasions had made very complimentary remarks about whatever qualities I possessed. Mr. Friedman knew when I met him, or seemed to know, that I was a professional writer and commentator, a speaker. I don't think my work was of national importance or of such prominence that everybody would know about me.

Mr. MORRIS. Clark Andrews met you on numerous occasions?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes. He knew all about my activity.

Mr. MORRIS. You had seen him on very many occasions?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were introduced to Mr. Friedman by Mr. Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Everything he indicated was that he had discussed you prior to your meeting?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes. Mr. Friedman, the first thing he did was apologize for his being late, apologize to me.

Mr. MORRIS. He knew you were going to be present when he arrived?

Mrs. WIDENER. I assume if he apologized to me for being late that he must have expected to meet me.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your profession discussed?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; oh yes; certainly, in the course of normal conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did this conversation take with Friedman? You say you left about 2 o'clock.

Mrs. WIDENER. My best recollection is that Mr. Friedman arrived about 11 o'clock or shortly thereafter, 11 o'clock at night. And I know that I left close to 2 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, in the course of the 1-hour conversation with Mr. Andrews and the 3-hour conversation with Mr. Friedman, did Mr. Andrews tell you that Friedman was a Communist?

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Andrews said to me: "Confidentially, I want you to know that this man is one of the top brains in the Communist Party."

Mr. MORRIS. Then subsequently did Mr. Friedman acknowledge he was a Communist?

Mrs. WIDENER. When he said, "our party" and said the social worker or social-service worker was a Communist "in our party," and when he spoke of "our cause in China" and said "Naturally, I would not do anything to hurt our cause, the Chinese Communist cause," it was obvious.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you report this conversation to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. WIDENER. I did after making an inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. What inquiry did you make?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment before she answers.

Some time back the witness asked to be permitted to continue and Senator Ferguson, Senator Eastland, and I think myself broke in on what you wanted to continue with. Do you have something that you want to bring out there? There was an interruption.

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me.

Mrs. WIDENER. Thank you.

The following morning after that conversation I received a telephone call from Mr. Andrews who said that "Well, we certainly took you for a ride last night. You really fell for a practical joke."

I said, "Maybe it was and maybe it wasn't, but I would like to tell you this: I am going to make every effort and do my level best to find out if it was or it wasn't." I did make that effort.

I knew a presswoman in the United States Mission to the United Nation. Her name is Sarah Hodgekinson.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell that?

Mrs. WIDENER. H-o-d-g—I am not sure whether there is an “e”—k-i-n-s-o-n.

I telephoned Miss Hodgekinson and said that I would like to come and see her. I went down to the United States Mission to the U. N. and saw her. I said, “If I am not imposing on you, I would like to ask you if you can get some information for me. I would like to know if there was a Julian Friedman in the employ of the State Department in China.”

She said, “That is not hard to find out and I will be glad to do so.” So she excused herself and came back and said, “Yes, there was.” I said, “Well, then, may I ask you could you get me more information about Mr. Friedman? And she said, “Well, I can try. What would you like to know?” I said, “Can you find out for me if he is a graduate of Harvard University and if he graduated with honors.”

She said, “You know, we have a direct line to Washington here and I will go in and ask the Department if I can use it, and I will try to find out for you.” So I waited for, I guess, 20 minutes or half an hour. She came back and said, “I have checked on it for you. Yes, Mr. Friedman did graduate from Harvard and he graduated with high honors.”

Then I said “Could I ask you to find out one more thing for me if I am not intruding or embarrassing you in any way?” She said, “No; not at all. It is all a matter of record.” I said, “Would you find out if Mr. Friedman was dismissed without prejudice?”

She again left the room and came back and said “Mr. Friedman was dismissed without prejudice.” She said, “Why do you want to know all this?” I said, “Because I had a long conversation with Mr. Friedman last night and it disturbed me very much.” I said, “Do you know anything about an arbitration case taking place before James Fly?” She said, “No; I don’t know.” I said, “Well, I would like to find out.”

I phoned a reporter that I knew and he was out. She said, “Why don’t call—” I forget what name, the name of a reporter she knew. She said, “I will get him on the phone and find out.” She did get her friend on the phone. He said, “Yes, there was a case before Mr. James Fly and it was being heard and it was a question of a dismissed worker.”

Then I told Miss Hodgekinson about the conversation I had with Mr. Friedman. In the meantime the newspaper reporter had said that the World-Telegram newspaper had been following this case very closely, the New York World-Telegram. Sarah Hodgekinson said to me, “Well, if it has to do with a Communist problem, Mr. Frederick Woltman on the New York Telegram knows a great deal about the Communist activities, and why don’t you call him?” I said that I had never met Mr. Woltman but I said I would. She said, “You can call him up and say I said to call him,” which I did.

I asked Mr. Woltman was there such a case as had been described to you and did he know if a Mr. Julian Friedman was appearing in the case. He said “Not on the record but off the record he is; not on the scene, off the scene.” I felt that verified the information that had been given to me. I reported it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, is it your testimony that at the termination of your session with Julian Friedman you told him you felt free to report the incident to the necessary authorities.

Mrs. WIDENER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that the next day you corroborated certain parts of the story told to you by Mr. Friedman in order to determine whether or not he was telling you those things in jest?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In making those efforts to verify details of the story, did you find that in fact those things he told you the night before were indeed true?

Mrs. WIDENER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you as a matter of fact report the incident to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember how long after this incident you made the report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, approximately?

Mrs. WIDENER. The morning I went down to the United States Mission to the United Nations and saw Sarah—

The CHAIRMAN. That was the morning after?

Mrs. WIDENER. That was the morning after. In the afternoon I spoke to Mr. Woltman.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom?

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Woltman on the New York World-Telegram. I believe it was that afternoon or the next morning I reported it to the authorities.

The CHAIRMAN. You reported it where, to the Washington office of the FBI or to the FBI representative in New York?

Mrs. WIDENER. To the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I recommend that we request of the State Department the report by Julian Friedman referred to by Mrs. Widener in her testimony on the Communist Chinese labor movement?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly write that out so that I can make the request?

Mr. MORRIS. I have it here. It is in regard to the Chinese Communist labor movement, and I will use the exact wording in the testimony by Friedman.

Mrs. Widener has testified Friedman told her he wrote such a report and described the report.

The CHAIRMAN. That request will be made at once.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that you request also further information about his discharge, what they meant by without prejudice, the facts surrounding his dismissal.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, while you were working with the Voice of America did you encounter any publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations in any way?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe whatever you did encounter?

Mrs. WIDENER. I think I must have a record of the date. I was given an assignment to write a script for the Voice of America covering confidential material that was sent by our Embassy in Moscow back to the United States. The report was written by, if my memory serves me correctly, Mr. John Stines. It covered conditions for women—I only wrote about the women's field, of course, for the Voice of America—it covered conditions for women in central and southeast Asiatic

parts of the Soviet Union. Mr. Stines' report covered in a very thorough way the deplorable or what he considered the deplorable conditions for women there, the fact they were being forced into heavy industry, into labor in pig iron production and heavy production destined for, I suppose, such things as armaments and so on.

The report was given to me to cover for a script for the Voice. I took it home. It was given to me to take home. When I studied it, I felt I needed a great deal of research material to write an effective script for it. So I went back to the Voice and I put in a request to the editor-in-chief if he could suggest good sources of research material. He said to me that the Foreign Affairs Publication section of the State Department had issued a very excellent bulletin on these deplorable conditions in the Asiatic regions of the Soviet Union and he would give that to me to study. No one at the Voice could find it. I waited a long time and though all other copies were in order in the files, this particular copy was missing. I waited quite a while, while they looked it up. Then the editor-in-chief said he would send me over to the research library of the Voice of America, which is about a block and a half away from the building in which I work. I did go over there. I was given a book issued under the sponsorship of the Institute of Pacific Affairs as research material for this script.

MR. SOURWINE. You mean the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MRS. WIDENER. Yes. I am sorry, Institute of Pacific Relations.

When I took the book home and I started to try to do my research, really, I am sorry, I just burst out laughing, because it was diametrically opposite Mr. Stines' report. The research in this book was diametrically opposed to everything in Mr. Stines' report.

SENATOR FERGUSON. What was the name of it?

MRS. WIDENER. Let me see. Either the Central Southeastern Soviet Russia—let me think—or Middle Eastern. I just can't quote the title to you. I know the author.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Who was it?

MRS. WIDENER. William Mandel. When I opened the book I was very much interested to see the Office of War Information was in it. When I noticed that I thought I would get some really good material for my script. But I couldn't use it. It was my belief and feeling that the book was largely Communist propaganda. At least if Mr. Stines' report and other material that I had studied on the subject consistently is accurate, then this book is inaccurate. It paints conditions there in those regions of the Soviet Union as a kind of paradise.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that we have introduced into the record evidence that Mr. William Mandel is a member of the Communist Party, in addition to the fact that we did show some connection of his with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I mention that to show the fact this is germane testimony.

Was that the end of that episode, Mrs. Widener?

MRS. WIDENER. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have taken, in executive session, testimony by an adviser of the Free China Labor League who spent some time on Formosa and in Shanghai. This gentleman is now currently in Europe. We have the choice today of either taking his executive session testimony and introducing it into the public record, or we can wait until he returns from Europe and he will give the

testimony in person. I think it is a decision that should be made by the chairman and the committee, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. He was sworn. The testimony was taken in regular executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was present? What Senators were present and where was it taken?

Mr. MORRIS. It was taken in executive session here in Washington. I know Senator Ferguson was present because it took place in the Senator's room. I think Senator Eastland was also present, but the transcript will show it.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness is now in Europe?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We summoned him to be here today. His wife notified us last week he could not be present for he is in Europe for a period of about 2 months. We have the decision of deciding whether or not we should use his executive session testimony and make it public, or wait until he returns from Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be the view of the Chair that we would defer until we can have the witness present, but that view of the Chair will be governed by the will of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. I would say normally that should be the program. I do not think we should delay the hearings because of the present condition when this could be made public.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I will take that up in committee in executive session at a later date as to what the decision will be. If it is necessary, we can use the executive testimony. I would prefer to have the witness appear and testify in open session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, for security purposes I feel we should not give his name, but this is the executive session taken Friday, July 6, 1951, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. That will be taken up by the committee in executive session and we will come to a conclusion on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here some evidence by Mr. Mandel which would corroborate the episode related by Mrs. Widener in connection with Mr. William Mandel's book.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a little pamphlet entitled "IPR books, 1950-51, Institute of Pacific Relations." It lists new and forthcoming publications on the Far East and the Pacific area. On page 24 of this list we find The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, by William Mandel, inquiry series. This is the book we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that title "The Soviet Far East" refresh your memory any?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, it does. Could I see the book?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Please see whether you can identify that as the book.

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; this is the book that was given to me.

I would, if I may, like to call attention to something that struck me when I looked at the book. It has a foreword. I read the foreword. It was the first thing I read. Before I had read any of the book, it struck me that the foreword is, well, it is double talk.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at this point I think the entire foreword should be made a part of the record and then the witness can comment on it if she likes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

THE SOVIET FAR EAST

(By William Mandel)

FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute.

The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process of revision.

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the view of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author.

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. I. W. Daffoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following advisers: Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia; Dr. J. B. Condliffe, of the University of California; M. Etienne Dennerly, of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship. Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the advisers and although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the inquiry.

The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area. To this end, the analysis will include an account of the economic and political conditions which produced the situation existing in July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan, and to the other foreign powers concerned; an evaluation of developments during the war period which appear to indicate important trends in the policies and programs of all the powers in relation to the far eastern situation; and finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic, and social conditions which may be expected in a postwar period, the possible forms of adjustment which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjustments upon the countries concerned.

The inquiry does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with the far eastern situation. Its aim is to focus available information on the present crisis in forms which will be useful to those who lack either the time or the expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing or already published in a number of languages.

The present study, "The Soviet Far East," falls within the framework of the first of the four general groups of studies which it is proposed to make as follows:

I. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of the policies of western powers in the Far East; their territorial and economic interests; the effects on their far-eastern policies of internal economic and political developments and of developments in their foreign policies vis-à-vis other parts of the world; the probable effects of the present conflict on their positions in the Far East; their changing attitudes and policies with respect to their future relations in that area.

II. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Japanese foreign policy and possible important future developments; the extent to which Japan's policy toward China has been influenced by Japan's geographic conditions and material resources, by special features in the political and economic organization of Japan which directly or indirectly affect the formulation of her present foreign policy, by economic and political developments in China, by the external policies of other powers affecting Japan; the principal political, economic, and social factors which may be expected in a postwar Japan; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of Japan's fundamental problems.

III. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Chinese foreign policy and possible important future developments; Chinese unification and reconstruction, 1931-37, and steps leading toward the policy of united national resistance to Japan; the present degree of political cohesion and economic strength; effects of resistance and current developments on the position of foreign interests in China and changes in China's relations with foreign powers; the principal political, economic, and social factors which may be expected in a postwar China; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of China's fundamental problems.

IV. Possible methods for the adjustment of specific problems, in the light of information and suggestions presented in the three studies outlined above; analysis of previous attempts at bilateral or multilateral adjustments of political and economic relations in the Pacific and causes of their success or failure; types of administrative procedures and controls already tried out and their relative effectiveness; the major issues likely to require international adjustment in a postwar period and the most helpful methods which might be devised to meet them; necessary adjustments by the powers concerned; the basic requirements of a practical system of international organization which could promote the security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area.

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Secretary General*.

Mrs. WIDENER (reading):

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

I took that to mean that the Institute of Pacific Relations sponsors this book. I think anybody would. [Continues reading:]

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute.

The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process of revision.

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author.

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In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East, the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following advisers—

May I say that I take the word "institute" here to mean the Institute of Pacific Relations, and it seems to me that this foreword—"so far as we are publishing it, but we are not responsible for it"—is double talk. I mean, to a professional writer it is. It seems to me that way, anyway. [Continues reading:]

Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia; Dr. J. B. Condliffe, of the University of California; M. Etienne Dennerly, of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general—

I take that to be the chairman and the secretary-general of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. What else would you take it?

Mrs. WIDENER (continues reading):

in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship.

Now, it seems to me before they said they were not responsible for the opinions expressed in this book. Here they are guaranteeing its impartiality.

Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the advisers; and, although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the inquiry.

The inquiry is being conducted, I understand, by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The more I read this foreword, frankly—I did feel like Alice in Wonderland.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that that book was given to you as a guide in your writing?

Mrs. WIDENER. Oh, yes, sir. This was given to me as research material. It was the only material given to me.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom was it given to you?

Mrs. WIDENER. By the research library of the Voice of America.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you think of an individual in there?

Mrs. WIDENER. I don't know the name of the librarian who gave it to me, but I do know it was given to me. [Continues reading:]

Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East.

Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of the IPR conferences, and then it goes on. Then it says it does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with the Far East situation. Then it goes on to guarantee that these are the contingencies. Anybody can read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out again we have had testimony before this committee that Mr. William Mandel, the author of that volume, was a member of the Communist Party. This episode is brought forth at this time, Mr. Chairman, simply as one episode that this particular witness is able to testify to and is offered for that purpose.

Mrs. WIDENER. May I say something?

Mr. MORRIS. If it is pertinent; yes.

Mrs. WIDENER. If you will permit me, I would like to make a suggestion here. I think this kind of thing is typical of the plight of the serious researcher and student and would-be accurate writer and re-

porter. I feel that if a book such as this exists in a Government library, for research purposes, a book which is I do not believe impartial, that somehow or other that book should be labeled so that the researcher who is writing for the Voice of America, or any other agency of the United States Government, knows when they are picking a book up such as this that this is in truth not an impartial factual document, or at least it is not when compared with the Government's own information.

I have no way of judging any of this information, except by what was given to me, but I do know what was given to me by the State Department on this subject which was in direct refutation of what is in this book.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then you feel, when the Government has in its library of research for the Voice of America a book and they present that book to a person to get out a script for the Voice, they in a way sponsor the accuracy of the information in the research book?

Mrs. WIDENER. I should think that the book in the research library would be classified as Communist propaganda or else Marxian-Socialist views, or Lenin-Stalin views. So, when you pick it up and read it, you know what you have. These are very complex, difficult matters covered in this book. If I had not been given special information by an expert, written by an expert in our own Embassy, how could I have any knowledge of the existing conditions in the central Asiatic part of the Soviet Union?

Senator FERGUSON. You could have accepted it as being the truth and the facts and given it on the air in your script.

Mrs. WIDENER. I could have accepted this book if I had not had any other information. If I had received an assignment and was given by my own Government this book to write about, which I was, it seems to me I would have accepted this as material suitable.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at the Friday session we introduced documents showing Mr. Julian Friedman was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I think Mr. Mandel has one more contribution to make to that list.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an issue of the Spotlight on the Far East, published monthly by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General. This is the issue of April 1947. On page 5 we find an article under the heading "Guest Column," by Julian Friedman, entitled "China's Unions Refuse to be Puppets." Under his name it says [reading]:

For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attaché in China. He became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks with authority on the Chinese labor movement.

I would like to put the article, which is brief, into the record and just quote a portion of it by way of example.

The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutely opposed to trade-unionism because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade-unionists are certainly opposed to the present antilabor National Government—and so on in the same strain.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this whole column introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

This is a column that Julian Friedman wrote for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been termed "a subversive organization" by the Attorney General.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is at least a column which appeared in that publication under his name.

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I see there is a photograph. Is that a photograph of Friedman? Maybe the witness can identify it as being the person she spoke to on the night she has been talking about.

Mrs. WIDENER. It resembles; I wouldn't say positively.

Mr. MORRIS. Let the record show it is a very small photograph, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. The photograph shows head and shoulders and the entire photograph is less than an inch square, and it is square.

Mrs. WIDENER. It resembles the person, but I wouldn't say positively it was the person.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that exhibit made part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 246" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 246

[From the Spotlight on the Far East, vol. II, No. 4, published monthly by the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, N. Y., April 1947]

GUEST COLUMN

CHINA'S UNIONS REFUSE TO BE PUPPETS

(By Julian Friedman)

[Photograph]

For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attaché in China. He became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks with authority on the Chinese labor movement.

Genuine trade-unionists are not easy to find in Kuomintang China. To reach them, you have to visit obscure, innocent-looking alleys or out-of-the-way fields in the suburbs of the cities.

But it is most dangerous for them to be known as trade-unionists or to work openly for real trade-unionism.

The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutely opposed to trade-unionism because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade-unionists are certainly opposed to the present anti-labor National Government.

Many were originally either company-union or Kuomintang headquarters appointees. There were also secret-society agents and gangsters in labor roles. The latter are quickly exposed today by the workers themselves.

As for the company-union and bureaucratic-union officials, the workers have given them every opportunity to work for the real trade-union movement. So, they now face this dilemma: serve as Kuomintang stooges and 'finks' and lose support among the workers or fight with the workers and be attacked by the Fascists.

That several have chosen the latter course has enraged the National Government and Kuomintang, which has retaliated with arrest, threats of violence, expulsion from official labor circles, purging of official unions, and reorganizing them.

Nothing illustrates the change in labor so aptly as the Shanghai anti-civil-war demonstration of June 23, 1946. On the day before, the Government had called official trade-union representatives to a meeting and dictated resolutions which said that no workers or unions would participate in the demonstration, and that any persons in the demonstration could not be considered workers. The resolutions were "unanimously adopted" because the Government chairman said so, with no one else given a chance to speak. But more than 100,000 workers

turned out the next day. And the representatives who had "passed" the resolutions the previous day marched at their head.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you wish the committee to meet again?

Mr. MORRIS. Tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, Mr. Chairman. We will have General Wedemeyer as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee stands in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11. 15 a. m. Tuesday, September 18, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Wednesday, September 19, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

General Wedemeyer, will you stand and be sworn, please?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WEDEMEYER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER, (RETIRED),
AVCO, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

General WEDEMEYER. A. C. Wedemeyer, AVCO, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

General WEDEMEYER. I am vice president and a member of the board of directors of AVCO.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell the committee what service commands you have held in the American Army with respect to the China theater.

General WEDEMEYER. I was designated theater commander and chief of staff to the Generalissimo in the fall of 1944 when General Stilwell was relieved from those two posts.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position?

General WEDEMEYER. Approximately 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be, then, until the fall of 1946?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next command then, General?

General WEDEMEYER. I commanded the Second Army with headquarters in Baltimore.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the end of your China command?

General WEDEMAYER. That is correct. I went out to China again in 1947 for 2 months.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the purpose of that trip, General?

General WEDEMAYER. I was sent out there as an envoy of the President to make a survey of conditions in China and Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write a report as a result of that survey?

General WEDEMAYER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the report which is now referred to as the Wedemeyer report on China?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, when you assumed command of the China theater what civilian members were there on duty at that time? This is now in the fall of 1944.

General WEDEMAYER. What civilian members were on duty on my staff?

Mr. MORRIS. On your staff.

General WEDEMAYER. I had four political advisers who had been serving in that capacity on General Stilwell's staff. They included Mr. Jack Service, Mr. John Davies, Mr. Raymond Ludden, and Mr. John Emmerson.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did they remain as political advisers to your command after your arrival?

General WEDEMAYER. Only a few months.

Mr. MORRIS. General, during that period of time were you able to form an opinion of the various political reports that they submitted at that time?

General WEDEMAYER. My analysis of the reports submitted by those gentlemen could not properly be called an intelligent or thoroughgoing analysis, and this is the reason: In my judgment, if I had it to do over again, I would have more carefully analyzed those reports, but at that time, that is, at the time I assumed command of the theater, the Japanese were pushing us around and it looked for a while as if I were going to have difficulty remaining there and to retain China in the war. I had two areas of strategic importance—Kunming and Chungking. Kunming was the terminal of my principal base of supply. All of my supplies, as you gentlemen know, came over the "hump" by air. We were cut off from the outside world except by air, so if I lost that, China might be put out of the war.

The other area of importance was the seat of the wartime government in Chungking. If I lost that, psychologically and militarily China again might be out. So I was hard put to it to retain my situation there, to stabilize the military situation, with the result that I neglected the political, diplomatic, or psychological factors which I properly should have taken heed of and taken appropriate steps.

These four men who were political advisers, two or three of them I had known previously. I had met them socially over in India when I was serving there with Lord Louis Mountbatten.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they?

General WEDEMAYER. I met John Davies, John Emmerson, and Jack Service. I had not met, prior to my assuming command in China, Raymond Ludden.

Mr. MORRIS. General, did the recommendations of these four political officers coincide with American policy at that time?

General WEDEMAYER. At that time the American policy, as I interpreted it, was to keep China in the war and to support the Chinese Nationalist Government. There were no clear-cut American policies enunciated, insofar as I can recall, pertaining to China or any other area of the world. Theater commanders in remote areas had oftentimes to interpret or try to conjecture what was desired in a broad sense, what was desired to accomplish what the Government wanted. However, I felt that my job in China was to continue China in the war, to contain as many Japanese in that area fighting so that they could not be removed from the area and sent over to oppose General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific. As I stated, also to support the Chinese Nationalist Government which our own Government recognized as the sovereign government in that area.

So everything that I did militarily or otherwise was in consonance with that interpretation of American policy in China. If I had followed the advice of these four advisers, some of the advice that they embodied in these reports, in my judgment I would not have been carrying out my directive, nor would I have been following the policy of my country in that particular area.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "the policy," are you speaking about the policy as laid down by the military or by the State Department, or was there a difference?

General WEDEMAYER. Senator Ferguson, I made a real effort back in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943 to determine American policy or policies insofar as our own country was concerned which were not clearly enunciated. Most of them were found in the Constitution, the bill of rights, and so forth, but our policies pertaining to other areas of the world were never, in my judgment, clearly enunciated. That goes right up to today. I don't think many people in our country know what we are striving to do in the Far East, in the Middle East, or in Western Europe today. The objectives established are too nebulous and, in my judgment, until we do have clearly enunciated policies by the appropriate authorities, not by the military but by civilian authorities, as is contemplated in our Constitution, we are going to have a difficult time in accomplishing what I think the American people believe to be our national objectives.

I said all of that because oftentimes as a theater commander I had to take action in the absence of clearly enunciated policy. I had to take action that inevitably created policy. Then if that action that I took had been wrong or had been subject to criticism on the part of our people, I would have been to blame. The military is assuming responsibility that they should not. But if the policy happened to be in consonance with the views of the American people, then the military would not be criticized. I just mention that because I think it is a vacuum that must be filled.

Senator EASTLAND. What was the policy that your political advisers put forth? What was their advice to you?

General WEDEMAYER. Sometimes it is quite implicit, Senator. Other times it is veiled, but the idea was to give more support to the Communist forces in lieu of the Nationalist forces. These reports would play up the shortcomings, the maladministration and the unscrupulousness of Nationalist leaders, play up the orderliness or the potentialities of the Communist forces in Yunnan.

I could not support the Communists' political party and still carry out what I believed to be the American policy in the area.

Senator EASTLAND. Those policies were pro-Communist, were they not?

General WEDEMAYER. I would not state that categorically, sir. I remember a newspaperman out there whom I thought was an out-and-out Communist. The reason I thought so, after considering it more carefully, I was sure that he was so critical of the Nationalists. There was much to be criticized in the Nationalist set-up. There was maladministration and there were dishonesties.

Senator EASTLAND. That was true with regard to the Communists, too, was it not?

General WEDEMAYER. No, sir. It was a smaller set-up. The opportunities were not quite there.

Senator FERGUSON. The Communists were not in power and did not have the opportunity?

General WEDEMAYER. That is right, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. If the Communists had the opportunity—

General WEDEMAYER. They would act just the same way; yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Knowing that these advisers favored the Communists over the Nationalists?

General WEDEMAYER. That is implicit in these reports, if you will read them over.

Mr. MORRIS. Were these reports critical of the Nationalist Government that you were there to defend and uphold?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like, if it is possible, for the general to designate which, if any, of the four people he has named rendered the reports that he makes mention of, the four advisers who were on his staff.

General WEDEMAYER. Actually, Senator, I do not recall ever receiving a written report from Mr. John Emmerson. The other three did submit written and oral reports to me. I stated clearly, sir, that I did not give them the attention that I properly should have, but I was involved in a military situation.

Mr. MORRIS. General, to whom were these reports made? I mean these reports that we are discussing.

General WEDEMAYER. They were submitted to me as theater commander.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they submitted through the State Department representative in China? They were State Department employees, were they not?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir. They were all Foreign Service officers, professionals.

Mr. MORRIS. Do they report to you through the ranking State Department representative in China?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes. When I assumed command of the theater, Mr. John Davies—I believe he was the senior one of the group—reported to me, indicated what they had been doing for General Stilwell, and expressed the desire to cooperate and to assist me in every way possible. All of them spoke Chinese. They were all Chinese language students. I think two of them were born out there, the sons of missionaries.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, may I refer you to the first report that is on that list of papers there in front of you on the table and that you will see is a report made by John S. Service. It is one of the reports that we are discussing.

Mr. Chairman, I am now referring to Report No. 40 from the United States Army Observer Section, APO 879. This is a report from John S. Service to General Stilwell, commanding general, USAF-CBI. It is dated October 10, 1944.

Are you acquainted with that memorandum, General?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. It was not submitted to me, of course, but when I assumed the command of the theater in order to get background for my duties, I read every document I could possibly get hold of in my headquarters. This document I definitely read at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything outstanding in that memorandum that made an impression on you in the past?

General WEDEMEYER. When I read it over I just recalled being impressed with the writer's criticism of the Chinese Nationalist Government. There were criticisms emphasized throughout the paper. When I took command of the theater, I found the American military were criticizing the Chinese military and the relations were not good. It was not a happy situation. I recall vividly visiting the Chinese headquarters to obtain from the Chinese generals a résumé of the situation as it existed at that time. I went over there with my chief of staff, a general named Hern. I was astounded at the attitude of the Chinese. They were correctly polite, but I did not get any information from them. I decided either they did not have any information or there was an intolerable situation that just couldn't continue.

So I suggested to the generalissimo that we set up a combined staff. I would sit at the head of this table and next to me would be the head of the Chinese Army. On my right would be one of my staff officers, say my Intelligence officer; and sitting next to him would be the Chinese Intelligence officer. That worked beautifully. At first the Chinese were not very cooperative. They were very quiet. When the war was over they gave a party for my staff officers, indicating that marvelous relationship had developed. That just was a thing because it permeated the field where we got better cooperation between the military Chinese and American.

I mention that because when I got over there there was no cooperation and there was mistrust and suspicion prevailing in the theater. These reports on the civilian side just played up that same philosophy that pervaded in the theater.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may we get back to this report? Is there anything outstanding in that particular report that you would care to comment on at this time?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment the military capabilities of the Communist forces in Yunnan were not great, were invariably over-emphasized in this and other reports submitted to me by these political advisers.

I think I am qualified to speak knowingly on that subject, because I am a trained military man and those men were not. On the political, economic, and diplomatic side I would feel inclined to yield to their views and opinions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in this particular report there is certain underscoring. I think it would be appropriate if Mr. Mandel were to read the underscored portions of this report and we can have particular questions addressed to General Wedemeyer concerning the views expressed therein.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the party was never lower, and Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.

The CHAIRMAN. I think before that question is discussed by the general you had better lay a foundation. Whose report is this? From where does it emanate?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a report of John S. Service dated October 10, 1944, and it is submitted to General Stilwell, commanding general, USAF-CBI, on that date.

As testimony has brought forth, General Stilwell was the predecessor of General Wedemeyer. This letter came to the attention of General Wedemeyer when he assumed command in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, the underscored matter is drawn to your attention. Do you wish to discuss it?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that particular aspect of the Service report?

General WEDEMEYER. From the American viewpoint as expressed to me by practically everyone with whom I came in contact, that statement might be said to epitomize the entire American viewpoint toward Chiang Kai-shek and his government when I arrived in the theater in October 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "the entire American viewpoint," just what do you encompass by that expression?

General WEDEMEYER. Mr. Chairman, practically everyone with whom I spoke felt that there was nothing that could be done constructively to keep China fighting in the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is those with whom you spoke in that theater?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. And Mr. Wallace was out there, the then Vice President. He stated that nothing but a miracle could keep China fighting in the war. He was quoted in the papers saying that.

That was the pessimistic view uniformly expressed to me when I went over there to assume command by military and by civilians with whom I came in contact.

Senator FERGUSON. General Wedemeyer, I wonder whether this was in line with what you thought to be the policy [reading]:

Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line.

He was the head, was he not, at that time of the Nationalist Government?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, he was.

Senator FERGUSON. How could that be in line with your idea of the policy of the United States in China, that sentence?

General WEDEMEYER. It was not, Senator. I state categorically these reports were not in consonance with my interpretation of my directive

or of American policy. That contravenes American policy as I understand it, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the second underscored passage?

Mr. MANDEL (reading) :

In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American support for survival. But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.

Then, skipping down—

We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for continued power.

General WEDEMEYER. My comment on that is this: The Communist Party in the U. S. S. R. was dependent upon America for support during the war. We gave plenty of it to the U. S. S. R., much more than we ever gave to China. A statement like that is just inane, in my judgment.

Mr. MORRIS. Did we need the Chinese Government in the war, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. We needed it just as much as we needed the U. S. S. R. Any diversion of the Japanese effort that could be accomplished, it was sound to do so. The Chinese were containing in their fighting with the Japanese a million and a half Japanese that might have been deployed against our boys coming up through the Philippine Archipelago and through the Ryukyus.

So the fact that the Chinese fighting, not as well as we would like them to have fought, but doing increasingly better as the war went on, they contained one million and a half Japanese which I think was creditable and under the circumstances, a very great contribution.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony we did need the Chinese Government at that time to that extent?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; just as today we need Franco, anyone that will help us in this struggle against communism. We may not approve of everything they do. We may not go along with their governmental structure, but if they can help us in our struggle, I say use them. We needed them then.

Mr. MORRIS. On the basis of your entire experience in China would you say that the situation as described to you by the political officers was erroneous in this respect?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment they were erroneous.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were able to make use of the Chinese Nationalist forces?

General WEDEMEYER. If I had followed the advice I would not have been carrying out my orders.

Senator FERGUSON. General Wedemeyer, isn't the way this would read and what you have said make it apparent that if you had followed the political advice you would have tried to take the Communist Government in China as lining up with the United States and have nothing to do with the Nationalists?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think that is a fair statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Their advice was to recognize in effect the Communist Government in China; whereas, you felt as we were then recognizing the Nationalists that that was the Government that you were to

support and to get the Nationalists' aid in your efforts in China; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. I think that is a fair statement. The Chinese Communists offered me command of their army and I notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff back in America. I, through the Ambassador, also notified the President that I did not want command of the army. At that time I recognized the implications of communism in the Far East as I did in Europe. I did not want to support people whom I knew were operating under the aegis of the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that the best interests of America would be served if the Nationalists were recognized?

General WEDEMEYER. Not only for America but for the world, for the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read further?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that paragraph, please, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. Here I am commenting on China in regard to experts' political views. It makes me rather vulnerable. But in my experience, which is only 5 years in China, or over 4 years, I found that most of the Chinese cannot read or write. They do not understand a thing about political philosophies, political structures, and economic structures. They mean nothing to them. They want shelter, food, and peace.

When he talks, when this man writes about other parties, there are not other parties over there worthy of the name. There was no other leadership through which I could work, except Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand, and on the other Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist leader. They were quite well organized, these Communists, and very articulate, much more so than Chiang Kai-shek, and very intolerant of criticism which Chiang was not. He did permit people to criticize him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Chinese Communists help you in your confining the Japanese on the mainland?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. I did make the effort to coordinate our military operations over there. They were operating in sporadic efforts to the north of wartime capital up in the Yunnan area and Shansi Province. They never launched a concerted attack in coordination with those attacks that I was putting on down below.

Now I should say in fairness to those people when my fliers would be shot down behind the Japanese lines, frequently the Chinese Communists would facilitate the return of those fliers. I don't want to overemphasize that point because I don't want it to be given disproportionate emphasis. But that is true. At times they did do that.

But their military operations did not make the contribution so often one reads in the press or hears about on the radio. The military operations of the Chinese Communists, at least while I was in command of the theater, were not significant.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that on the basis of fact you were the theater commander?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General, I call particularly your attention to the next sentence in the paragraph that Mr. Mandel has just read:

Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.

Would you comment on that?

General WEDEMAYER. As I stated, there were only two broad political parties, one the Communists and one the Kuomintang. The splinter parties were absolutely impotent. There were not enough people involved. If we threw over the Kuomintang, it meant we were going to assume support and cooperate with the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that then have been true, namely, that under any other than the present reactionary control, to use Mr. Service's words, the Communists would have been more cooperative?

General WEDEMAYER. The Communists, in my judgment—and I have tried to be objective, I have tried to find good in Marxist theories—the Communists will cooperate when the advantage accrues to them. At no time will a Communist cooperate otherwise. That was applicable then and it is applicable now. We are naive if we think otherwise.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue reading, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the country, now and after the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMAYER. Again I do not know what other groups he is talking about. You had the professors—

Mr. MORRIS. Certainly the Communists were one of those groups.

General WEDEMAYER. They were the major group. There were only two major groups there. There were splinter parties made up of a few of the intelligentsia and they were not significant. They had no power. They were not articulate, so I think you can disregard them.

Mr. MORRIS. As a matter of fact, General, the Chinese Communists have not proved to be friendly to the United States and they have not looked to us for the salvation of their country then or after the war; is that correct?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes. The Chinese Communists have no friendly attitude toward anyone, in my judgment, except the Kremlin. They certainly have no friendly attitudes or friendly intentions toward countries that they call capitalistic nations. Their objective is to destroy capitalism. Their avowed intention is to destroy capitalism, expressed to me personally.

Mr. MORRIS. General, their performances, particularly during the past year, would seem to be a complete refutation of that statement, would they not, sir?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek

the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's government in London, ignoring Tito.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you comment on that, General?

General WEDEMAYER. I think events that have transpired since we supported Tito have proved us wrong. I think the real patriot over in Yugoslavia, Mikhailovitch, we let down. Personally I think we should have supported him. The same would be true in China. With all his faults, and he does have faults, I think Chiang Kai-shek was the proper leader to support at the time we did. I do not know of another leader today whom we might support and obtain best results in China from other than Chiang Kai-shek. To me today he epitomizes leadership there.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more there, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading) :

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without consideration of the opposition forces—Communist, provincial, and liberal.

We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is an old trick of Chiang's.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that, General?

General WEDEMAYER. It sounds exactly like somebody was writing about the attitude of Stalin when we were worried. Stalin was pressurizing the Allies in World War II to establish a second front. It was always the implicit threat there "If you don't establish a second front, we will make a separate peace with Germany."

I think the same philosophy behind the situation in Russia applied out in China, and this chap points out we should not support Chiang Kai-shek because he is a reactionary. So was Stalin, the worst kind, yet we supported him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading) :

Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit to the Communist capital at Yenan would have significance that no Chinese would miss—least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even if it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more than a mere demonstration; we must, for instance, plan an eventual use of the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMAYER. I think that would be just like foreign representatives coming over here and visiting Bob Taft and ignoring President Truman. The only difference is Senator Bob Taft would not have an armed force to support his political Republican Party.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that would disturb Mr. Truman, do you?

General WEDEMAYER. I did not mean to imply any disparagement of any name I mention.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this document preparatory to its being put in the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This document, listed as No. 40, was taken from the transcript of the proceedings of the Loyalty Security Board meeting in the case of John S. Service as a reprinting of a State Department employee loyalty investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, as such may that be introduced in the record and marked with the next consecutive exhibit number?

The CHAIRMAN. It is to be understood and the record will show that this is the exhibit from which Mr. Mandel has been reading that the excerpts were commented on by the witness; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 247" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 247

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION,
APO 879, October 10, 1944.

Report No. 40

Secret

Subject: The need for greater realism in our relations with Chiang Kai-shek.
To: General Stilwell, Commanding General, USAF-CBI.

1. You have allowed me, as a political officer attached to your staff, to express myself freely in the past regarding the situation in China as I have seen it. Although in Yenan I am only a distant observer of recent developments in Chungking and Washington, I trust that you will permit the continued frankness which I have assumed in the attached memorandum regarding the stronger policy which I think it is now time for us to adopt toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government.

2. It is obvious, of course, that you cannot act independently along the lines suggested. The situation in China and the measures necessary to meet it have both military importance and far-reaching political significance; the two aspects cannot be separated. Because of this interrelation, and because of the high level on which action in China must be taken, there must be agreement and mutual support between our political and military branches. But this will be ineffective without clear decision and forceful implementation by the President.

3. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted, as usual, to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters USAF-CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies.

(Signed) J. S.

(Typed) JOHN S. SERVICE.

Enclosure: Memorandum, as stated.

[First endorsement]

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION,
APO 879, October 16, 1944.

To: Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding United States Army Forces, China, Burma, and India, APO 879.

Approved:

DAVID D. BARRETT,
Colonel, GSC.

MEMORANDUM

Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line.

The Kuomintang government is in crisis. Recent defeats have exposed its military ineffectiveness and will hasten the approaching economic disaster. Passive inability to meet these crises in a constructive way, stubborn unwillingness to submerge selfish power seeking in democratic unity, and the statements of Chiang himself to the People's Political Council and on October 10, 1944, are sufficient evidence of the bankruptcy of Kuomintang leadership.

With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the party was never lower, and Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.

In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American support for survival. *But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.*

We do not need it for military reasons. It has lost the southern air bases and cannot hold any section of the sea coast. Without drastic reforms—which

must have a political base—its armies cannot fight the Japanese effectively no matter how many arms we give them. But it will not permit those reforms because its war against Japan is secondary to its desire to maintain its own undemocratic power.

On the other hand, neither the Kuomintang nor any other Chinese regime, because of the sentiment of the people, can refuse American forces the use of Chinese territory against the Japanese. And the Kuomintang attitude prevents the utilization of other forces, such as the Communist or provincial troops, who should be more useful than the Kuomintang's demoralized armies.

We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for continued power. But our support of the Kuomintang will not stop its normally traitorous relations with the enemy and will only encourage it to continue sowing the seeds of future civil war by plotting with the present puppets for eventual consolidation of the occupied territories against the Communist-led forces of popular resistance.

We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.

Actually, by continued and exclusive support of the Kuomintang, we tend to prevent the reforms and democratic reorganization of the Government which are essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. Encouraged by our support, the Kuomintang will continue in its present course, progressively losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent. Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution of the war, the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own interests by more direct opposition.

We need not support the Kuomintang for international political reasons. The day when it was expedient to inflate Chiang's status to one of the Big Four is past, because with the obvious certainty of defeat, Japan's Pan-Asia propaganda loses its effectiveness. We cannot hope that China under the present Kuomintang can be an effective balance to Soviet Russia, Japan, or the British Empire in the Far East.

On the contrary, artificial inflation of Chiang's status only adds to his unreasonableness. The example of a democratic, nonimperialistic China will be much better counterpropaganda in Asia than the present regime, which, even in books like China's Destiny, hypnotizes itself with ideas of consolidating minority nations (such as Tibet and Mongolia), recovering lost territories (such as the southern peninsula), and protecting the rights and at the same time nationalities of its numerous emigrants (to such areas as Thailand, Malaya, and the East Indies). Finally, the perpetuation in power of the present Kuomintang can only mean a weak and disunited China—a sure cause of international involvements in the Far East. The key to stability must be a strong, unified China. This can be accomplished only on a democratic foundation.

We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the country, now and after the war.

In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American-educated, democratically minded liberals and intellectuals. The Chen brothers, military, and secret police cliques which control the party and are Chiang's main supports are the most Chauvinist elements in the country. The present party ideology, as shown in Chiang's own books China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory, is fundamentally antiforeign and antidemocratic, both politically and economically.

Finally, we need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang. The men he has kept around him have proved selfish and corrupt, incapable, and obstructive. Chiang's own dealings with us have been an opportunist combination of extravagant demands and unfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff, and blackmail. Chiang did not resist Japan until forced by his own people. He has fought only passively—not daring to mobilize his own people. He has sought to have us save him—so that he can continue his conquest of his own country. In the process, he has worked us for all we were worth.

We seem to forget that Chiang is an oriental; that his background and vision are limited; that his position is built on the skill as an extremely adroit political manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes kindness

and flattery for weakness; and that he listens to his own instrument of force rather than reason.

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, *we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled*. Second, *we cannot hope to solve China's problems [which are now our problems] without consideration of the opposition forces—Communist, provincial, and liberal*.

The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's government in Lonon, ignoring Tito.

We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is an old trick of Chiang's.

There may be a collapse of the Kuomintang government, but it will not be the collapse of China's resistance. There may be a period of some confusion but the eventual gains of the Kuomintang's collapse will more than make up for this. The crisis itself makes reform more urgent—and at the same time increases the weight of our influence. *The crisis is the time to push—not to relax*.

We should not let Chiang divert us from the important questions by wasting time in futile discussions as to who is to be American commander. This is an obvious subterfuge.

There is only one man qualified by experience for the job. And the fact is that no one who knows anything about China and is concerned over American rather than Chiang's interests will satisfy Chiang.

We should end the hollow pretense that China is unified and that we can talk only to Chiang. This puts the trump card in Chiang's hands.

Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit to the Communist capital at Yenai would have significance that no Chinese would miss—least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even if it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more than a mere demonstration; we must, for instance, plan on eventual use of the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms.

Finally if these steps do not succeed, we should stop veiling our negotiations with China in complete secrecy. This shields Chiang and is the voluntary abandonment of our strongest weapon.

Chinese public opinion would swing violently against Chiang if he were shown obstructive and noncooperative with the United States. We should not be misled by the relatively very few Kuomintang die-hards; they are not the people. The Kuomintang government could not withstand public belief that the United States was considering withdrawal of military support or recognition of the Kuomintang as the leader of Chinese resistance.

More than ever, we hold all the aces in Chiang's poker game. It is time we start playing them.

(Signed) J. S.

(Typed) JOHN S. SERVICE.

OCTOBER 10, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. I think it would be appropriate at this time if we showed a connection between Mr. Service and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, will you bring something forth on that score, please?

Mr. MANDEL. From the same loyalty board meeting transcript of proceedings, the date being May 27, 1950, I read the following testimony:

Question. Under what circumstances did you give that off-the-record talk at the IPR?

This was a question directed to Mr. Service.

Answer. During the period of consultation at my return in 1944 I was much sought after because I was the first man to get back to Washington after having visited in the Chinese Communist areas since 1939. In addition to all these interrogations by the different agencies, a number of newspapermen were sent to me by the press section of the Department. I was asked to go up to New

York to talk to Mr. Luce. I got approval. I talked to Mr. Hopkins, Mr. White, and various other people. And the IPR asked—

The CHAIRMAN. Will you just explain IPR?

Answer. The Institute of Pacific Relations. May we refer to it as the IPR?

The CHAIRMAN. Afterward, yes.

Answer. The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all right with me.

Question. In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the IPR?

Answer. That is right.

Question. I notice that in your statement you subscribed at that time to a number of magazines dealing with China, one of which was the Far Eastern Survey. What is the character of that?

Answer. The Far Eastern Survey is a biweekly publication put out by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations containing articles written by a very large number of people on subjects related to the Far East generally.

Question. And Pacific Affairs?

Answer. Pacific Affairs is a quarterly published by the International Council of the International Secretariat, I believe. Perhaps—I'm not sure of the exact wording of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Question. You were undoubtedly aware from the press of the charges that the Institute of Pacific Relations was seriously infiltrated by Communists. Do you have any knowledge as to how long that situation has existed, when the IPR first began to be influenced in its publications by Communist thinking?

Answer. No; I do not. Outside of being a subscriber to some of its magazines, I have had no interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have never attended its periodic conferences or participated in its affairs in any way. Certainly it was always thought of in the days referred to here as a most respectable type of organization. I have heard from reading the press that there were some Communists who did occupy positions of some influence in it at one period, but I can't tell you with any definiteness or from personal knowledge when that was or how influential those people were.

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Question. I also notice in your statement that at that time you subscribed to the magazine Amerasia. How could you describe that magazine?

Answer. I subscribed to it just after it was established, I think.

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS—LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: Tuesday, May 30, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12:30 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

* * * * *

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time Document 327, which is a receipt signed by the assistant treasurer of the American Institute of Pacific Relations for membership dues for John S. Service in the IPR for the year ending February 1951 in the amount of \$15.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get it clear. This document represents interrogation and answer by whom?

Mr. MANDEL. The Loyalty Security Board in the case of John S. Service, the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. With John S. Service answering?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 248" and filed for the committee's information.)

Mr. MORRIS. That bears on the precise connection that John S. Service had with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I now come to the report of January 23, 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire whether that was sworn testimony?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

This document is marked No. 103 and is taken from the same proceeding in the case of John S. Service before the State Department Loyalty Security Board.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the report of January 23, 1943?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this a report by Mr. John S. Service?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I call your attention to the report of January 23, 1943? I think that should be the second one in that group of papers before you.

General WEDEMEYER. I have it.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with that particular report of John S. Service?

General WEDEMEYER. I have read it over, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not made at a time you were theater commander?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; several months prior to my becoming commander.

Mr. MORRIS. It did come to your attention after you became theater commander?

General WEDEMEYER. There was a copy in the headquarters of the China theater.

Mr. MORRIS. You recognize it is a report made by John S. Service?

General WEDEMEYER. Frankly, I couldn't say under oath that I could say that.

Mr. MORRIS. You do remember reading it?

General WEDEMEYER. I remember reading all these memoranda in the headquarters submitted by the political advisers.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the fourth paragraph on that page?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the instrument?

Mr. MORRIS. This has been identified by Mr. Mandel as a John Service report that was made part of the record of the loyalty proceedings of the State Department in the case of John S. Service.

Mr. Mandel, please read part of the second paragraph, not the fourth paragraph, beginning with the third sentence.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is a growing pre-occupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever-widening definition of "communism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward forms of

democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a victory over Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that, General?

General WEDEMAYER. Frankly, I do not know what to comment. I don't want to repeat over and over again and take the Senators' time. I have tried to make it clear that the Nationalist Government with which I dealt was improving steadily, cooperated with me to the best of its ability, and, on the other hand, I received no cooperation from the Communists. I didn't consider them a government, of course, but there wasn't much cooperation requested. The little I asked them to do was not done, namely, conducting these military operations coordinated with my over-all operations.

I really do not know what thoughts I could give.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything in that particular report, in the entire report, you would care to comment on?

General WEDEMAYER. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce this in the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It will be inserted and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 249" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 249

JANUARY 23, 1943.

Subject: Kuomintang-Communist Situation.

An outstanding impression gained during the past 18 months spent in Chungking and in travel through southwest and northwest China is that the most careful study should be given to the internal political situation in China, particularly the growing rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

The united front is now definitely a thing of the past and it is impossible to find any optimism regarding the possibility of its resurrection as long as present tendencies continue and the present leadership of the Kuomintang, both civil and military, remains in power. Far from improving, the situation is deteriorating. In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is a growing preoccupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever widening definition of "communism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward forms of democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a victory over Japan.

The dangers and implications of this disunity are obvious and far reaching. Militarily, the present situation is a great hindrance to any effective war effort by China. Its deterioration into civil war would be disastrous. The situation therefore has direct relationship to our own efforts to defeat Japan. At the present time a large and comparatively well-trained and equipped portion of the Kuomintang army is diverted from active combat against the Japanese to blockade the Communists. In the north (Kansu and Shensi) the lines are well established by multiple lines of block houses and those large forces remain in a condition of armed readiness. Further south (Hupeh, Anhwei, North Kiangsu) the lines are less clearly demarcated and sporadic hostilities, which have gone on for over 2 years and in which the Kuomintang forces appear to take the initiative, continue.

On the other side, the Communist army is starved of all supplies and forced in turn to immobilize most of its strength to guard against what it considers the Kuomintang threat. It was admitted by both parties that there was extreme tension in Kuomintang-Communist relations in the spring of 1942. The Communists believe that it was only the Japanese invasion of Yunnan that saved them from attack at that time. The Communists and their friends claim, furthermore, that the Kuomintang is devoting its energies to the strengthening of

its control over those parts of China accessible to it rather than to fighting Japan. This strengthening of the position of the Kuomintang will of course assist it in re-establishing its control over areas which will then be opened to it. A logical part of such a policy would be the taking over, as soon as an opportunity is found, of the Communist base area in Kansu-Shensi. Success in this move would weaken the Communists and make easier the eventual recapture by the Kuomintang of the Communist guerrilla zones. To support this thesis the Communists point to the campaign in the more extreme Kuomintang publications for the immediate abolition of the border area. Another factor sometimes suggested as tending to provoke an early Kuomintang attack on the Communists is the desirability, from the Kuomintang point of view, of disposing of them before China finds itself an active ally of Russia against Japan.

The possible positive military value of the Communist army to our war effort should not be ignored. These forces control the territory through which access may be had to Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Japanese North China bases. The strategic importance of their position would be enhanced by the entry of Russia into the war against Japan. This importance is largely potential but fairly recent reports of continued bitter fighting in Shansi indicate that the Communists are still enough of a force to provoke periodic Japanese mopping up campaigns. Reflection of this is found in the intensive Japanese anti-Communist propaganda campaign in North China in the summer of 1941, although the fact must not be overlooked that Japanese propaganda has emphasized the anti-Communist angle to appeal to whatever collaborationist elements there may be in occupied China and to the more conservative sections of the Kuomintang. This activity in Shansi and the difficulties of the Japanese there contrast with the inactivity on most of the other Kuomintang-Japanese fronts.

Aside from the immediate war aspects, the political implications of the situation are also serious. Assuming that open hostilities are for the time being averted, the eventual defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese will leave the Kuomintang still confronted with the Communists solidly entrenched in most of North China (East Kansu, North Shensi, Shansi, South Chahar, Hopei, Shantung, North Kiangsu, and North Anhwei). In addition the Communists will be in position to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal from Suiyuan, Jehol, and Manchuria, in all of which areas there is already some Communist activity. In the rest of China they will have the sympathy of elements among the liberals, intellectuals, and students. These elements are of uncertain size but of considerable influence in China, and the Kuomintang's fear of their power, and the power of whatever underground organization the Communists have succeeded in maintaining in the Kuomintang area, is indicated by the size and activity of its various secret police organs.

But possibly the greatest potential strength of the Communists, and one reason why military action against them will not be entirely effective at the present time, is their control of the rural areas of North China in the rear of the Japanese. Here the Kuomintang cannot reach them and the Communists have apparently been able to carry out some degree of popular mobilization. I am in possession of a secret Kuomintang publication describing the Communist control of Hopei. It discusses measures of combating the Communists (by such means, for instance, as the blockade now being enforced) and concludes that if the Communists fail to cooperate (i. e. submit to complete Kuomintang domination) they must be exterminated. I hope to make a translation of this pamphlet which would appear to have significance as an official Kuomintang indication of the policy it will pursue in these areas. It seems reasonable to question, as some thoughtful Chinese do, whether the people of these guerrilla zones, after several years of political education and what must be assumed to be at least partial sovietization, will accept peacefully the imposition of Kuomintang control activated by such a spirit and implemented by military force and the political repression, and secret police and gendarmerie power, which are already important adjuncts of party control and which are being steadily strengthened and expanded.

Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance (as, for instance, the nephew of the well-known late editor of the *Ta Kung Pao*) consider the likelihood of civil war the greatest problem facing China. They point out that the Communists are far stronger now than they were when they stood off Kuomintang armies for 10 years in central China and that they will be much stronger yet if it proves that they have succeeded in winning the support of the population in the guerrilla zone. They point to numerous recent instances of successful Communist infiltration into and indoctrination of opposing Chinese armies (such as those of Yen Hsi-shan) and wonder whether this will not cause a prolongation of the

struggle and perhaps make a victory for the Kuomintang, or for either side, impossible. There is undoubtedly a strong revulsion in the mind of the average, nonparty Chinese to the idea of renewed civil war and the Kuomintang may indeed have difficulty with the loyalty and effectiveness of its conscript troops.

Belief in the certainty of eventual civil war leads these same Chinese to question whether the United States has given sufficient realistic consideration to the future in China of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China's advantage, or to America's own interests, for the United States to give the Kuomintang Government large quantities of military supplies which, judging from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will be available for civil war to enforce unity in the country by military force. These Chinese also speculate on the position of the American troops which may be in China (in support of the Kuomintang army) if there should be a civil war; and wonder what will be the attitude of Russia, especially if it has become by that time a partner in the victory over Japan.

But ignoring these problematical implications, there can be no denial that civil war in China, or even the continuation after the defeat of Japan of the present deadlock, will greatly impede the return of peaceful conditions. This blocking of the orderly large-scale rehabilitation of China will in itself seriously and adversely affect American interests. Even if a conflict is averted, the continuance or, as is probable in such an event, the worsening of the already serious economic strains within the country may result in economic collapse. If there is a civil war the likelihood of such an economic collapse is of course greater.

There is also the possibility that economic difficulties may make the war-weary, overconscribed and overtaxed farmers fertile ground for Communist propaganda and thus bring about a revolution going beyond the moderate democracy which the Chinese Communists now claim to be seeking. Such a Communist government would probably not be democratic in the American sense. And it is probable, even if the United States did not incur the enmity of the Communists for alleged material or diplomatic support of the Kuomintang, that this Communist government would be more inclined toward friendship and cooperation with Russia than with Great Britain and America.

For these reasons it would therefore appear to be in the interest of the United States to make efforts to prevent a deterioration of the internal political situation in China and, if possible, to bring about an improvement.

The Communists themselves (Chou-En-lai and Lin Piao in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider that foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully made. But they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government, and in our propaganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict; democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.

Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the central government to the eighteenth group army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.

Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves. But there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.

This visit would have the great additional advantage of providing us with comprehensive and reliable information regarding the Communist side of the situation. For instance we might be able to have better answers to some of the following pertinent questions: How faithfully have the Communists carried out their united front promises? What is the form of their local government? How Communistic is it? Does it show any democratic character or possibilities? Has it won any support of the people? How does it compare with conditions of government in Kuomintang China? How does the Communist treatment of the people in

such matters as taxation, grain requisition, military service and forced labor compare with that in the Kuomintang territory? What is the military and economic strength of the Communists and what is their probable value to the Allied cause? How have they dealt with problems such as inflation, price control, development of economic resources for carrying on the war, and trading with the enemy? Have the people in the guerrilla area been mobilized and aroused to the degree necessary to support real guerrilla warfare?

Without such knowledge, it is difficult to appraise conflicting reports and reach a considered judgment. Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information regarding conditions in the Communist area is at present not available. Such information as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to scope and probable reliability. Carlson was primarily a military man and had a limited knowledge of the Chinese language. Most of the journalists who have been able to visit the Communist area appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists. They also suffered from language limitations and were unable to remain in the area for an extended period.

I suggest that the American representatives best suited to visit the Communist area are Foreign Service officers of the China language service. One or two men might be sent. They should combine moderately long-term residence at Yenai or its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area. It is important that they not be required to base a report on a brief visit during which they would be under the influence of official guides, but that they should have a sufficient time to become familiar with conditions and make personal day-to-day observations.

There is mail and telegraphic communication between Yenai and Chungking, and similar communication between various parts of the Communist area. The officers would therefore not be out of touch with the Embassy and could, if it is thought desirable, make periodic reports.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I call your attention to the report of April 7, 1944, that is before you?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read pertinent excerpts from that?

The CHAIRMAN. Before we go into that, what is this instrument, where does it stem from and what is the foundation for it?

Mr. MANDEL. The date is April 7, 1944 [reading]:

Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service forwarded to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2461, April 21, 1944, under title "Situation in Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union."

This was also introduced in the Loyalty Board proceedings before the State Department in the case of John S. Service.

Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious.

Mr. MORRIS. What paragraph is that?

Mr. MANDEL. The second paragraph. Further:

Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available; in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.

Mr. MORRIS. General, can you comment on that?

General WEDEMAYER. This statement was made at a time when there were a lot of people in our country who were making similar statements. Today they are on the band wagon of opposing communism. Quite a few Americans were making statements along that line. In fact, when I came back after the war, I found it rather dangerous, and I could only talk to a very few people, found it very dangerous to talk realistically about the implications of communism in this country and in the world in general. I am very glad that Chiang Kai-shek

even at that time epitomized opposition to communism and thank God for General MacArthur out in Japan for the same reason when others were playing footsie with communism, many others. I think Chiang showed a shrewdness, a political shrewdness, in continuing his opposition.

As far as cooperation was concerned, the Soviet Communists did not persist in the China theater. The contribution they made in the war against Japan was negligible. The American people ought to understand that clearly.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask in relation to this: Is this not an indication that this was a warning at least to America that she had better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's desires rather than what was well for America or the world? That is, when he says "We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are," and the previous sentence that was read to you about Russia having her way. Is that right?

General WEDEMAYER. It could be interpreted that way. I think that is a sound interpretation of the statement.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I refer you to a report now of Mr. John P. Davies, one of the four political advisers?

The CHAIRMAN. Has this last one been inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir. That may be introduced in the record, having been identified.

The CHAIRMAN. It may.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 250" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 250

APRIL 7, 1944.

Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service, forwarded to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2461, April 21, 1944, under title "Situation in Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy Vis-à-Vis China and the Soviet Union."

We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations with Russia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military relations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and postwar settlement. We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese Communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands. To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.

As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By so doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only north China and Manchuria but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.

Neither now nor in the immediately foreseeable future does the United States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.

The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary Government of China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the

military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists—who probably hold the key to control, not only of north China but of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria as well—that we are on the other side and that their only hope for survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available: in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.

It is important, therefore, that the United States have the following aims in its dealings with China:

1. Avoid becoming involved in any way in Sino-Soviet relations; avoid all appearance of unqualified diplomatic support of China, especially vis-à-vis Russia; and limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war against Japan.

This may involve soft-pedaling of grandiose promises of postwar aid and economic rehabilitation, unless they are predicated on satisfactory reforms within China.

2. Show a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in China. Try to fit the Communists into the war against Japan.

In so doing, we may promote Chinese unity and galvanize the lagging Chinese war effort. The liberals, generally speaking, already consider that their hope lies in America. The Communists, from what little we know of them, also are friendly toward America, believe that democracy must be the next step in China, and take the view that economic collaboration with the United States is the only hope for speedy postwar rehabilitation and development. It is vital that we do not lose this good will and influence.

3. Use our tremendous and as yet unexploited influence with the Kuomintang promote internal Chinese unity on the only possible and lasting foundation of progressive reform.

There is no reason for us to fear using our influence. The Kuomintang knows that it is dependent on us; it cannot turn toward a Japan approaching annihilation; it is inconceivable that it will turn toward communistic Russia; and Great Britain is not in a position to be of help. American interest in the Chinese Communists will be a potent force in persuading Kuomintang China to set its house in order.

The Communists would undoubtedly play an important part in a genuinely unified China—one not unified by the Kuomintang's present policy in practice of military force and threat. But it is most probable that such a democratic and unified China would naturally gravitate toward the United States, and that the United States, by virtue of sympathy, position, and economic resources, would enjoy a greater influence in China than any other foreign power.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have the Davies report? That is dated June 24, 1943.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May I refer to the second extract made on that page, General, November 7, 1944—Davies [reading]:

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The Communists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process which has been operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe blockade imposed by Chiang.

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million. And they will continue to grow.

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and fundamental. It is mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people.

I wonder if you would comment on that extract, General?

General WEDEMEYER. As of that date, of that period, I think the writer is incorrect in the military capabilities of the Communists, and the statement there, the correctness of which I question namely, they had withstood the heavy attacks of the Japanese is not correct for the period I commanded the theater. I do not believe it was correct prior to my assuming command, because I read the history of the operations that had taken place from the beginning of the war, 1937. At no time were large numbers of Communist forces involved with Japanese forces, and at no time did the Chinese Communist military forces make a real contribution to the over-all China war effort. Most of their operations were guerrilla in nature. They were designed to capture blockhouses established by the Japanese and to capture small quantities of arms and equipment.

He goes on to say the reason for the success that he alludes to of the Chinese Communists is simple and fundamental. He says it is mass support, mass participation. I would change that and then go along with the statement [reading]:

It is Soviet support and police participation, secret-police participation and propaganda participation.

Those are the things that took over China.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say he was wrong when he said that "they have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people?" Were the Chinese people Communists at heart, or were they dominated by the Soviet Union?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment—and this man is an expert and I am not on China; he has lived most of his life there and he speaks the language—but in my humble judgment the Chinese people per se are not communistically inclined. They are individualistic. The family is the integral unit. We often accuse them of nepotism because they have these strong family ties. If one enjoys economic success, he is duty-bound to take care of the other members of his family.

I would go back to this, Senator: The Chinese people don't understand political philosophies. I mean the bulk of them do not. There is just a thin veneer of educated people in China who understand what we are talking about. When anyone talks about any leader, any war lord, any political party having the support of the Chinese people, you can see how nebulous that is.

Mr. MORRIS. General, I draw your attention to the same document on the second page.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that extract, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

The generalissimo realizes that, if he accedes to the Communist terms for a coalition government, they will sooner or later disposses him and his kuomintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, form a genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present government, passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the Communist issue must eventually be joined.

It further says:

The Communists, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with the generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize that Chiang's position is crumbling; that they may before long receive substantial Russian support, and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority in at least north China.

Mr. MORRIS. General, do you believe, if the generalissimo had acceded to the Communist terms for a coalition government, that they would sooner or later dispossess him and his Kuomintang of power?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir; I do. The Communists at that time had very little power. The generalissimo had most of the power. The Communists were determined to have all the power, and the generalissimo was just as determined to retain all the power. It just makes sense to me. That is the way the situation maintained out there. Any other solution I do not accept. I do not think it is sound.

Mr. MORRIS. With respect to the second paragraph there, you agree with Mr. Davies when he said that the Communists had no intention of reaching an agreement with the generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government?

General WEDEMAYER. I think the Communists had the idea of a coalition government just a step toward acquisition of all power. They would violate any agreement they made just as they have in other areas of the world. When the time came they would seize all the power and there would be no representation on the part of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang would be liquidated.

Senator FERGUSON. General, if this advice of Mr. Davies of December 9, 1944, was taken, how could we hope to sustain a democratic government in China by the use of philosophy of General Marshall's mission to form a coalition?

General WEDEMAYER. We couldn't, sir. I never did believe that a coalition with the Communists was possible. You can coalesce political parties at times over the years. The Republicans and Democrats have gotten together in a bipartisan approach to international problems. Personally I do not agree with that. It is the American way to make a man defend what he proposes to do. I think we should always question the other man's judgment; do it in a respectful but intelligent way, and continuously. I think that is the whole philosophy behind democracy.

Now, you will get no such philosophy or get no such *modus operandi* in operations with the Communists. All you have to do is read the Communist Manifesto and Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* and you will have it laid out for you just as Hitler so obligingly told us what he was going to do and we ignored his warnings.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you get a clearer statement than an indication of Davies as to what the Communists were. They were dominated by Russia and "if they have patience they will succeed to authority in at least north China." He limited it to the north of China, but he indicated that they would get the support to take over China. Is that not true?

General WEDEMAYER. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were to back the Communists, it was to back the idea that Russia would be the dominant power of China.

General WEDEMAYER. That is true.

I have told you earlier, sir, I neglected to give the attention that I should have when I was commanding that theater—give attention to these reports. As an alibi, I was involved in military operations and busy as the dickens. Later, in analyzing these reports and going back over many things that had happened in this, the psychological or diplomatic field, I realized I had been remiss in my duties as a theater commander in not analyzing them more carefully. I did not take the advice. I adhered to the path of trying to contain the Japanese and supporting the Nationalist Government in my personal relations with the Chinese military and civilians.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not follow this advice, in other words?

General WEDEMAYER. No. I was fortunate in having a very loyal American out there as a diplomatic representative, Patrick J. Hurley. I admired him a great deal and felt he represented American policies realistically, courageously and continuously. He was the American Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I draw your attention to the next extract we have on this page?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Under date of November 15, 1944, Mr. Mandel, and will you read that for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recognition of Chiang's Government.

But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek Government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our great assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent and friendly China—our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Communists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the Communists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we are going to support.

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind these basic considerations: Power in China is on the verge of shifting from Chiang to the Communists.

If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope to win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of supplies and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction of Chinese nationalism and independence from Soviet control.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you comment on that excerpt, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMAYER. Well, I think prior comments on other excerpts cover that, sir, namely, that a coalition government meant a Communist government, insofar as I am concerned. It would not be such a thing as a coalition government, the Communists would have all control.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you think that the Chinese Communist organization was a complete auxiliary and part of the international Communist organization?

General WEDEMAYER. Definitely. I felt they were operating under the aegis of the Kremlin, and most of the leaders had been trained in the U. S. S. R., over the years, over a period of 20 years. And it is that hard core of fanatic loyal leadership that the Communists have generated in the various areas of the world that has enabled these well-organized minorities to take over unsuspecting intimidated masses. And particularly, where the masses are illiterate, unemployed, improvident, as they are in China and in India; those areas are particularly vulnerable to the Marxian philosophies and methods.

Mr. MORRIS. And is there not implicit in this statement, General Wedemeyer, an assertion that the Chinese Communists were independent of Moscow?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that not obvious, General?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In which you do not believe?

General WEDEMAYER. Definitely, Senator. I think that all of these satellites are oriented toward the Kremlin. Now, the Soviet leaders wisely adjust and change the application of their political and economic ideas to conform more or less to the customs, the organization, and to the traditions of the particular area where they are applying these ideas. They make adjustments. But the basic idea is the destruction of free enterprise, the enslavement of mind and body and destruction of any spiritual force in this world. Those are the basic objectives of communism, and they are making progress toward accomplishing those objectives.

Mr. MORRIS. May I call your attention to the first full paragraph on page 3 in that statement. It begins [reading]:

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind these basic considerations: Power in China is on the verge of shifting from Chiang to the Communists.

Do you not interpret that, General Wedemeyer, as a recommendation that we should support the Chinese Communist faction?

General WEDEMAYER. That is one interpretation, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your interpretation, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMAYER. My interpretation is that this chap felt that the Communists in China were getting increasing power. I do not go quite so far as to suggest just from that statement that this Foreign Service officer wants us to feel that we should support the Communists. I think there is always danger in reading into a statement—

Mr. MORRIS. We do not intend to do that.

General WEDEMAYER. I know you don't, and I cannot do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would say the language was an inducement toward that conclusion, though; would you not?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes; it inclines in that direction. In fairness to the writer, however, I think he is the best witness on that.

Senator FERGUSON. It could be taken as a recommendation that if you wanted to be on the power side you take his views; is that correct?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce all of these excerpts into the record, but Mr. Mandel has not yet told us from what sources he has put these together, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This document that we have in hand here on which General Wedemeyer has been testifying has not been offered for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what these are?

Mr. MANDEL. These are taken from a publication called United States Relations With China, a Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. Released by whom and by what authority?

Mr. MANDEL. By the State Department. That is popularly known as the white paper.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the paper I have in my mind.

Mr. MORRIS. Those are extracts from that publication, Senator. Before introducing that into the record, I think Mr. Sourwine would like to ask a few questions of General Wedemeyer on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, referring to the excerpt headed November 15, 1944, which has been previously discussed, the second paragraph starts out with the sentence, "But we must be realistic." Would it be fair, therefore, to judge the rest of this excerpt on the basis of whether it is realistic?

General WEDEMEYER. I think it would, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, the third sentence is the one referred to by Mr. Morris obliquely when he asked you if you shared the apparent feeling of this writer that the Chinese Communists were free agents, were independent, and that is the sentence which reads:

And if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians.

That necessarily implies, does it not, that the Chinese Communists, at the time of this writing, were not tied up with the Russians?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes; that is implicit in that statement, but I do not agree with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is also implicit in that statement, is it not, that we could "capture" politically the Chinese Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you agree with that statement?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't agree with it, but that is implicit in the statement as you read it to me, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, is either of those implications realistic?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely not. In my judgment, in my humble judgment, definitely not.

I want to say one thing there to you, sir: In my relations with the Communists they were not emotional, they were not unobjective. They had illness up in that area and it was remote, and at great cost to my limited war effort I sent 15 tons of medical supplies to help Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, with the permission of the Generalissimo. I want you to understand that my attitude toward them was just as humanitarian as the record of our great country over many years.

Now, therefore, when I make statements they are not emotional replies, sir, they are just in the interest of the country; not in my own personal interest or not in the interest of the Communists or the Kuomintang.

I want to make a statement to you, because I have emphasized that I do not agree with the implications there. I accept the statements, that the statements are implicit in the way you interpret them, I accept that, but I do not agree with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, I am attempting here to be quite coldly logical about this passage and not emotional at all, and I appreciate your answer.

General WEDEMEYER. I am not saying you were suggesting emotion. I do not want emotionalism to enter into it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next sentence reads:

Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

That phrase "are committed to a steadily decaying regime" can only be interpreted as a charge that the Chiang Kai-shek government was steadily decaying, is that not correct?

General WEDEMEYER. You mean that the government was decaying? Is that what you are asking me, if it is correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is implicit in this language?

General WEDEMEYER. It is implicit in that language, but again——

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not true, was it?

General WEDEMEYER. That would require quite a lot of development. I do not know whether the Senators want me to develop that, Mr. Sourwine, or not, but I would be happy to do it. In other words, I am not going to answer yes or no and establish a very important point that will militate against my entire testimony here.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that would take an explanation?

General WEDEMEYER. It would take an explanation, Senator Ferguson, in my judgment, of about 10 minutes, indicating the development that brought about the steadily deteriorating situation in China, economic, psychological, and military.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the committee care to hear it?

Senator FERGUSON. I think because of the question it would be of interest on this record.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, then, General.

General WEDEMEYER. Do you want to hear it, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. You all are familiar with the fact that Chiang Kai-shek took over the Chinese Nationalist Government upon the death of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. At that time there were Soviet Russian advisers in the area and they had agreed that there would be no political propagandizing, but they would assist the new Chinese Republic in evolving a stable economy and building up their military forces.

In typical Communist fashion they violated their agreement with reference to the dissemination of Communist political propaganda and just brought about the conflict that ended up with the Communists being pushed back clear up in Yunan, in a remote western province of China.

The period 1927 to 1937 was often alluded to by Americans, Britishers, and other foreigners in the area who had lived there many years as the golden decade. From 1927 to 1937, during that period, communications were being improved, the economy was being better stabilized, and schools were being built to extend advantages of education, and many improvements, in other words, were being instituted.

Now, you all know that there are many dialects in China, but basically there are three areas and people living in those three areas,

respectively, cannot understand each other. They all read and write the same hieroglyphics, the same characters.

Chiang Kai-shek also was striving to bring about an alphabet that would be universally understood to simplify the education that he envisaged for his people.

Now, the military jingoists of Japan, recognizing the developments which would bring about a nationalization, a political consciousness in China, a unity, were concerned, and they had ideas of a co-prosperity sphere in Asia under their domination. So many observers with whom I talked in the Far East who had lived there many years, they refer to this golden decade—mind you now, under Chiang Kai-shek's regime and approximately the same leaders whom we have today, and we read in the press considerable criticism about them, they had that period where they were improving conditions in China and many people feel that the thing that precipitated the war in 1937 on the part of the Japanese was the fact that a strongly unified China would make it more difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to take over in that area. So that precipitated the attack in 1937.

Now, for 8 years China fought the Japanese. The Japanese were a modern military nation. In the first year or so of the war we suffered many humiliating reverses at the hands of the Japanese in the battles that we fought with them on the sea and in the air and on the ground, as did the British. Gradually we evolved forces that enabled us to defeat the Japanese militarily.

But the Chinese did not have competent or well-organized military forces, and they did not fight well—they fought well with what they had—but by our standards it was not a great contribution. And I have never in any testimony stated that the contribution made by the Chinese in the war was overwhelming, but it was important to us in that it did contain large numbers of Japanese that might have been employed at crucial places and critical times against our forces as they advanced up north against the Japanese Archipelago.

But during the war, and immediately subsequent to VJ-day, propaganda increased in that area, propaganda that denounced you and me, the Americans, and distorted our objectives in that area, called us imperialists, Yankee imperialists, and indicated our determination to take over the Far East, to dominate the Far East. These programs emanated from Yunnan, the Chinese Communist headquarters, and frequently were reaffirmed in articles appearing in Pravda and other Communist-inspired newspapers and radio releases.

It was perfectly obvious to those Americans who were out there with me in 1945 at the close of the war that this propaganda campaign was being intensified against us to cause the Chinese people to suspect our motives and to turn against us.

Now, in considering any problem in China, I think all of that period, the development in that period, must be thought about objectively. And I also think about those things in relation to the statements that I read here by experts on the area. This is just a soldier's view, a practical view that I personally experienced and concluded. These are conclusions that I drew as a result of serving out there just a few years.

- That is the background I wanted to give you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, General. I have just two or three more questions about this particular section of the report, this November 15, 1944, item.

General WEDMEYER. All right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the same sentence which elicited the answer you have just given us is a phrase, and I had better read the whole sentence and underline the phrase vocally [reading]:

Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime—

and here is the phase I want to underline—

and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

Does that not carry with it, implicit in it, the thought that the working out of military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists was one of our objectives that it was important to us?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, it does.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that true?

General WEDEMEYER. Have you been here all morning?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir, and I heard your previous testimony, but I am attempting to get the answer to this.

General WEDEMEYER. I will be glad again to say it. The contribution made by the Communists was very limited militarily, and economic assistance would be nil.

Now, if the theater commander had been directed to assist the Chinese Communists by giving them equipment and advisers it would have been a very difficult logistical job for me to get it way up there by air. I had no other way of getting it up there. Just sending 15 tons of medical supplies, I indicated to you, impinged upon my little war effort in the southeastern part of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. But that difficulty was not caused by the fact that we were supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government, was it? That logistic difficulty you speak of was a logistic problem.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, it was, because I could not put my planes in operation in logistical support in southeast China and concurrently up to the north. So, in a way, it did militate against supporting the Communists. If I had been directed to support the Communists in lieu of the Nationalists, I would have carried out my orders, and I would have gotten supplies up there, but at much greater difficulty, because of the distance.

Now, may I explain to you, it may not be apparent to you right away, but intratheater distribution, within the theater, was a real problem, because I had to bring the fuel to operate the planes over the hump. But when we captured Bhamo and Mytchinya I had a staging area so my planes could hop over the short hop and unload and go back without refueling in my theater, so I kept the gasoline they brought. Once I started to distribute in China it was a real problem because I was burning up gasoline at long distances.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I was attempting to get at is whether there was some outstanding advantage to us to be gained through military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists, which we were losing at that time. In your opinion was there such an advantage?

General WEDEMEYER. No, I don't think there was an outstanding advantage to be gained.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the point.

General WEDEMEYER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was another item in which your own opinion is at variance with the opinion implicit in this statement?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The final comment I want to ask you for, sir, is on this, and this says [reading]:

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impassé most desirable to us. It provides our greatest assurance of a strong united, democratic, independent, and friendly China.

And in view of the statements already made by Mr. Davies, in one of these reports and in other testimony here with regard to what would have happened in the event there had been a coalition government, I would like to ask you, sir, Would a coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists found a satisfactory place have provided us with assurance of either a democratic or an independent or a friendly China?

General WEDEMEYER. No. For many reasons, in my judgment, it would not have provided a cooperative, friendly China. I indicated earlier, sir, that in my judgment the Chinese Communists were determined to take over all the power.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. And that they were working under the aegis of the Kremlin power whose avowed purpose is to destroy your country and mine. And it is just inconsistent; we are being naive if we consider for a moment that we could generate a friendly spirit among the Chinese as long as the Communists are influencing them with their sinister propaganda. We just cannot do it. And they are most vulnerable to that propaganda because they are illiterate and they are capable of intimidations that the Communists so skillfully handle.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it not then become apparent, General, that not only is that passage not realistic, but that in the space of a dozen lines it has advanced a half dozen propositions, all of which are unsound and untenable?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. For example, one other point that you could develop is the Chinese are not ready for a democratic government. Democracy, as I understand it, is predicated upon an informed electorate. So that as long as you have 80 percent of the population illiterate it is impractical to have a true democracy there. There are a lot of things that are just inconsistent, in my judgment.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is as far as I wanted to develop that point, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That document therefore may be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 251" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 251

[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949]

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA

MEMORANDA BY FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS IN CHINA, 1943-45

June 24, 1943 (Davies)

Chinese Communist policy appears to have followed the Comintern line. In its initial expression the policy adhered to the program of world revolution.

With the Comintern's abandonment of this program, the Chinese Communists embraced in 1935, in compliance with Moscow directives, the policy of the united front.

The new line, so far as it applied to Asia, was in all probability prompted by the Kremlin's realistic appraisal of the Soviet Union's position in the Far East. Russia was threatened by Japan. The Japanese Army had with its Manchurian adventure apparently decided upon a policy of continental expansion. Confronted by a strong Russian Army in eastern Siberia, the Japanese seemed to be intent upon outflanking the Russians through China. China could not be expected to offer strong resistance to Japanese expansion so long as it was torn by internal dissension. It was therefore evident that China should become unified and actively resist Japanese pressure westward.

As the Chinese Communists moved away from world revolution to nationalism they also moved in the direction of more moderate internal political and economic policy. Whether these other moves were in compliance with Comintern dictates is less material than that they were historically and evolutionarily sound.

The trend toward nationalism is believed to be strongest among the troops and guerrillas who have been fighting the national enemy. Although we have no accurate information on the subject, it is suspected that the political leaders of the party retain their pro-Russian orientation and that they are, notwithstanding the dissolution of the Comintern, likely to be susceptible to Moscow direction. This probable schism within the party may prove at some later date to be of major importance (p. 565).

November 7, 1944 (Davies)

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The Communists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process, which has been operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe blockade imposed by Chiang.

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million. And they will continue to grow.

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and fundamental. It is a mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people (pp. 566-567).

January 4, 1945 (Davies)

The current situation in China must afford the Kremlin a certain sardonic satisfaction.

The Russians see the anti-Soviet government of Chiang Kai-shek decaying militarily, politically, and economically. They observe the Chinese Communists consolidating in north China, expanding southward in the wake of Chiang's military debacles and now preparing for the formal establishment of a separatist administration.

It is equally evident to the Russians that the Chinese Communists will not in the meantime be idle. The Communists have amply demonstrated a capacity for independent, dynamic growth. However Marshal Stalin may describe the Chinese Communists to his American visitors, he can scarcely be unaware of the fact that the Communists are a considerably more stalwart and self-sufficient force than any European underground or partisan movement (p. 567).

June 24, 1943 (Davies)

Basis for conflict: The Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek recognize that the Communists, with the popular support which they enjoy and their reputation for administrative reform and honesty, represent a challenge to the Central Government and its spoils system. The Generalissimo cannot admit the seemingly innocent demands of the Communists that their party be legalized and democratic

processes be put into practice. To do so would probably mean the abdication of the Kuomintang and the provincial satraps.

The Communists, on the other hand, dare not accept the Central Government's invitation that they disband their armies and be absorbed in the national body politic. To do so would be to invite extinction.

This impasse will probably be resolved, American and other foreign observers in Chungking agree, by an attempt by the Central Government to liquidate the Communists. This action may be expected to precipitate a civil war from which one of the two contending factions will emerge dominant. * * *

Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang lieutenants fully realize the risks of an attack on the Communists. This may explain the reported statements of high officials in Chungking that they must prepare not only for the coming civil war but also for the coming war with Russia. Chiang and his Central Government recognize that they cannot defeat the Communists and the Soviet Union without foreign aid. Such aid would naturally be sought from the United States and possibly Great Britain.

* * * We may anticipate that Chiang Kai-shek will exert every effort and resort to every stratagem to involve us in active support of the Central Government. We will probably be told that if fresh American aid is not forthcoming, all of China and eventually all of Asia will be swept by communism. It will be difficult for us to resist such appeals, especially in view of our moral commitments to continued assistance to China during the postwar period.

It is therefore not inconceivable that, should Chiang attempt to liquidate the Communists, we would find ourselves entangled not only in a civil war in China but also drawn into conflict with the Soviet Union (p. 571).

December 9, 1944 (Davies)

* * * The Generalissimo realizes that if he accedes to the Communist terms for a coalition government, they will sooner or later dispossess him and his Kuomintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, form a genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present government, passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the Communist issue must eventually be joined.

The Communist, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with the Generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize that Chiang's position is crumbling, that they may before long receive a substantial Russian support and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority in at least north China * * * (p. 572).

November 15, 1944 (Davies)

We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recognition of Chiang's government.

But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our greatest assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent, and friendly China—our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Communists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the Communists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we are going to support.

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind these basic considerations; Power in China is on the verge of shifting from Chiang to the Communists.

If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope to win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of supplies

and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction of Chinese nationalism and independence from Soviet control (p. 574).

December 12, 1944 (Davies)

The negotiations looking to an agreement between the Generalissimo and the Chinese Communists have failed. It is not impossible, however, that one or the other side may in the near future revive the negotiations with a new proposal.

So long as the deadlock exists, or new negotiations drag on, it is reasonable to assume that the Generalissimo will continue to refuse us permission to exploit militarily the Chinese Communist position extending into the geographical center of Japan's inner zone. With the war against Japan proving so costly to us, we can ill afford to continue denying ourselves positive assistance and strategically valuable positions.

It is time that we unequivocally told Chiang Kai-shek that we will work with and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese forces we believe can contribute most to the war against Japan. We should tell him that we will not work with or supply any Chinese unit, whether General Government, Provincial or Communist, which shows any inclination toward precipitating civil conflict. We should tell him that we propose to keep him as head of the recognized government, informed of what supplies we give to the various Chinese forces.

It is time that we make it clear to Chiang Kai-shek that we expect the Chinese to settle their own political differences; that we refuse to become further involved in and party to Chinese domestic political disputes. We greatly hope and desire that China will emerge from this war unified, democratic, independent and strong. We feel that this goal is to be achieved most expeditiously and with the least possible expenditure of Chinese and American blood and treasure if the United States bends its efforts in China primarily toward working with and assisting whatever elements can contribute most to the speedy defeat of Japan (p. 574).

Mr. MORRIS. We have some other reports here that I would like to get your advice on as to what we should do with them, Mr. Chairman. There are four reports here, and I believe they are all reports by Mr. Service, are they not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you take those into the record, Senator? They are amplifications of the same theme that we have been developing. Do you think we should go into them in detail?

The CHAIRMAN. No. But I want to lay the foundation for them. The foundation is the same as those that we have already inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what they are?

Mr. MANDEL. They deal with the theme developed by Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us where they are from.

Mr. MANDEL. They are all from the transcript of the testimony before the State Department Loyalty Security Board in the case of John S. Service.

Senator FERGUSON. Have they all been published in the white paper?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they become at least part of this official record.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see any reason, if they are taken from an official record made in the State Department, that they should not be admissible.

Senator FERGUSON. And they should become part of this record.

Senator JENNER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 252, 253, 254, and 255," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 252

[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949]

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA

MEMORANDA BY FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS IN CHINA, 1943-45

October 9, 1944 (*Service*)

Reports of two American officers, several correspondents and twenty-odd foreign travelers regarding conditions in the areas of North China under Communist control are in striking agreement. This unanimity, based on actual observation, is significant. It forces us to accept certain facts, and to draw from those facts an important conclusion.

The Japanese are being actively opposed—in spite of the constant warfare and cruel retaliation this imposes on the population. This opposition is gaining in strength. The Japanese can temporarily crush it in a limited area by the concentration of overwhelming force. But it is impossible for them to do this simultaneously over the huge territory the Communists now influence.

This opposition is possible and successful because it is total guerrilla warfare aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population. In this total mobilization the regular forces of the Communists, though leaders and organizers, have become subordinate to the vastly more numerous forces of the people themselves. They exist because the people permit, support, and wholeheartedly fight with them. There is complete solidarity of army and people.

This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what amounts to an economic, political, and social revolution. This revolution has been moderate and democratic. It has improved the economic condition of the peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform and good government. It has given them democratic self-government, political consciousness and a sense of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic bonds and given them self-respect, self-reliance and a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for.

The Japanese are being fought now not merely because they are foreign invaders but because they deny this revolution. The people will continue to fight any government which limits or deprives them of these newly won gains (p. 566).

June 20, 1944 (*Service*)

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past 10 years.

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses are becoming accentuated and there is taking place a reversal of the process of unification.

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is a general feeling of hopelessness.

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away from the larger cities. Government mandates and measures of control cannot be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoralized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress; the weight of years of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and leadership they once had.

5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever-increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may increase in scale and find political motivation.

6. The provincial groups are making common cause with one another and with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their position. Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.

7. Unrest within the Kuomintang armies is increasing, as shown in one important instance by the "young generals conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher plane, the war zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence and are thus creating a new warlordism.

8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows no signs of being closed, but grows more critical with the passage of time: the inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.

9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissensions and cliquism within the party, which grows more rather than less acute, the leadership is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers cliques.

10. The Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be sage as well as leader—shown, for instance, by China's Destiny and his book on economics—have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming outspoken.

In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese society, the role in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.

C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiative: on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.

Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and in the presence of obvious signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the Central Executive Committee.

1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. The result is the enthronement of reaction.

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitutionalism remains an empty promise for which the only preparation is a half-hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the constitution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character to the existing but impotent Peoples Political Council are ignored.

The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the authoritarian controls on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the paraphernalia of a police state—the multiple and omnipresent secret police organizations, the gendarmerie, and so forth—it continues to strengthen them as its last resort for internal security.

2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.

It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption which is one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation—all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with intimate political connections.

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as for instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulation.

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft production to run down, as they of course must when it is more profitable for speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal productive process.

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the manufacture and trade of luxury goods, many of which come from areas under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.

It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and increase revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to hog down in corruption and inefficiency, to the point that possibly not more than one-third of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge government funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and foreign currency.

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China such as the growing concentration of land holdings, extortionate rents and ruinous interest rates, and the impact of inflation.

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the party.

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against Japan itself nor to cooperate whole-heartedly with the American Army in China; and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.

The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description becomes ever more true; the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural-gentry-landlords and militarists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy, and merchant bankers having intimate connections with the Government bureaucrats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.

The relations of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded above is clear.

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience of the war is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the party's selfish shortcomings.

It cannot fight an effective war because this is impossible without greater reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform can regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of passive inertia. Thus are they sacrificing China's national interests to their own selfish ends.

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give whole-hearted cooperation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to carry out or make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears the large scale, widespread and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing influence (pp. 567-570).

October 9, 1944 (Service)

Just as the Japanese Army cannot crush these militant people now, so also will Kuomintang force fail in the future. With their new arms and organization, knowledge of their own strength, and determination to keep what they have been fighting for, these people—now some 90 million and certain to be many more before the Kuomintang can reach them—will resist oppression. They are not Communists. They do not want separation or independence. But at present they regard the Kuomintang, from their own experience, as oppressors; and the Communists as their leaders and benefactors.

With this great popular base, the Communists likewise cannot be eliminated. Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a complete denial of democracy. This will strengthen the ties of the Communists with the people; a Communist victory will be inevitable. * * *

From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in China's future. * * * I suggest the future conclusion that unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years (p. 572-573).

February 14, 1945 (Ludden and Service)

American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be subordinate.

The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources the attainment of our primary objective will be unnecessarily delayed.

There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utilization in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the Generalissimo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources against the Japanese through fear that it will then vis-à-vis other groups.

The aim of American policy as indicated clearly by official statements in the United States is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On the contrary, it has retarded its effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang Government that we will continue to support it and it alone. The Kuomintang Government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.

We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable influence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplomatic means has failed; * * *.

At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows:

"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and

thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological preferences for one side or the other."

A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united-front coalition. The present opposition groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a united ally (pp. 575-576).

EXHIBIT No. 253

YENAN, May 1, 1945.

CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEETS

YENAN, May 1.—The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yen-an in the latter part of April. This is one of the most important events in the history of modern China.

"The task of this Congress is to rally people throughout China on the eve of the counteroffensive to save the nation from the crisis which is the consequence of the erroneous policy of the Kuomintang Government, and so thoroughly to defeat and annihilate the Japanese aggressors and set up an independent, free, democratic, unified, strong and prosperous new China.

"There are 752 delegates representing 1,210,000 members of the Chinese Communist Party. Of these 544 are delegates and 208 are probationary delegates.

"Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Li Shao-Chi, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Lin Po-hu, Pen Tah-huai, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kao Kang, Lo Fu, and Peng Chen were elected to the presidium of the congress. Jen Pi-shih was elected secretary and Li Fu-chen assistant secretary of the congress.

"AGENDA ITEMS

"There were four items on the agenda: The political report by Comrade Chu Teh, the report on redrafting of the party statutes by Comrade Li Shao-chi, and the election of members of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

"Since its foundation in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party held six national congresses. These congresses were held in July 1921, May 1922, June 1923, January 1925, April 1927, and July 1928. Because of the long period of war and struggle, 17 years have elapsed before the present seventh congress could be convened.

"At the convention of the present congress, the power of the Chinese Communist Party, unity and solidarity within the party, and the party's prestige among the people of China are higher than at any period in the past.

"TOTAL STRENGTH

"At present the Chinese Communist Party not only has over 1,200,000 members but also has under its leadership the Eighth Route, New Fourth, and other anti-Japanese regular armies, numbering 110,000 strong, over 2,200,000 People's Volunteer Corps, and 19 liberated areas distributed over 19 provinces in Manchuria, north, central, and south China, with a total population of 95,500,000.

"Because the war of resistance in the liberated areas is rapidly developing, these figures are steadily increasing. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party and liberated areas under its leadership have really become the center of gravity of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese "national salvation movement" and struggle for liberation. The present congress will undoubtedly have an extremely important influence on the future development of the war of resistance and internal politics of China." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May 1, 1945, 9:30 a. m. e. w. t.)

"COALITION GOVERNMENT NEEDED," SAYS MAO

"YENAN, May 1.—On the 'coalition government' was the title of the political report given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

"Mao Tze-tung pointed out that the 'unification of all parties and groups and nonparty representatives, to form a provisional democratic coalition government so as to carry out democratic reform to overcome the present crisis, mobilize and unify the national forces of the war or resistance to effectively collaborate with the Allies in fighting and defeating the Japanese aggressor, and to secure the thorough liberation of the Chinese, are the basic demands of the Chinese people at present.'

"NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

"China needs a coalition government, said Mao Tze-tung, not only during the war but also after the war. 'After the victory of the war of resistance, the National Assembly, based on a broad, democratic foundation, should be called to form a regular democratic government of a similar coalition nature embracing more broadly all parties and groups and nonparty representatives. This government will lead the liberated people of the entire nation to build up an independent, free, unified, prosperous, and strong new country. After China has had a democratic elective system, the Government should be a coalition working on the basis of a commonly recognized new democratic program, no matter whether the Communist Party is the majority or minority party in the National Assembly.'

"IMMEDIATE FORMATION

"Mao Tze-tung repeatedly urged the necessity of immediate formation of a coalition government. One party, dictatorship, dictatorship of the antipopulation group within the Kuomintang, said Mao Tze-tung, is not only 'a fundamental obstacle to the mobilization and unification of the strength of the Chinese people in the war of resistance, it is also the (colossal) embryo of the civil war.'

MAO REVEALS POSTWAR PLAN FOR CHINA

The following is Yen-an's continuation in English Morse of the political report given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Yen-an, the first part of which was reported under the heading "Coalition Government Needed, Says Mao."

"In his report, Mao Tze-tung brought forward a program for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a new China. This program is divided into two sections—namely, general and specific—and furnishes the answers to many important wartime and postwar problems. Concerning the thorough annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and forbidding a halfway compromise, Mao Tze-tung called the people's attention to the secret understandings and dealings between the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang government and the Japanese secret emissaries.

"NO COMPROMISE

"He said: 'The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang government must thoroughly annihilate the Japanese aggressors and forbid any compromise. At the same time the Chinese people should expand the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and other People's Armies. Moreover, wherever the enemy has penetrated, the Chinese people should universally and voluntarily develop anti-Japanese armed forces ready to cooperate directly with our allies in the fighting.'

"To reactionary elements who want to steal the sacred right of armed resistance to the Japanese aggressors from them, 'The Chinese people should in self-defense resolutely deal a counterblow after remonstrances have proved futile.'

PEOPLE'S FREEDOM

"With regard to the people's freedom, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that in their struggle for freedom at the present the first and main effort of the Chinese people is directed against the Japanese aggressor. But the Kuomintang government

has deprived the people of their freedom and bound them hand and foot, rendering them unable to oppose the Japanese aggressors.

"Mao said that 'The people in China's liberated areas have gained their freedom, and the people in other areas are able to and should gain such freedom. The more the Chinese people have gained, the greater is the organized democratic force, and then there is the possibility of a coalition government.'

"UNIFICATION OF PEOPLE

"With regard to the unification of the people, Mao pointed out that 'divided China must be changed into unified China.' But what Chinese people want is not 'absolutist unification by dictators' but the 'democratic unification by the people. The movement of the Chinese people striving for freedom, democracy, and a coalition government is actually a movement for unification.'

"With regard to the People's Armies, Mao pointed out that without any army which stands on the side of the people a coalition government cannot be formed. The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are wholeheartedly on the side of the people. Mao also pointed out that many Kuomintang troops which frequently suffered [words missing] oppress the people and discriminate against other troops should be reformed. Mao Tze-tung declared: 'As soon as the new democratic coalition government and the united high command is formed in China, troops in the Chinese liberated areas will at once be handed over to them. But all Kuomintang troops must also be handed over to them at the same time.

"PRIVATE CAPITALISM

"Mao Tze-tung declared that the Chinese Communist Party in the entire period [words missing]. The new democracy approves the development of private capitalism and ownership of private property, but this must follow the theory propounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen; namely, to carry out the principle of 'tillers own their land' and to guarantee that private capitalism 'cannot control the life of the people in the country.'

"With regard to the land problem, Mao pointed out that in the liberated areas the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out so that the landlords and peasants jointly take part in the war of resistance.

"Mao also declared: 'If there is no particular hindrance, we shall continue to carry out this policy after the war. First of all, the reduction of rent and interest will be carried out throughout the country and then [words missing]. Then appropriate means will be found to arrive systematically at the [words missing] "tillers own their land."' [Next paragraph garbled in transmission—Ed.]

"On the one hand 'workers' interest will be 'protected', while on the other hand 'guaranties are given to [words missing] profits from proper commercial [enterprise—Ed.]' He declared that in this new democratic state 'facilities will certainly be [words missing] widespread [development—Ed.] of a private capitalistic economy' apart from the economy of state-owned business and co-operatives.

"Mao Tze-tung welcomes foreign investments in China. He said that the industrialization of China 'will [afford—Ed.] a very great amount of foreign investments.'

"CULTURE AND EDUCATION

"With regard to culture and education, Mao Tze-tung pointed out [words missing] respecting the intelligentsia who serve the people and have made [words missing]. He also pointed out the various tasks such as the liquidation of illiteracy, and the popularization of public hygiene. He further pointed out that the ancient Chinese and foreign culture should be 'absorbed critically.'

"NATIONAL MINORITIES

"Concerning the national minorities problem, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'national minorities should be helped [asterisks supplied by Yen-an—Ed.] to attain liberation and development, politically, economically, and culturally. Their language, literature, customs, habits, and religious faith should be respected.'

"With regard to the problem of religion, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'according to the principle of freedom of belief, China's liberated areas will allow every school of religion to exist. Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists,

and other religious beliefs, provided they obey the Government laws and decrees, will be protected by the Government.'

"Mao Tze-tung in his report dwelt in detail on 'diplomatic problems' [words missing] principle of the Chinese Communist Party in diplomatic policy, declared Mao Tze-tung, 'is the establishment and consolidation of the diplomatic relations with other countries, the solution of mutually related wartime and postwar problems, such as the cooperation in fighting, peace conference, commercial intercourse, investments, [words missing] of thorough extermination of the Japanese aggressors, upholding of world peace [words missing] for equal and independent status of the nation [words missing] interests and friendship of nations and peoples.'

"INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

"Also the Atlantic Charter and resolutions was [words missing] Moscow, Cairo, Tehran, and Crimea international conferences, Mao Tze-tung said, that the Chinese Communist Party [words missing] the Crimea Conference on this question. The Chinese Communist Party 'welcomes the San Francisco United Nations Conference and has sent its representative to join the Chinese delegation in order to express the will of the Chinese people.'

"Mao Tze-tung opined that the Crimea line accords [words missing] with the policy held by the Chinese Communist Party in the settlement of the Chinese and oriental question. He is of the opinion that a policy similar to that of [words missing] be adopted in the Orient and China."

4-POINT PROGRAM

"He said that '(1) The Japanese aggressors must be ultimately defeated and the Japanese Fascist military and the causes producing them thoroughly exterminated. There should be on halfway compromise: (2) [words missing] the vestige of fascism in China must be exterminated without allowing the least trace to remain; (3) domestic peace must be established in China and civil war not allowed to recur; (4) the Kuomintang dictatorship [words missing] must be abolished [words missing.] After its abolition it should at first be supplanted by a provisional democratic coalition government fully supported by the whole nation. [Words missing] territories having been recovered, the regular coalition government executing the popular will should be set up through free and unrestricted elections."

SOVIET UNION

"Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, '[We are of the opinion—Ed.] that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity toward the Soviet Union and swiftly improve [Sino—Ed.] Soviet diplomatic relations.' 'On behalf of the Chinese people, Mao Tze-tung expressed [words missing] which has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in China's war [words missing] liberated and expressed welcome of Marshal Stalin's speech [words missing] and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.'

"Mao Tze-tung added: 'We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.'"

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

"Regarding Sino-Anglo and Sino-American diplomatic relations, Mao Tze-tung said: 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, American and Great Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to China, deserve our thanks. [Words missing] will or Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people. If any foreign government helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed.'

"Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China [words missing], Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese people welcome [words missing] Chinese people on a footing of equality. But he pointed out, China 'definitely cannot rely on an [words missing] equality [words missing] being given by the good will of foreign governments and peoples. [Words missing] and actual footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese people

to build up politically, economically, and culturally a new democratic country, which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous, and strong. China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy of the Kuomintang government at present in force?"

FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES

"Mao Tze-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to the countries in the Far East: After the [words missing] unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors, all democratic [words missing] of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough extermination of the Japanese [words missing] would not be possible to guarantee peace in the Pacific [asterisks supplied by Yen-an—Ed.] 'The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should so help the Korean people to attain liberation [words missing].' With regard to Thailand, she 'should be dealt with according to the measures of dealing with a Fascist turncoat.'" (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May 2, 1945.)

EXHIBIT No. 254

JUNE 1944.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING AMERICAN POLICY

I. The situation in China is rapidly becoming critical

A. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as military, has so far been eminently successful.

Japan has had the choice of two alternatives.

1. It could beat China to its knees. But this would have required large-scale military operations and a large and continuing army occupation. And there was the danger that it might have driven the Kuomintang to carry out a real mobilization of the people, thus making possible effective resistance and perhaps rendering the Japanese task as long and costly as it has been in north China.

2. Or Japan could maintain just enough pressure on China to cause slow strangulation. Based on the astute use of puppets, the understanding of the continuing struggle for power within China (including the Kuomintang-Communist conflict), and the knowledge that Chiang expects to have the war won for him outside of China by his allies, this policy had the advantage that as long as the Kuomintang leaders saw a chance for survival they would not take the steps necessary to energize an effective war. It would thus remove any active or immediate threat to Japan's flank, and permit consolidation and gradual extension of the important Japanese-held bases in China. Finally, it would permit the accomplishment of these aims at a relatively small cost.

Japan chose the second alternative, accepting the gamble that the Kuomintang would behave exactly as it has. Like many other Japanese gambles, it has so far proved to have been nicely calculated. China is dying a lingering death by slow strangulation. China does not now constitute any threat to Japan. And China cannot, if the present situation continues, successfully resist a determined Japanese drive to seize our offensive bases in east China.

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past 10 years.

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses are becoming accentuated, and there is taking place a reversal of the process of unification.

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is general feeling of hopelessness.

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away from the larger cities, and Government mandates and measures of control cannot be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoralized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress; the weight of years of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and leadership they once had.

5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may increase in scale and find political motivation.

6. The Provincial groups, are making common cause with one another and with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their positions. Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.

7. Unrest within the Kuomintang Armies is increasing, as shown in one important instance by the "young generals' conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher plane the war-zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence and are thus creating a "new warlordism."

8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows no signs of being closed but grows more critical with the passage of time; the inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.

9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissension and cliquism within the party, which grow more rather than less acute, the leadership is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers' clique.

10. The Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be "sage" as well as leader—shown, for instance, by "China's Destiny" and his book on economics—have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming more outspoken.

These symptoms of deterioration and internal stress have been increased by the defeat in Honan and will be further accelerated if, as seems likely, the Japanese succeed in partially or wholly depriving the Central Government of east China south of the Yangtze.

In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese security, the role in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.

C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiatives: on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.

Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and to the presence of obvious signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the central executive committee.

1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations.

The result is the enthronement of reaction.

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitutionalism remains an empty promise for which the only "preparation" is a half-hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the Constitution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character to the existing but important People's Political Council are ignored.

On the contrary, the trend is still in the other direction. Through such means as compulsory political training for Government posts, emphasis on the political nature of the army, through control, and increasing identification of the party and Government, the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for "Ein Volk, ein Reich,

ein Führer," even though such a policy in China is inevitably doomed to failure.

The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the authoritarian controls on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the paraphernalia of a police state—the multiple and omnipresent secret-police organizations, the gendarmerie, and so forth—it continues to strengthen them as its last resort for internal security. (For the reenforcement of the most important of these German-inspired and Gestapo-like organizations we must, unfortunately, bear some responsibility.)

Obsessed by the growing and potential threat of the Communists, who it fears may attract the popular support its own nature makes impossible, the Kuomintang, despite the pretext—to meet foreign and Chinese criticism—of conducting negotiations with the Communists, continues to adhere to policies and plans which can only result in civil war. In so doing, it shows itself blind to the facts: that its internal political and military situation is so weak that success without outside assistance is most problematic, that such a civil war would hasten the process of disintegration and the spread of chaos; that it would prevent the prosecution of any effective war against Japan; and that the only parties to benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. Preparations for this civil war include an alliance with the present Chinese puppets which augur ill for future unity and democracy.

2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.

It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption, which is one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation, all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with intimate political connections.

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as, for instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulations.

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft production to run down, as they, of course, must when it is more profitable for speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal productive process.

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the manufacture and trade in luxury goods, many of which come from areas under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.

It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and increases revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to bog down in corruption and inefficiency to the point that possibly not more than one-third of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge Government funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and foreign currency.

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China, such as the growing concentration of landholdings, extortionate rents, and ruinous interest rates, and the impact of inflation.

3. On the external front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly short-sighted by progressive estrangement of its allies.

By persistence in tactics of bargaining, bluff, and blackmail, most inappropriate to its circumstances, and its continuing failure to deal openly and frankly, and to extend whole-hearted cooperation, which its own interests demand, the Kuomintang is alienating China's most important ally, the United States. It has already alienated its other major potential ally, Soviet Russia, toward which its attitude is as irrational and short-sighted as it is toward the Communists. The latest example of this is the irresponsible circulation of the report that Soviet Russia and Japan have signed a secret military agreement permitting Japanese troop withdrawals from Manchuria.

It is allowing this situation to develop at a time when its survival is dependent as never before upon foreign support. But the Kuomintang is endangering not only itself by its rash foreign policy: There are indications that it is anxious to create friction between the United States and Great Britain and Russia. When speedy victory, and any victory at all, demands maximizing of

agreements and the minimizing of frictions, such maneuvers amount to sabotage of the war effort of the United Nations.

4. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from active participation.

Its most important present contribution is to allow us, at our own and fantastic cost, to build and use air bases in China.

It delayed, perhaps too long for success, to allow forces designated for the purpose and trained and equipped by us to take the offensive in west Yunnan, even though needed to support the American-Chinese campaign in north Burma, the purpose of which is to open a life line into China and facilitate the eventual landing on the China coast. It agreed to this action only after long months of obstruction.

It fails to make effective use of American equipment given to it, as it also failed with earlier Russian supplies. Equipment brought into China has often not been transported to the fighting fronts. In other cases it has been known to have been hoarded or diverted to nonmilitary purpose. China has displayed a dog in the manger attitude in regard to equipment consigned to China and deteriorating in India for lack of transportation. It has concealed and refused to make available to our forces hoards of supplies such as gasoline known to exist in China, even when the emergency was great and China's own interest directly served.

It has consistently refused to consolidate and efficiently administer transportation. In the past this resulted in great losses of supplies in the Japanese capture of Burma and west Yunnan; now it is crippling Chinese internal transportation on which military activity must depend.

It has allowed military cooperation to be tied up with irrelevant financial demands which can only be described as a form of blackmail. It has made these excessive demands in spite of the fact that American expenditures in China (against which there are almost no balancing Chinese payments) continually add to the large Chinese nest egg of foreign exchange, which cannot be used in China at present and thus constitutes in effect a "kitty" being hoarded for postwar use.

It has failed to implement military requisitioning laws to assist us in obtaining supplies in China and has left us at the mercy of conscienceless profiteers, some of whom have been known to have official connections. It has permitted the imposition on us of fantastic prices, made more so by a wholly unrealistic exchange rate, for articles in some cases originally supplied to China through American credits. It seemingly has ignored the fact that the more supplies that can be obtained in China, the greater the tonnage from India that can be devoted to other essential military items.

It remains uncooperative and at times obstructive in American efforts to collect vital intelligence regarding the enemy in China. This attitude is exemplified by the disappointing fruits of promised cooperation by Chinese espionage organizations (toward which we have expended great effort and large sums); by the continued obstruction, in the face of agreement, to visits by American observers to the actual fighting fronts, and by the steadfast refusal to permit any contact with the Communist areas. It apparently remains oblivious to the urgent military need, both in China and in other related theaters, for this intelligence regarding our common enemy, and it seemingly cares little for the fact that exclusion from Communist-controlled territory hampers our long-range bombing of Japan and may cost needless loss of American lives.

In its own war effort a pernicious and corrupt conscription system which works to insure the selection and retention of the unfit, since the ablest and the strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out, or desert. It starves and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military effectiveness is greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds of the people as a sentence of death. At the same time it refuses to follow the suggestion that the army should be reduced to the size that could be adequately fed, medically cared for, trained and armed. It bases this refusal on mercenary political considerations—the concentration on the continuing struggle for power in China, and the ultimate measurement of power in terms of armies.

For the same reason it refuses to mobilize its soldiers and people for the only kind of war which China is in a position to wage effectively—a people's guerrilla war. Perhaps our entry into the war has simplified the problems of the Kuomintang. As afraid of the forces within the country, its own people, as it is of the Japanese, it now seeks to avoid conflict with the Japanese in order to concentrate on the perpetuation of its own power.

The condition to which it has permitted its armies to deteriorate is shown most recently by the defeat in Honan, which is due not only to lack of heavy armament but also to poor morale and miserable condition of the soldiers, absence of support by the people, who have been consistently mistreated, lack of leadership, and prevalent corruption among the officers through such practices as trade with the occupied areas.

If we accept the obvious indications that the present Kuomintang leadership does not want to fight the Japanese any more than it can help, we must go further and recognize that it may even seek to prevent China from becoming the battleground for large-scale campaigns against the Japanese land forces. This helps to explain the Kuomintang's continued dealings with the Japanese and puppets. Thus the Kuomintang may hope to avert determined Japanese attack, maintain its own position and power, save the east China homes of practically all of its officials, and preserve its old economic-industrial base in the coastal cities.

If this analysis is valid it reveals on the part of the Kuomintang leadership, which means the generalissimo, a cynical disregard of the added cost of the inevitable prolongation of the war in American lives and resources.

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the party.

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against Japan itself nor to cooperate wholeheartedly with the American Army in China, and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.

The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description becomes ever more true: the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural gentry landlords, the militarists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy and merchant bankers having intimate connections with the bureaucrats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.

The relation of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded above is clear.

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience of the war, is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the party's selfish shortcomings.

It cannot fight an effective war because this is impossible without greater reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform can now regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of passive inertia. They are thus sacrificing China's national interests to their own selfish ends.

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give wholehearted cooperation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to carry out or to make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears that large-scale, widespread, and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing influence.

The Kuomintang cannot unify the country because it derives its support from the economically most conservative groups, who wish the retention of China's economically and socially backward agrarian society. These groups are incapable of bringing about China's industrialization, although they pay this objective elaborate lip service. They are also committed to the maintenance of an order which by its very nature fosters particularism and resists modern

centralization. Countless examples can be given to show the line-up of the party with the groups that oppose modernization and industrialization—such as connections with Szechwan warlords and militarists. The Kuomintang sees no objection to maintaining the economic interests of some of its component groups in occupied China or in preserving trade with occupied China, the criterion of which is not the national interest but its profitability to the engaging groups. This explains why free China's imports from occupied China consist largely of luxuries, against exports of food and strategic raw materials. It is therefore not surprising that there are many links, both political and economic, between the Kuomintang and the puppet regime.

E. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure; if that failure results in a collapse of China, it will have consequences disastrous both to our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far East.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the Kuomintang, under its present leadership, has neither the ability nor desire to undertake a program which could energize the war and check the process of internal disintegration. Its preoccupation with the maintenance and consolidation of its power must result, to the contrary, in acceleration rather than retardation of the rate of this disintegration. Unless it widens its base and changes its character, it must be expected to continue its present policies. It will not of its own volition take steps to bring about this broadening and reform. The opposite will be the case: Precisely because it has lost popular support, it is redoubling its efforts to maintain and monopolize control.

The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain to fail because they run counter to strong forces within the country and are forcing China into ruin. Since these policies are not favorable to us, nor of assistance in the prosecution of an effective war by China, their failure would not of itself be disastrous to American interests. For many reasons mentioned above, we might welcome the fall of the Kuomintang if it could immediately be followed by a progressive government able to unify the country and help us fight Japan.

But the danger is that the present drifting and deterioration under the Kuomintang may end in a collapse. The result would be the creation in China of a vacuum. This would eliminate any possibility in the near future of utilizing China's potential military strength. Because the Japanese and their puppets might be able to occupy this vacuum, at much less cost than by a major military campaign, it might also become impossible for us to exploit China's flank position and to continue operating from Chinese bases. The war would thus be prolonged and made more difficult.

Such a collapse would also initiate a period of internal chaos in China, which would deter the emergence of a strong and stable government, an indispensable precondition for stability and order in the Far East.

China, which might be a minor asset to us now, would become a major liability.

F. There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might avert the threatened collapse.

These groups, all increasingly dissatisfied with the Government and the party responsible for it, include the patriotic younger army officers; the small merchants; large sections of the lower ranks of the Government bureaucracy; most of the foreign returned students; the intelligentsia, including professors, students, and the professional classes; the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, who make up a sizable minority under the leadership of such men as Sun Fo; the minor parties and groups, some of which like the National Salvationists enjoy great prestige; the Chinese Communist Party; and the inarticulate but increasingly restless rural population.

The collective numbers and influence of these groups could be tremendous. A Kuomintang official recently admitted that resentment against the present Kuomintang Government is so widespread that if there were free, universal elections 80 percent of the votes might be cast against it. But most of these groups are nebulous and unorganized, feeling—like the farmers—perhaps only a blind dislike of conditions as they are. They represent different classes and varying political beliefs, where they have any at all. They are tending, however, to draw together in the consciousness of their common interest in the change of the status quo. This awakening and fusion is, of course, opposed by the Kuomintang with every means at its disposal.

The danger, as conditions grow worse, is that some of these groups may act independently and blindly. The effect may be to make confusion worse. Such might be the case in a military putsch, a possibility that cannot be disregarded.

The result might be something analogous to the Sian incident of 1936. But the greater delicacy and precariousness of the present situation would lend itself more easily to exploitation by the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang, the Japanese, or the puppets. Another possibility is the outbreak, on a much larger scale than heretofore, of unorganized and disruptive farmers revolts. A disturbing phenomenon is the apparent attempt now being made by some of the minority parties to effect a marriage of convenience with the provincial warlords, among the most reactionary and unscrupulous figures in Chinese politics and hardly crusaders for a new democracy.

The hopeful sign is that all of these groups are agreed that the basic problem in China today is political reform toward democracy. This point requires emphasis. It is only through political reform that the restoration of the will to fight, the unification of the country, the elimination of provincial warlordism, the solution of the Communist problem, the institution of economic policies which can avoid collapse, and the emergence of a government actually supported by the people can be achieved. Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic, and political.

It is clear beyond doubt that China's hope for internal peace and effective unity—certainly in the immediate future (which for the sake of the war must be our prior consideration) and probably in the long term as well—lies neither with the present Kuomintang nor with the Communists, but in a democratic combination of the liberal elements within the country, including these within the Kuomintang, and the probably large sections of the Communists who would be willing, by their own statements and past actions, to collaborate in the resurrection of a united front.

Given the known interest and attitudes of the Chinese people, we can be sure that measures to accomplish the solution of these problems will be undertaken in earnest by a broadly based government. Such a government—and only such a government—will galvanize China out of its military inertia by restoring national morale through such means as the reduction of the evils of conscription and stopping the maltreatment and starvation of the troops. Such a government—and only such a government—will automatically end the paralyzing internal dissension and political unrest. Such a government—and only such a government—will undertake the economic measures necessary to increase production, establish effective price controls, mobilize national resources, and end corruption, hoarding, speculation, and profiteering.

It is, of course, unrealistic to assume that such a broadly based democratic government can be established at one stroke, or that it can immediately achieve the accomplishment of these broad objectives. But progress will be made as, only as, the government moves toward democracy.

II. In the light of this developing crisis what should be the American attitude toward China?

It is impossible to predict exactly how far the present disintegration in China can continue without spectacular change in the internal situation and drastic effect on the war against Japan. But we must face the question whether we can afford passively to stand by and allow the process to continue to an almost certainly disastrous collapse, or whether we wish to do what we legitimately and practically can to arrest it. We need to formulate a realistic policy toward China.

A. The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dependence on us and will be forced to appeal for our support.

We must realize that when the process of disintegration gets out of hand it will be to us that the Kuomintang will turn for financial, political, and military salvation. The awareness of this dependence is the obvious and correct explanation of the Kuomintang's hypersensitivity to American opinion and criticism. The Kuomintang—and particularly the Generalissimo—know that we are the only disinterested, yet powerful, ally to whom China can turn.

The appeal will be made to us on many grounds besides the obvious, well-worn but still effective one of pure sentiment. They have said in the past and will say in the future that they could long ago have made peace with Japan on what are falsely stated would have been favorable terms. They have claimed and will claim again that their resistance and refusal to compromise with Japan saved Russia, Great Britain, and ourselves, ignoring the truth that our own refusal to compromise with Japan to China's disadvantage brought on Pearl Harbor and our involvement before we were ready. They have complained and will continue to complain that they have received less support in the form of materials than any other major ally, forgetting that they have done less fighting,

have not used the materials given, and would not have had the ability to use what they asked for. Finally, they have tried and will continue to try to lay the blame on us for their difficulties, distorting the effect of American Army expenditures in China and ignoring the fact that these expenditures are only a minor factor in the whole sorry picture of the mismanagement of the Chinese economy.

But however far-fetched these appeals, our flat refusal of them might have several embarrassing effects.

1. We would probably see China enter a period of internal chaos. Our war effort in this theater would be disrupted, instability in the Far East prolonged, and possible Russian intervention attracted.

2. We would be blamed by large sections of both Chinese and American public opinion for "abandoning" China after having been responsible for its collapse. (In a measure we would have brought such blame upon ourselves because we have tended to allow ourselves to become identified not merely with China but also with the Kuomintang and its policies. Henceforth, it may be the better part of valor to avoid too close identification with the Kuomintang.)

3. By an apparent abandonment of China in its hour of need, we would lose international prestige, especially in the Far East.

On the other hand, if we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms we would be buttressing, but only temporarily, a decadent regime which by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems. Both China and ourselves would be gaining only a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckoning. It is clear, therefore, that it is to our advantage to avoid a situation arising in which we would be presented with a Hobson's choice between two such unpalatable alternatives.

B. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence.

Circumstances are rapidly developing so that the Generalissimo will have to ask for the continuance and increase of our support. Weak as he is, he is in no position—and the weaker he becomes the less he will be able—to turn down or render nugatory any coordinated and positive policy we may adopt toward China. The cards are all in our favor. Our influence, intelligently used, can be tremendous.

C. There are three general alternatives open to us.

1. We may give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it altogether.

2. We may continue to give support to the Generalissimo, when and as he asks for it.

3. We may formulate a coordinated and positive policy toward China and take the necessary steps for its implementation.

D. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives in China.

The United States, if it so desired and if it had a coherent policy, could play an important and perhaps decisive role in—

1. Stimulating China to an active part in the war in the Far East, thus hastening the defeat of Japan.

2. Staving off economic collapse in China and bringing about basic political and economic reforms, thus enabling China to carry on the war and enhance the chances of its orderly postwar recovery.

3. Enabling China to emerge from the war as a major and stabilizing factor in postwar east Asia.

4. Winning a permanent and valuable ally in the progressive, independent, and democratic China.

E. We should adopt the third alternative—a coordinated and positive policy.

This is clear from an examination of the background of the present situation in China and the proper objectives of our policy there.

The first alternative must be rejected on immediate military grounds, but also for obvious long-range considerations. It would deprive us of valuable air bases and position on Japan's flank. Its adoption would prolong the war. We cannot afford to wash our hands of China.

The results of the second alternative—which, insofar as we have a China policy, has been the one we have been and are pursuing—speak for themselves. The substantial financial assistance we have given China has been frittered away with negligible, if any effect in slowing inflation and retarding economic collapse. The military help we have given has certainly not been used to increase China's war effort against Japan. Our political support has been used for the Kuomintang's own selfish purposes and to bolster its short-sighted and ruinous policies.

The third, therefore, is the only real alternative left to us. Granted the rejection of the first alternative, there is no longer a question of helping and advis-

ing China. China itself must request this help and advice. The only question is whether we give this help within a framework which makes sense, or whether we continue to give it in our present disjointed and absent-minded manner. In the past it has sometimes seemed that our right hand did not know what the left was doing. To continue without a coherent and coordinated policy will be dissipating our effort without either China or ourselves deriving any appreciable benefit. It can only continue to create new problems, in addition to these already troubling us, without any compensating advantages beyond those of indolent short-term expediency. But most important is the possibility that this haphazard giving, this serving of short-term expediency, may not be enough to save the situation; even with it, China may continue toward collapse.

F. This positive policy should be political.

The problem confronting us is whether we are to continue as in the past to ignore political considerations of direct military significance or whether we are to take a leaf out of the Japanese book and invoke even stronger existing political forces in China to achieve our military and long-term political objective.

We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic political reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exertion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically used.

III. The implementation of this political policy, though difficult in some respects, is practical and can be carried out by many means

A. Diplomatic finesse will be required in the execution of this policy in such a way as not to offend the strong current of genuine nationalism (as distinguished from the chauvinism of the Kuomintang) which characterizes almost all sections of the Chinese people. There must be a sensitivity to the situation in China and the political changes there so that there can be an appropriate and immediate stiffening or softening of the measures which we undertake. This tact and sensitivity will be required not only of the top policy-directing agency but of all other agencies actually implementing that policy and concerned in direct relations with China.

There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China.

The present lack of effective cooperation between the various Government agencies—State, War, and some of the newer autonomous organizations—detracts from the efficient functioning of each, and weakens American influence, when it is most needed.

It must be recognized—and it will be even more the case under the policy proposed—that all our dealings with all our activities in China have political implication. Coordination is absolutely essential for the achievement of unity of policy and synchronization of action. Its attainment will require intelligent and forceful direction both in Washington and in Chungking.

The logical person to coordinate activities in Chungking is obviously, because of the broad issues involved, the Ambassador. Similarly the corresponding person in Washington might be the Chief of the China Section of the State Department who would watch the whole field for the President or a responsible Cabinet member. Positive action, of course, would depend on constant and close consultation, both in Washington and in the field, between the representatives of the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the other agencies operating in China.

C. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there should be careful selection and timing.

Some measures will be simple and immediately useful. Others should be deferred until primary steps have been taken. Still others will be more forceful or direct and their use will depend on the Kuomintang's recalcitrance to change its ways. We must avoid overplaying or underplaying our hand.

D. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this positive policy include the following:

1. Negative: (a) Stop our present mollycoddling of China by: Restricting lend-lease, cutting down training of Chinese military cadets, discontinuing training of the Chinese Army, taking a firmer stand in the financial negotiations, or stopping the shipment of gold. Any or all of these restrictive measures can be reversed as the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang become more cooperative in carrying on military operations, using equipment and training supplied, being

reasonable on financial questions, or allowing us freedom in such military requirements as establishing contact with the Communist areas.

(b) Stop building up the Generalissimo's and the Kuomintang's prestige internationally and in the United States. Such "face" serves only to bolster the regime internally and to harden it in its present policies. Our inclusion of China as one of the Big Four served a useful purpose in the early stage of the war and as a counter to Japanese racial propaganda but has now lost its justification.

We make fools of ourselves by such actions as the attention given to the meaningless utterances of Chu Hsueh-fen as a spokesman of Chinese labor and the prominence accorded to China in the International Labor Office Conference. Our tendency toward overlavish praise is regarded by the Chinese as a sign of either stupidity or weakness.

Abandonment of glib generalities for hard-headed realism in our attitude toward China will be quickly understood, without the resentment that would probably be felt against the British. We can make it clear that praise will be given when praise is due.

(c) Stop making unconditional and grandiose promises of help along such lines as UNNRA, postwar economic aid, and political support. We can make it clear without having to be very explicit that we stand ready to help China when China shows itself deserving. This ties into the more positive phase of publicity and propaganda to the effect, for instance, that American postwar economic aid will not be extended to build up monopolistic enterprise or support the landlord-gentry class but in the interests of a democratic people.

(d) Discontinue our present active collaboration with Chinese secret police organizations, which support the forces of reaction and stand for the opposite of our American democratic aims and ideals. This collaboration, which results in the effective strengthening of a Gestapo-like organization, is becoming increasingly known in China. It confuses and disillusion Chinese liberals, who look to us as their hope, and it weakens our position with the Kuomintang leaders in pressing for democratic reform.

2. Positive: (a) High Government officials in conversation with Chinese leaders in Washington and in China can make known our interest in democracy and unity in China and our dissatisfaction with present Kuomintang military, financial, and other policies. Such suggestions will bear great weight if they come from the President and advantage can be taken of opportunities such as the visits of the Vice President Wallace to China and H. H. Kung to the United States. A progressive stage can be questions or statements by Members of Congress regarding affairs in China.

(b) We should take up the repeated, but usually insincere requests of the Kuomintang for advice. If advisers are asked for, we should see that they are provided, that good men are selected, and that they get all possible aid and support from us. While the Kuomintang will be reluctant to accept the advice we may give, its mere reiteration will have some effect.

(c) We should seek to extend our influence on Chinese opinion by every practical means available.

The Office of War Information should go beyond its present function of reporting American war news to pointing up the values of democracy as a permanent political system and as an aid in the waging of war against totalitarianism. We should attempt to increase the dissemination in China, by radio or other more direct means, of constructive American criticism. This should include recognition and implied encouragement to liberal and progressive forces within China. Care should be taken to keep this criticism on a helpful, constructive, and objective plane and to avoid derogatory attacks which may injure Chinese nationalistic sensitivities. To do this work, there may have to be some expansion of the OWI in China and of our propaganda directed toward this country.

A second line is the active expansion of our cultural relations program. The present diversion, by Koumintang wishes, to technical subjects should be rectified and greater emphasis laid on social sciences, cultural, and practical political subjects such as American Government administration. We should increase our aid and support to intellectuals in China by the many means already explored, such as aid to research in China, translation of articles, and opportunity for study or lecturing in the United States.

Other, more indirect lines, are the expansion of our American Foreign Service representation in China to new localities (since each office is in some measure a center of American influence and contact with Chinese liberals and returned students from the United States) and the careful indoctrination of the American

Army personnel in China to create, by example and their attitude toward Chinese, favorable impressions of America and the things that America stands for. Where contact between American and Chinese military personnel has been close, as in Burma, the result has apparently been a democratizing influence.

(d) We should assist the education of public opinion in the United States toward a realistic but constructively sympathetic attitude toward China. The most obvious means would be making background information available, in an unofficial way, to responsible political commentators, writers, and research workers. Without action on our part their writings will become known to Chinese Government circles and from them to other politically minded groups. We should, however, coordinate this with the activity described in the section above to promote dissemination in China.

(e) We should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements in the Kuomintang, the minor parties, and the Communists. This can, and should for its maximum effect, be done in an open, aboveboard manner. The recognition which it implies will be quickly understood by the Chinese.

Further steps in this direction could be publicity to liberals, such as distinguished intellectuals. When possible they may be included in consideration for special honors or awards, given recognition by being asked to participate in international commissions or other bodies, and invited to travel or lecture in the United States. A very effective action of this type would be an invitation to Madam Sun Yat-sen from the White House.

We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural relations, and other lines of work in China.

(f) We should continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists. This includes contact with the Communist representatives in Chungking, publicity on the blockade and the situation between the two parties, and continued pressure for the dispatch of observers to north China. At the same time we should stress the importance of north China militarily for intelligence regarding Japanese battle order, Japanese air strength, weather reporting, bombing data, and damage assessment, and air crew evacuation and rescue work. We should consider the eventual advance of active operations against the Japanese to north China and the question of assistance to or cooperation with Communist and guerrilla forces. If our reasonable requests based on urgent military grounds do not receive a favorable response, we should send our military observers anyway.

(g) We should consider the training and equipping of provincial and other armies in China in cases where we can be satisfied that they will fight the Japanese.

(h) We should continue to press, and if necessary insist, on getting American observers to the actual fighting fronts. We should urge, and when possible assist, the improvement of the condition of the Chinese soldier, especially his treatment, clothing, feeding, and medical care.

(i) We should publicize statements by responsible Government officials indicating our interest in Chinese unity and our attitude toward such questions as the use of American lend-lease supplies by the Kuomintang in a civil war. It is interesting for instance, that Under Secretary Welles' letter to Browder regarding American interest in Chinese unity was considered so important by the Kuomintang that publication in China was prohibited.

This program is, of course, far from complete. Other measures will occur to the policy agency and will suggest themselves as the situation in China develops.

E. Most of these measures can be applied progressively.

This is true, for instance, of the various negative actions suggested, and of the conversations, statements, and other lines of endeavor to influence public opinion in China. A planned activity of encouragement and attention to liberals, minor party leaders, and the Communists can advance.

F. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an uncoordinated and only partially effective manner.

What is needed chiefly is an integration, systematic motivation and planned expansion of activities in which we are already, perhaps in some cases unconsciously, engaged. We do, for instance, try to maintain contact with liberal groups; we have expressed the desire to send observers to the Communist area; we have a weak cultural relations program; and the OWI has made some attempts to propagandize American democratic ideals.

G. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in Chinese affairs.

It must be admitted that some of the measures proposed would involve taking more than normal interest in the affairs of another sovereign nation. But they do not go so far as to infringe on Chinese sovereignty. If we choose to make lend-lease conditional on a better war effort by China, it is also China's freedom to refuse to accept it on these conditions. We do not go nearly as far as imperialistic countries have often done in the past. We obviously do not, for instance, suggest active assistance or subsidizing of rival parties to the Kuomintang, as the Russians did in the case of the Communists.

Furthermore, the Chinese Government would find it difficult to object. The Chinese have abused their freedom to propagandize in the United States by the statements and writing of such men as Lin Yu-tang. They have also, and through Lin Yu-tang, who carries an official passport as a representative of the Chinese Government, engaged in "cultural relations" work. They have freely criticized American policies and American leaders. And they have attempted to dabble in American politics, through Madame Chiang, Luce, Willkie, and Republican Congressmen. They have had, and will continue to have, freedom to try to influence public opinion in the United States in the same way that we will try to do it in China.

EXHIBIT No. 255

MILITARY WEAKNESS OF OUR FAR EASTERN POLICY

FEBRUARY 14, 1945.

To the Commanding General, USAF:

American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be subordinate.

The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources, the attainment of our primary objective will be unnecessarily delayed.

There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utilization in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the generalissimo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources against the Japanese through fear that it will weaken them vis-à-vis other groups. A recent instance is the lack of resistance to the Japanese capture of the southern section of the Hankow-Canton Railway. Equally, the Kuomintang is jealously intent on preventing the strengthening of other groups: Witness the blockade of the Communists.

The aim of American policy, as indicated clearly by official statements in the United States, is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On the contrary, it has retarded its achievement. It has had this undesired and undesirable effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang government that we will continue to support it, and it alone. The Kuomintang government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.

We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable influence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplomatic means has failed; we should not be deceived by any face-saving formula re-

sulting from the discussions because neither side is willing to bear the onus of failure. We should also realize that no government can survive in China without American support.

There are in China important elements interested in governmental reform by which unity and active prosecution of the war may result. Aside from the Chinese Communists, however, all of these elements are cowed by a widespread secret police system and lack any firm rallying point. They will remain helpless to do anything constructive as long as statements of our policy indicate that we are champions of the status quo.

At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows:

"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological preferences for one side or the other."

A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united front coalition. The present opposition groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a united ally.

Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force in the internal politics of China and that force should be used to accomplish our primary mission. In spite of hero-worshipping publicity in the United States, Chiang Kai-shek is not China and by our present narrow policy of outspokenly supporting his dog-in-the-manger attitude we are needlessly cutting ourselves off from millions of useful allies; many of whom are already organized and in position to engage the enemy. These allies, let it be clear, are not confined to Communist-controlled areas of China, but are to be found everywhere in the country. The Communist movement is merely the most prominent manifestation of a condition which is potentially present throughout China. Other important groups favor the same program as that espoused by the so-called Communist-agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions—but the Communists are the only group at present having the organization and strength openly to foster such revolutionary ideas.

Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into a position from which we have only one approach to the objective. Support of the generalissimo is desirable insofar as there is concrete evidence that he is willing and able to marshal the full strength of China against Japan. Support of the generalissimo is but one means to an end; it is not an end in itself, but by present statements of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should be an immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of approach to our primary objective may be restored.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you testify that to the best of your recollection the reports of these four political officers were uniformly derogatory of the Chinese Nationalist Government?

General WEDEMAYER. I could state that the reports oral and written of three, Mr. Service, Mr. Davies, and Mr. Ludden, were very commendatory in references to the Communists, and frequently derogatory in references to the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, can you recall that any friction or disagreement was openly expressed between yourself and General Hurley on the one hand and these political advisers on the other? You have testified that generally you were in support of General Hurley's position.

General WEDEMAYER. Well, my position out there was I was just a military man and I looked up to the Ambassador as the senior rep-

representative of my country in that area. And when I first reported to take over the command I paid my respects to Ambassador Gaus. He was the Ambassador to China at that time. And shortly thereafter, a month or so later, he resigned, and Mr. Patrick J. Hurley became the Ambassador. And I evolved a system of working together, and, as I stated, I recognized him as a senior, a civilian, and I deferred to his ideas in the political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural fields. In the military field I felt that I was responsible and he did too.

Senator FERGUSON. General, when you were assigned to China on this mission, was it to carry out a new policy?

General WEDEMAYER. No, sir, I received no instructions about a new policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You were assigned to carry out a mission which in your opinion was the mission previous to your assignment?

General WEDEMAYER. To support the Nationalist Government of China and to actually, to put it bluntly, kill as many Japanese as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. To help them in the Japanese cause.

General WEDEMAYER. To assist them or to cooperate with them in their military operations against the Japanese, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you understood that that was a carrying on of a policy that had been there?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you found in the files of the foreign officers a different philosophy?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you kept to the assignment that you felt that you had and carried that out as nearly as you could?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was the policy at least of Hurley who came there as the Ambassador of the United States?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, there was a question, I think, on the record: Did you recall any expressions of disagreement between any of these Foreign Service officers and yourself and General Hurley?

General WEDEMAYER. Well, I did not have any disagreement with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear of any?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about it, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMAYER. Well, Ambassador Hurley moved over to my house during the winter of 1944-45 because the Japs used to bomb us there and a big boulder had rolled into the Ambassador's house, so he moved into my house for a few weeks while his house was being renovated. And he, in the evening discussions in my home, suggested that these four political advisers that I had be placed under him. That seemed logical to me. I looked to the Ambassador for my instructions in political matters, diplomatic matters, and I told him I would agree to that.

So we were ordered home in February of 1945 by President Roosevelt. And when we got back to this country, to the Capital, Mr. Hurley requested that those four men be returned to him and to operate in the Embassy, and said that General Wedemeyer had no

objection; which was correct. That was done. Mr. Stimson, as Secretary of War, had requested those four political advisers for his friend General Stilwell when General Stilwell assumed command out there some years earlier.

So, Mr. Stimson was interested in my view, and I had lunch with him and expressed agreement that they should be put back over under the Embassy. I did not express disapproval or concern about these men. I had none. They had been loyal to me. I did not agree with their reports. I found them to be very bright, keen, and they certainly knew most of the Chinese leaders. But, as I indicated, I did not analyze their reports nearly as carefully as I should have, and talk to them about it, because I was so busily involved with military duties. They were put over under the Ambassador.

When we got back, we were only home about a week, and we flew back to China, and Mr. Hurley then had some difficulties with these men. He felt, as he expressed it, that they were undermining his efforts to bring about a stability in the China area. He finally had one of them transferred. And some had already left, I think. Mr. Service had come back, and Mr. Emmerson and Ludden and Davies still were there. And finally Davies was transferred to Moscow, and he came over to say good-bye to me. At that time Hurley was still living with me, and they had quite a heated argument in my home.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you tell us what the argument was about?

General WEDEMEYER. Of course, one does not remember all of the details.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that. Just give us the substance.

General WEDEMEYER. This has not occurred to me in the years intervening. But Hurley stated to Mr. Davies that he, Davies, had not supported Mr. Hurley and had made reports that contravened American policy as he, Hurley, understood it, and that he was going to ask the State Department to relieve Mr. Davies; that is, to discharge him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean discharge him entirely from the service?

General WEDEMEYER. Discharge him entirely from the Foreign Service. Mr. Hurley made that statement.

And Mr. Davies protested very strongly and became highly emotional, as did the Ambassador, and there were exchanges. I do not recall, really, in fairness to either one of them, what was said.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you can give the substance of it.

General WEDEMEYER. The substance was that Mr. Davies felt that he had been loyal, and Mr. Hurley that he had not been loyal to him, Hurley, and finally Mr. Hurley agreed not to request his discharge but definitely that he should be transferred and go to Moscow to see at first hand the operation of some of these ideas that Mr. Davies had been espousing.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it was Mr. Hurley's idea that he would not ask for his discharge from the service?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But he recommended that Davies be sent to Moscow to experience things that he had been advocating in China?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. That is my recollection of the conversation that took place in my house in about February or March or April, right around in there.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, you felt, when their advice was not in line with what you thought your mission was, that you, being a military man and assigned there to do a certain mission, did not have any personal feeling against them?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes; I did, Senator, but I was too busy with the military job. But if I had known—those men were under me, and if I ever have anybody, civilian or military, under me, and he is doing anything that I interpret as disloyal, I will go after him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you interpret these things as being disloyal?

General WEDEMEYER. I did not, sir, because I did not analyze them as I should have carefully.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put it to you now: What is your opinion now after you read these reports in the light of all the circumstances? Were they disloyal to the Government and the policy that we had there?

General WEDEMEYER. I cannot answer that question, sir; honestly I cannot answer it. But I can say this: If I had followed their advice, communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly than it did. And I would not have carried out my directive or my instructions as I understood them.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is an answer to my question.

General WEDEMEYER. I would hesitate to call any man categorically disloyal, sir, unless I had the proof.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand your answer.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, when General Marshall went to China, did you ever see his directive that he took with him?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who prepared that directive?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't. I think that General Hull and General Lincoln and General Marshall himself had something to do with it.

Subsequently I saw a carbon copy of that directive in the Pentagon, and it had the initials J. C. V. in the lower left-hand corner, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose initials could they be?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the head of the Far Eastern Division was John Carter Vincent at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you saw the initials J. C. V. on the draft of the directive?

General WEDEMEYER. I have seen them on a carbon copy of that directive, sir. Whether it was the final directive, I don't know. I mean, I did not compare the phraseology exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I wonder whether you have an opinion as to why it is so difficult for committees to actually ascertain who did prepare this directive. Why should there be any argument about who prepared this or any secrecy about who prepared it? Why should it not be an open book?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Senator Ferguson, I can understand why we should protect sources of information in the FBI. I can understand that where the FBI at times does not want you to have access, or anyone to have access, to their files.

Senator FERGUSON. To their source.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. You will destroy a source.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that.

General WEDEMEYER. Or jeopardize a source. But I do not understand at all why the representatives of the American people do not have more information concerning national and international developments.

Senator FERGUSON. As to who prepared a document.

General WEDEMEYER. I think that who prepared a document certainly should be available to you representatives of the American peoples.

I could not understand, for example, why Wedemeyer's name was mentioned so frequently in the MacArthur hearings, associated with a telegram, and yet we could not find out who in the State Department had direct contact with the same matter. And I do not know to this day, and I tried to find out. Yet my name was bandied about freely.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was not a secret on your part?

General WEDEMEYER. And my permission was not requested either. If I had some compunction about it, I certainly was not given the opportunity to express it, but I did not care.

Senator FERGUSON. When it comes to a State Department official, then it becomes a deep, dark secret?

General WEDEMEYER. I could not say that as a generality, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It did in that case.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is certainly true as to who prepared the document of the Marshall situation; is it not?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't know, sir. I did not know that you people had made the request to get this information, sir. I did not know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that at this time we have not made such a request for that document.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I now suggest and ask that the Chair and the committee obtain this information as to who actually did, and let us have it on the record so that it will not be in dispute.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean we will try to obtain it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is all the committee can do. It can do its best.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will proceed through its chairman at once to try to secure the information by every means that we know of. I wish to say, however, that the Chair has had some difficulty in times past.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness on the stand now, General Wedemeyer, rendered a very valuable report that would have been of great interest to the people of this country, and the chairman, then chairman of another committee of the Senate, attempted by subpoena to get that report, and the subpoena was denied, or the document was denied to the subpoena officer. So, we may have some trouble here again, but we will try.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, do you recall the recommendations made in the directive that General Marshall took with him to China?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I could give you substantially what was in it. It required General Marshall, as a special envoy of the President, to go to China and to broaden the base of the Government, to bring about a coalition of the various political parties there and to create stability in that area.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say that was the substance of the directive?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General Wedemeyer, were you in China when General Marshall first arrived on his mission?

General WEDEMEYER. You mean on this mission? Yes, sir; I met him at the airport.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you the ranking American military commander in the field at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you consulted on military matters by General Marshall in the execution of his mission?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I gave General Marshall a résumé of the situation that maintained in China at the end of the war and indicated my intention, which was hardly necessary to do, but that every resource in the China theater was at his disposal to help him out.

Mr. MORRIS. Did General Marshall make an effort to bring about a coalition between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Communist government?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think he made a very continued and studied effort to bring about a coalition of the political factions, and also to do away with the military forces of any particular political party, and to amalgamate them with the political forces, and they would be the army or the military force of the political entity that he ended up with. Obviously, it would be impossible to carry on a political entity if Republicans had an army and Democrats had an army in our own country.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, do you have any knowledge that General Marshall imposed an embargo on the Chinese Nationalist Government at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. The term "embargo," in the connotation of that term, I do not know whether it had application to what I know about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us just what you know?

General WEDEMEYER. There was, as I recall it, \$500,000,000 appropriated by the Congress to help China. I do not know whether the help was military or economic or both, but I know that General Marshall was authorized by the President to determine the assistance, economic and military, that would be given to China. This, of course, was to assist him in bringing about this coalition that he was ordered to accomplish.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you know that this money was withheld from the Chinese Government?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, when I returned, I was put in command of the Second Army over here with headquarters in Baltimore. But I did receive calls from Chinese friends here telling me that they were desperate for ammunition and for maintenance parts for their vehicles, American vehicles that they had secured during the war, and they urged me to do what I could. I was in no official status and could

do nothing about it, but it would indicate that there were retardations or stoppages of the flow of supplies to China. That was my only contact with that situation.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no further questions to ask General Wedemeyer on this score.

Senator FERGUSON. I have a question.

You did answer some questions to the United States News; is that correct?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I am asking you in relation to the answers to questions on how our policy was influenced. Do you recall those answers?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir. I think Mr. David Lawrence asked me if in my judgment there were influences—

The CHAIRMAN. I think the questions and answers might be submitted.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to know whether or not there was any change that you wanted to make in those answers or whether that is your opinion.

General WEDEMAYER. No, sir; that is my considered opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your considered opinion?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we insert this.

General WEDEMAYER. I would like to emphasize there, Senator Ferguson, that in referring to that I know of my own personal experience that there are thousands of loyal Americans in Government service.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that in here.

General WEDEMAYER. And I want it emphasized here, sir, because I do not want in any way to reflect against the many of my own comrades in military service, or against many fine people in the Government service in general.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not detract from these answers in here?

General WEDEMAYER. Not one iota, sir. I believe those statements to be correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that this excerpt of an interview of General Wedemeyer appearing in the September 14, 1951, issue of United States News and World Report be inserted in the record. That is, only that portion of it beginning with How Policy Was Influenced and down to Basic Mistakes of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is proper. It may be inserted in the record.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

HOW POLICY WAS INFLUENCED

Question. What do you mean by "sinister influences"?

Answer. Communist influences which had their genesis in the Kremlin, but which were implemented by representatives in this country, both by Soviet representatives and, unfortunately, by some of our own misguided citizens.

Question. Inside the Government?

Answer. Undoubtedly to a limited extent. I do not want to reflect against the thousands of loyal Americans in Government service who have been stead-

fast in their devotion to duty and to the principles of democracy. They are in the vast majority.

Question. I suppose you include the State Department?

Answer. Yes. I mean in many departments.

Question. Do you think there are communistic influences in the military departments?

Answer. I never came into direct contact with a man in uniform in any of the services of whom I could say categorically that he was a Communist or had Communist connections.

Question. But were there suspicions as to that voiced from time to time in the Far East?

Answer. Yes. Take the newspaper that we published and disseminated widely in the China theater during and subsequent to the war. It was called The China Lantern. There were editorials that appeared in that paper from time to time that were inimical to the best interests of our country. The men on the staff of that paper were in the military service.

Question. Going back to this matter of the influences on our policy, isn't it possible that some of these influences were those that swallowed the communistic line and believed it to be the better line of the two?

Answer. Yes, sir; I accept that explanation. But as far back as 1933, when we recognized Soviet Russia, I perceived in my small way the real implications of communism. I had read Das Kapital and had studied and followed as much as I could the developments in Soviet Russia. During the 2 years, 1936 to 1938, that I was in Germany as a student at the German War College, the Nazis contributed considerably—not intentionally—to my education pertaining to Soviet objectives. It was not all propaganda that the Nazis put out about the Soviets. I warned both civil and military leaders with whom I was associated in America about the implications of what I called "indiscriminate assistance to the Soviet Russians."

From 1940 through most of 1943, I was connected with strategic planning in the then War Department and had an opportunity to express views. There were a number of American officers who realized the real implications of what I term "indiscriminate assistance" to a nation whose objectives or aims were just as dangerous to America, if not more so, than were those of Hitler and his henchmen.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever express disagreement with General Marshall on the advisability of forming a coalition government in China?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir. When General Marshall first came out and showed me his directive I told him I did not believe it was possible of accomplishment. I testified to that effect before in the MacArthur hearings, and that is in coincidence with the view I expressed earlier today several times, namely, you cannot coalesce Communists with people who desire individual freedom. It just is not going to work. People who have a spiritual belief, people who respect the dignity of the individual, they are just antithetical to the views or philosophies of Marxism.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jenner?

Senator JENNER. I have no questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say then that the old proverb of saying you cannot mix oil and water would apply to trying to mix these two philosophies, and that you would have domination by the Communists?

General WEDEMAYER. Yes, sir. I am always afraid of cliches, you know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you think the Communist philosophy would dominate?

General WEDEMAYER. Definitely, yes, sir. They will dominate if they are permitted to.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, if you try to compromise with them. -
General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no further questions at this particular time of General Wedemeyer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions, Senator Jenner?

Senator JENNER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we wish to express our sincere gratitude for your presence here and for your splendid testimony and cooperation generally.

General WEDEMEYER. I would like to make just one statement, sir. I have been following the work of this committee, and I commend both the Democratic and Republican members for what I believe to be an objective investigation in the interest of the country. Don't pay any attention, please, to the smear campaigns that are being instituted by those very same forces that you are investigating. I wish you success.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, the chairman of this committee has received a letter dated September 15, 1951, on the letter-head 450 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N. Y., purporting to be signed by Corliss Lamont and bearing his signature. The letter starts out by saying (reading) :

I wish to protest again to you and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, of which you are chairman—

and so forth. I will not detain the committee to read the letter.

Senator JENNER. I received a copy, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The members of the committee, I think, have received copies.

The letter from Mr. Lamont will be inserted in the record with the permission of the committee.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

NEW YORK 27, N. Y., *September 15, 1951.*

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I wish to protest again to you and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, of which you are chairman, against the repeated actions of that subcommittee in attempting to smear me as a Communist and to associate me with the alleged betrayal of American foreign policy in the Far East. Your subcommittee has dragged me into this picture as part of a shabby endeavor to discredit the American Institute of Pacific Relations and to establish it as a subversive organization.

The Subcommittee on Internal Security has tried to give the totally false impression that I am a far-eastern expert and have been a prime mover in the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But in fact I have never been particularly interested in the Far East and have only a few years been a member of the institute, and a very inactive one at that.

However, my late father, Thomas W. Lamont, of J. P. Morgan & Co., did have considerable knowledge of the Far East and visited both Japan and China. For more than 20 years he participated actively in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations and contributed generously to it. From 1925 until the time of his death in 1948 he made to that organization 14 donations amounting to \$14,700.

On the other hand, I did not start contributing to the institute until 1946. From that year until the present I made six donations totaling \$800, or about one-eighteenth of the total of my father's gifts. Yet your subcommittee and its investigators have never once mentioned my Republican father's long and deep interest in the institute. Instead, this subcommittee has stressed my own slight and brief association with the institute, obviously as part of its effort to paint that excellent organization as red by concealing the fact that leading bankers and conservatives have been among its chief backers.

At its hearing on August 22, 1951, your subcommittee read into its records the crudest sort of dishonesty about me. Your counsel submitted on that occasion a memorandum headed, "C. L. from E. C. C.," and then suggested that it had been written to Corliss Lamont from E. C. Carter, former secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Testimony continued for some time on this assumption; and nobody was given an opportunity to refute it and to show that the memo was from Mr. Carter to Clayton Lane, at one time an officer of the institute.

The memorandum itself was perfectly innocent. And this episode well illustrates the method of your subcommittee in striving to mislead public opinion. Evidently some members of this subcommittee would be glad to see me hung for the nonexistent crimes of someone else whose initials happen to be the same as mine.

On August 2, 1951, a self-confessed ex-spy, Mrs. Hede Massing, testified before your subcommittee that I was a Communist. I wrote your subcommittee August 12 disproving this charge and saying in part: "For the one-thousandth time I completely and categorically deny that I am or ever have been a Communist. My numerous disagreements on fundamental points with Communist and Soviet doctrines, such as those regarding philosophy, civil liberties, the Tito controversy, and the aggression of the North Koreans in 1950, show clearly that I rely on my own independent thinking and follow nobody's line. I am a radical American dissenter carrying on as best I can the dissenting tradition of my ancestors who came over on the *Mayflower*."

I requested your subcommittee to enter the above statement into its official records. But I did not even receive an acknowledgement of my letter.

From its record, Mr. Senator, it seems to me that your subcommittee is constantly encouraging the violation of the Ninth Commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." It is turning representative government into government by misrepresentation. It is causing the American people to lose faith in their democratic institutions and is thereby doing more to undermine the political system of the United States than all the Communists who have ever existed in this country.

Other congressional investigating committees, of both House and Senate, have behaved just as scandalously. The procedures of such committees ought to be revised by law in order to guarantee defendant witnesses, organizations, and other victims their legitimate rights and a fair hearing. The new rules should apply whether bankers or teachers, labor leaders or Communists, liberals or independents, Republicans or Democrats are being investigated.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me earnestly request that in the interests of the truth you enter this letter in the official records of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security as my refutation of the untrue accusations made against me at its hearings.

Very truly yours,

CORLISS LAMONT.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with Mr. Lamont's letter the chairman desires to insert in the record at this time the reply of the chairman of this committee dated September 19, 1951, addressed to Mr. Corliss Lamont and signed by the chairman of this committee. Those letters will be inserted in the record so as to become a part of the record of this hearing.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

SEPTEMBER 19, 1951.

MR. CORLISS LAMONT,
New York 27, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LAMONT: I have your letter of September 15, 1951, which I notice you have released to the press.

I take note of the fact which you impart in your letter that your father, Thomas W. Lamont, contributed \$14,700 to the Institute of Pacific Relations during the period 1925-48 and that he took an active interest in the institute and in the Far East. I also note that you point out that your own six donations to the institute totaled only \$800 by contrast.

I would like to point out, however, that you are wrong in your statement that this committee has never once mentioned your father's name in its hear-

ings. In fact, the only substantial testimony involving either you or your father concerned an episode which took place in 1945. As you must know, if you read the record, this episode involved an effort made by Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations to induce your father, Thomas W. Lamont, through you, to sign a draft prepared by Mr. Lattimore in answer to an article that appeared in the Reader's Digest by J. B. Powell and Max Eastman. Testimony showed that Mr. Lattimore prepared a draft of an answer after consultation with Mr. T. A. Bisson and made arrangements to have it published in the name of some prominent American. According to testimony, they selected your father, Thomas W. Lamont, as a person who might sign the article. Arrangements for the carrying out of this plan, according to testimony and documents introduced into the record, were made through you. When your father declined to have his name signed to the article, this committee took especial care to bring out his refusal to do so.

It is also to be noted that the committee and the staff questioned Mr. Carter at length on the unusual language used in the letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lattimore who were admittedly good friends. The letter of June 19, 1945, reads in part:

"DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought it would better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday. He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful a letter as I can write on the off-chance that he might be will to do something. * * *

"EDWARD C. CARTER."

I believe if you will read or, if you have already done so, reread that testimony you will find that the committee was simply trying to bring out the facts, and the incidence of your name and your father's name was dictated by the underlying circumstances and by nothing else.

With respect to the second point you make in your letter, therein you accuse the committee of dishonesty to you. The record you refer to is as follows:

"Mr. MANDEL: I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 'CL from ECC'. 'CL' may be Corliss Lamont, and 'ECC' may be E. C. Carter."

Two letters "CL from ECC" were introduced into the record at this point and there was no significance whatever attached to the identity of the "CL."

As you must know, it was the habit of the Institute of Pacific Relations to refer to individuals in the various memoranda by their initials only. The assumption that it may have been Corliss Lamont was without significance and represented a mere guess on the part of the research director as to the addressee therein. Certainly there was no invidious connotation drawn from this conclusion. However, inasmuch as you point out that the "CL" is Clayton Lane and not Corliss Lamont, your statement of this fact will be cross-indexed to that testimony.

As for the fact that you have been identified before this committee as a Communist, I call attention to the fact that this committee has made no findings nor drawn any conclusions from the sworn testimony before it.

As you request, your letter is being put into the official record.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Michigan has received a letter from Henry A. Wallace, and I do not know whether other members of the committee have also received it, but I would ask that that be inserted in the record also. I will turn it over to the committee.

¹ See p. 574, pt. 2.

The CHAIRMAN. As regards the letter to which Senator Ferguson refers, that letter and the reply will be inserted also.

(The letters referred to are as follows:)

SEPTEMBER 13, 1951.

Hon. HENRY A. WALLACE,
South Salem, N. Y.

MY DEAR HENRY: Upon my return from Turkey, I found your letter of August 25 which had been previously acknowledged by my secretary.

If you would permit me to do so, I shall be very glad to place your letter in the official record of the committee.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

SOUTH SALEM, N. Y., *August 25, 1951.*

Hon. HOMER FERGUSON,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR FERGUSON: In a UP report of August 22 you are quoted as saying that much of the Budenz testimony was hearsay. Therefore I am moved to call your attention to the Budenz testimony on August 23 before the Senate Internal Security Committee to the effect that I was under the influence of Communists (Lattimore and Vincent, according to Budenz) on my trip to China in 1944.

For your information I may say that Lattimore was sent along on the trip not as a member of my personal staff but as a representative of OWI at the instance of Elmer Davis and Roosevelt. He was an expert on the nomadic tribes and occasionally was helpful as an interpreter but he had nothing whatever to do with my report to President Roosevelt or with my communication to President Roosevelt on June 28, 1944.

The person who had by far the greatest influence on me was a Republican, Ambassador to China, Hon. Clarence E. Gauss. You may remember that in the fall of 1945 Senator Hart, of Connecticut, was urging him for the Republican place on the Export-Import Bank. It was at instance of Gauss that I reported to Roosevelt that in spite of Chiang's weaknesses as a leader that at the moment we had no alternative to the support of Chiang.

It was at Chiang's instance that I sent a message from Kunming to Roosevelt on June 28, 1944, suggesting the name of General Wedemeyer as liaison between Roosevelt and Chiang. While Vincent did not inspire this suggestion he was cognizant of what was in my cable and did not in any way object.

On December 15, 1945, the Honorable Patrick Hurley, recently resigned as Ambassador to China, told me in the presence of Herbert Brownell that he never had any quarrel with me with regard to the Chinese situation.

I thought you ought to have these facts in view of the Budenz testimony.

With cordial regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

HENRY A. WALLACE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter from Mr. Carter addressed to me which I think should go in the record. It is very short. Mr. Mandel, will you read that very briefly?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a letter from Edward C. Carter dated September 6, 1951 [reading]:

DEAR Mr. MORRIS: In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods in Yorkshire at the Cholomeley's home. It was because of this intimate relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were cousins.

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant, but I want to correct it.

Mr. MORRIS. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we allow that letter to go into the record as a correction of Mr. Carter's own testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

NEW YORK CITY, September 6, 1951.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods in Yorkshire at the Cholmeley's home. It was because of this intimate relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were cousins.

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant but I want to correct it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.¹

Senator FERGUSON. When it is printed in the record, if it is possible, could this not be put in at that place so that it will correct the record without too much trouble? Has it already been printed?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be satisfactory if that were cross-indexed back to it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; so that at least it would be clear that the correction was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. There is one other letter that the War Department has asked us to put into our record. It concerns the testimony of General Willoughby. It is not very important, but I think inasmuch as the Army has requested that it should go in, we could put it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That letter is dated August 15, 1951, from Miles Reber, major general, GSC.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON,
Washington, D. C., August 15, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security,

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In connection with the recent testimony of General Willoughby before your committee pertaining to his official report on the Sorge case, it is respectfully requested that the following facts in connection with his report be included in the record of the hearings of your committee.

Copies of all consecutive reports and exhibits pertaining to the Sorge case received by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, FECOM, were distributed to the FBI, CIA, and State Department between the dates of March 9, 1949, and November 22, 1950. No reports or exhibits to the Sorge case have been received since November 22, 1950.

On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, may I suggest that this letter be made a part of the record of hearings in this case. Your cooperation in such action will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

MILES REBER,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.

¹ See p. 51, pt. 1.

Mr. MORRIS. Tomorrow, Senator McCarran, we have General Fortier who is theater intelligence commander in the Far East Command. He will be our witness tomorrow. That will be at 10 o'clock or 9 o'clock, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it can be 10 o'clock. It is very difficult to convene at 9 o'clock. I think we will be able to meet at 10 o'clock. I have discussed it with the leader and I think it will be all right to proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. General Fortier is under subpoena to appear here at 9 o'clock. May I inform him that he may come in at 10?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The committee is recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the committee recessed to be reconvened at 10 a. m. Thursday, September 20, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Please stand and be sworn, General.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General FORTIER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. L. JOSEPH FORTIER, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED), McLEAN, VA.

Mr. MORRIS. General Fortier, will you give your full name and address to the reporter, please?

General FORTIER. Louis Joseph Fortier, brigadier general, United States Army, retired, Spring Hill Road, McLean, Va.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present military status?

General FORTIER. United States Army, retired.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last military assignment, General?

General FORTIER. Director of Theater Intelligence Division of the Far East Command.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you relinquish that command?

General FORTIER. I sailed from Japan in October, the middle of October 1950. I was the Director of Theater Intelligence Division until some time in September 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe briefly the nature of your assignment, General Fortier, at that time?

General FORTIER. From around the 1st day of February 1949 until September 1950 I was in charge of the Theater Intelligence Division under G-2, Far East Command, GHQ, Tokyo.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe for us generally the functions that you had to perform in that post?

General FORTIER. As Director of this Division, my job was that of observing, studying the capabilities of any external threat to the Far East Command. In other words, I was concerned with any potential outside enemy that might threaten the security of the Far East Command.

Mr. MORRIS. As such, General, did you take recognition of the development of Red China?

General FORTIER. Besides observing the capabilities of the Soviets in that area, probably my greatest interest was that of watching the development in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you been interested in communism in China as a professional matter, General Fortier?

General FORTIER. I had been in and out of Intelligence for the last 14 years and, as a matter of fact, ever since 1921-23 when I took a master of science degree in political science, in which I specialized on the problems arising from the Versailles Treaty, I have been closely observing the development of Soviet Russia and communism in general.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that while you held this position you were concerned with the development and the consolidation of communism on the mainland of China?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not be right in line with your duties if you were to look into the questions that might be a threat to your command? Communism in China could be a threat to the command in Tokyo, could it not?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir.

May I explain this? That whereas I had the division that was charged with the external security, in other words, a threat from outside, there was another division of G-2 which was charged with the internal security. My primary interest was watching the development in China and seeing the advance of communism and Mao Tse-tung's forces in China.

Mr. MORRIS. General, did you ever have occasion to brief important leaders of the United States Government as an adviser to Japan?

General FORTIER. It was what we call in the service a standard operating procedure that whenever any distinguished representative of the United States Government came to Tokyo, he was given a briefing as to the situation as we saw it and in turn we endeavored to obtain from him his views, or the Washington view if he came from Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. That was standard operating procedure?

General FORTIER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall a visit that Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup made to Japan in late 1949 or early 1950?

General FORTIER. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate the circumstances to this committee, please?

General FORTIER. As I recall it, Mr. Jessup came to Japan, to Tokyo, in the early days of January 1950. It was just about the time that we had gotten word that Britain had recognized Communist China. We gave Mr. Jessup the normal briefing that was given to visiting

people from Washington. And it so happened, the instance that Mr. Morris is referring to, that during one of the intermissions, I found myself alone with Mr. Jessup—

The CHAIRMAN. Found yourself where?

General FORTIER. Standing next to him in the conference room, and I put the following question to him. I said: "When will we recognize Communist China?"

Senator FERGUSON. You knew at that time he was connected with the State Department of the United States Government?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. He was there as an ambassador with that rank.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you put the question that way, in the affirmative, General?

General FORTIER. I had been very much concerned about Britain recognizing Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. Had he been briefed on that question? Was that mentioned in the briefing?

General FORTIER. I don't recall that it was. We had a set briefing that involved our views on Asia as a whole; that is, on the periphery of the Far East Command. That briefing was usually given by General Willoughby who was G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. You usually had around the table more than General Willoughby and yourself, did you not?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, as I recall, your briefing form.

General FORTIER. All the key staff officers of GHQ Far East Command were present at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know whether that question was raised in the briefing?

General FORTIER. I don't think it was, as a matter of fact.

Senator EASTLAND. What did Mr. Jessup tell you?

General FORTIER. Mr. Jessup said, "Well, in about 2 or 3 weeks."

Mr. MORRIS. Was it as a categorical statement?

General FORTIER. It is a little bit difficult for me to remember his exact words as to whether it was a categorical statement or not, but I do remember that I picked up the statement and I argued with Mr. Jessup and told him that I thought it would be a grave error if we recognized Communist China.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you think it would be a grave error?

General FORTIER. I thought it would be a grave error for the following reason: that as far as I knew never in its history had China been consolidated under one particular regime or one head. China had always had these regional groups and throughout the history of China there had been an attempt made to consolidate it, but never with success.

Having followed the development in China, in Communist China, and seeing Mao Tse-tung's army overrun the key areas, and feeling that Mao Tse-tung was being aided and abetted by the Russians, I felt that Mao Tse-tung had a very fine chance of consolidating that country for once under a regime that would be inimical to us and against the best interests of the United States.

Senator EASTLAND. If we recognized them?

General FORTIER. Yes; if we recognized the country and gave them that moral and political support that would be received by them should we grant recognition.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Jessup say about that?

General FORTIER. Mr. Jessup said, "Well, we must face facts." I am not putting in quotes and end quotes now. I am giving you my recollection on this. He said, "We must face facts. After all, Mao Tse-tung's armies have overrun the vast portion, in fact the key areas of China. They are in the process of reestablishing law and order and the mere fact that we should recognize them does not mean we approve either of the character of their government or of the nature of it. In arriving at a decision as to recognition or nonrecognition, the criteria should be whether the government that has come in has established sovereignty, has control of the majority of the country, and is in the process of reestablishing law and order."

Senator EASTLAND. Had they consolidated China at that time?

General FORTIER. In my opinion, no.

Senator EASTLAND. Had they consolidated their position in China when you left Japan?

General FORTIER. In my opinion, no.

Senator EASTLAND. Have they consolidated China today?

General FORTIER. In my opinion, no.

Senator EASTLAND. You think recognition by this country would do much to consolidate communism in China?

General FORTIER. I certainly do.

Senator FERGUSON. You told Jessup that?

General FORTIER. I told him substantially that.

About that time, someone else came in. Here was this conference room and the conversation was interrupted and never came to a final conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you we had an agreement with Great Britain that after recognition by Britain that we would recognize China?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he mention anything about the fact of Britain's recognition?

General FORTIER. He did not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Right there, as a general in intelligence and from your sources of information and your feel of the atmosphere and general knowledge, did you not think that there had been an understanding between this country and Great Britain that Great Britain's recognition of Communist China would be followed by our recognition?

General FORTIER. That is a rather difficult question to answer. I prefer to give you the atmosphere.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that not your judgment, General, and is not that the reason you asked Mr. Jessup the question you did?

General FORTIER. Well, some time in October or November 1949, I had become so much concerned with the fact that Britain might recognize Communist China that I had made a study for my own satisfaction of the situation as faced by the British in Hong Kong in 1941, in December, when the Japanese invaded Hong Kong, and the situation as existed in 1949, late 1949.

I studied it from a political, economic, military, and psychological point of view, I drafted mainly for my own information and that of my immediate entourage, a study in which I concluded that while it would be a great error should Britain recognize Communist China, I feared very much they would and that possibly the economic factor would be the determining one because there was no question but that there had been a terrific increase in trade through Hong Kong between 1948 and 1949.

To answer Senator Eastland's question, I have no information, direct evidence, on which to base any deal between the United States and Britain. On the other hand, I feared, you might say, that the United States would follow a recognition by Britain, and if I remember correctly, either Britain had just recognized Communist China, at the time I spoke to Mr. Jessup, or I had obtained some information that they would do so shortly. I believe that is what prompted my questioning of Mr. Jessup, the fact that a day or two before there had been some sort of an official announcement that Britain had recognized Communist China.

Senator EASTLAND. You were worried about Formosa, too?

General FORTIER. I was worried we might follow suit.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get his personal opinion, or was he speaking, that the Government was going to do this?

General FORTIER. No, sir. This was a man to man conversation between Jessup and me.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was his personal idea that it should be recognized?

General FORTIER. Senator, the entire conversation——

Senator FERGUSON. Because you were giving him your personal argument and he was giving his.

General FORTIER. I feel he was.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the way it impressed you at the time?

General FORTIER. Yes. The whole conversation did not last more than 2 or 3 minutes, as you can well understand. We were having this conference and about every 50 minutes there would be a 10-minute intermission. It was in one of them I tackled him on that subject.

Senator EASTLAND. Were you afraid of the loss of Formosa, too?

General FORTIER. I was very much concerned with that.

Senator EASTLAND. Why were you concerned with that?

General FORTIER. Because I shared the view that Formosa is a key area—I do not like to use the word "vital" because the word has been overworked, but that Formosa lies between the Philippines and Japan and if it fell in enemy hands it would be a very serious threat to either country.

Senator EASTLAND. Would it not put Japan in a nutcracker between the islands we have given Russia on the north and those islands south of Japan?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Were there many airfields on Formosa?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir; there are.

Senator EASTLAND. Did the Far East Command have trouble with the State Department in getting in Formosa, or did the United States State Department attempt to keep generals in the Far East Command away from Formosa?

General FORTIER. Well, the correct answer to that is I know of no important official of GHQ who was ever barred admittance to Formosa.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you not have to resort to subterfuges to get in?

General FORTIER. I think the Senator is referring to the fact that there was at times a tendency to scrutinize the group from GHQ that had requested admission to Formosa, and I will say, Senator, that it was based largely, at least from the information we obtained, on the lack of hotel reservations and facilities there.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you not think that was a subterfuge, General?

General FORTIER. In my particular case, when I went to Formosa, every one in GHQ knew, of course, of my particular job, that of Director of Theater Intelligence Division, and the United States Government had its set-up in Formosa, including military, air, and naval attachés. At least, theoretically, any information that we desired concerning Formosa could have been obtained through those sources.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you not have to resort to subterfuge to get in Formosa? I want you to answer that question.

General FORTIER. I don't know whether I had to or not, but I did.

Senator EASTLAND. What was that subterfuge?

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you hesitate on this?

General FORTIER. Because, if I seem to hesitate it may have been in this particular instance being referred to that it was overplayed. I have no reason to believe that had I applied formally for admission to Formosa that that would not have been granted me. I think it would, but on a particular occasion, I had heard certain reports about the defense capabilities of Formosa that bothered me. I wanted to get over there and get there in a hurry, because it was a time when actually it was a critical period. It was late May, early June, of 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you have to ask the State Department?

Senator EASTLAND. Please go ahead and answer the question.

General FORTIER. So, in order to get there and get there in a hurry, an arrangement was made whereby I was invited as a guest of a very high-ranking official in Formosa.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that official?

General FORTIER. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it true that you sent word you were coming to the State Department representative and got in a plane and left before he had time to answer?

General FORTIER. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it not general knowledge that the Far East command was not welcomed down at Formosa by the American State Department?

General FORTIER. Well, it was my impression that we were none too welcome, at least those of us in the intelligence field.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever hear of a General Merritt who was being sent subrosa by the State Department to organize an anti-Chiang faction in Formosa?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You made a statement a little while ago, General, that when you attempted to go to Formosa you seemed to be "scruti-

nized." Why do you use the word "scrutinize"? Your going to Formosa was scrutinized. By whom and how?

General FORTIER. Did I use that word?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General FORTIER. I believe I don't recall in a particular thing, but I said those officers who were involved in the intelligence field, their request for admission into Formosa would have been more closely scrutinized by the American representation in Formosa than would others. After all, let's be fair about this thing. The United States Government had a consul general, had United States Military, Air and Naval attachés in Formosa. Certainly, theoretically, we had appropriate United States representation in the place. If I was not satisfied with their views and reports and I desired my own estimate, why, you might attribute that to my own idiosyncrasy, that I preferred my own evaluation to that which I was receiving.

Senator FERGUSON. But, General, you don't claim that the military and attachés at an embassy are Intelligence officers, do you, in the sense of the word you were?

General FORTIER. No, sir; they are not.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you had to obtain information out of Formosa. Why did you have to ask the State Department for permission to go to Formosa?

General FORTIER. Sir, one has to obtain a visa from the State Department or through the State Department channels to visit any foreign country. Formosa was not under the aegis of the Far East Command.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it true that civilians who went to Japan, for instance, connected with the United States Government and not connected with the State Department, had difficulty going to Formosa?

General FORTIER. Sir, that I would not know. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that?

General FORTIER. That is the first I ever heard of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get a visa from the State Department?

General FORTIER. I got one from the State Department representative. General MacArthur's chief political adviser, Mr. Seabald, was my channel of getting into any country. Through him, we could contact these various missions that were in Tokyo. For example, when I went to Hong Kong or Indochina, or to Korea, that was processed through the State Department representative in Tokyo.

Senator EASTLAND. That State Department representative in Tokyo told you how to get into Formosa, did he not?

General FORTIER. He aided and abetted me.

Senator EASTLAND. That was through subterfuge, to send a message to Formosa you were coming and get in your plane and go before they had time to answer. Is that true?

General FORTIER. That is the way I got in there; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I might tell you, General, that I had a similar experience to get into Formosa after I was in the air in the plane. We had to obtain permission to go in instead of getting clearance from the State Department.

Is that not what you did? You got in the plane and got permission to land?

General FORTIER. I had anticipated that I would have trouble getting in.

The CHAIRMAN. Trouble from what source? From our authorities or from whom?

General FORTIER. Through Mr. Robert Strong, who was our consul general there.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out the relevancy of this testimony to our Institute of Pacific Relations inquiry.

Our records are replete with the association of Mr. Jessup to the Institute of Pacific Relations. So Mr. Mandel has compiled a list of the important positions that Mr. Jessup held in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like those introduced in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. He has compiled them from what source?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe your compilation?

Mr. MANDEL. According to Problems of the Pacific, 1933, Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held August 14 to 26, 1933, one of the conference members was Philip Jessup.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. The Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then, according to Problems of the Pacific, dated 1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Virginia Beach, November 18 to December 2, 1939, page 273, one of the international officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations was Philip C. Jessup, who was also chairman of the Pacific Council.

Then, according to the Annual Report of the American Council of the IPR, 1938, page 58, Philip C. Jessup was vice chairman and a member of the board of trustees.

Then in the volume called War and Peace in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Mont Tremblant, December 4 to December 14, 1942, page 159, Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member and as chairman of the Pacific Council.

Again in a volume called Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to January 17, 1945, page 157, Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member; and, finally, we have a telegram addressed to Edward C. Carter from "Fred"—

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know who that Fred is?

Mr. MANDEL. It may be Field.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. November 23, and the year is not given.

It says: "Approve nominations suggest Jessup for research chairman."

Mr. MORRIS. There is no other Fred on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations other than Fred Field?

Mr. MANDEL. None that I know of.

Senator EASTLAND. Have you any idea what year that is?

Mr. MANDEL. We can check it and establish the year from other correspondence.

Mr. MORRIS. When you do verify that, which we are not prepared to do now, verify the position that Mr. Jessup did hold as research chairman, you will be able to relate it to that telegram.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I had another question of the witness. I wanted to ask whether or not it was a fact, to your knowledge, that in the Far East in the various embassies there were rumors about the insecurity of the defense and the fact that Formosa was just ready for an overthrow of the Nationalist Government? That was back around the time you were talking about.

General FORTIER. There was considerable rumor and misgiving about the state of defense of Formosa in general.

To be very honest with you, that is the reason I was anxious to go down there.

Senator FERGUSON. To go down and see and get the facts?

General FORTIER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know on October 26, I think that is the date, the United States Government sent a message to the Nationalist Government at Formosa that we would not give them any more military aid, and that was 1949?

General FORTIER. No, sir; I do not know that. I had heard they were not receiving any military aid, but I did not know of any message such as you spoke of.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that such a message was sent?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To the Nationalist Government?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you stay in Formosa?

General FORTIER. As I recall, I stayed there 3 days.

Senator FERGUSON.. I assume you talked to General Sun?

General FORTIER. I did, at long length.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no trouble getting hotel space?

General FORTIER. I did not live in a hotel.

Senator FERGUSON. You lived in the palace?

General FORTIER. No; but I lived in a cottage, a very comfortable cottage in the mountains.

Senator FERGUSON. Near Chiang Kai-shek's place?

General FORTIER. Yes; where the generalissimo lived.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not know they had plenty of space for visitors in Taipei?

General FORTIER. The facts are not quite that way, Senator. In late August 1950, I was the deputy chief of the Far East Command's survey group that made a complete, exhaustive study of Formosa. This was after the Korean war had broken out. This was in August 1950.

We sent a rather sizable group of officers and enlisted men to Formosa, to Taipei, to conduct the survey. We had, as I recall, something between 40 and 50 officers. We had considerable difficulty in finding—

Senator FERGUSON. But I am talking about the number of people you had in mind going down just to get information.

General FORTIER. Hotel accommodations——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about the hotels; I am talking about the place that the former resident commissioner of Japan used as a guest house for visiting people.

General FORTIER. Sir, I am inclined to agree that hotel accommodations in Formosa were extremely limited, that one or two individuals might not have been taken care of, would not stand too close scrutiny. But if there were a group of 10 or 12 people——

Senator FERGUSON. If you tried to send a large mission over there; but that was not your purpose, was it? It was to get some man in there to get accurate information for you?

General FORTIER. The problem was to get just a few to obtain information.

Senator EASTLAND. The problem was for you to get in?

General FORTIER. I got in, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. General, it is just to get your full background in the record, but were you ever stationed in Yugoslavia?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. I was military attaché to Yugoslavia from the latter part of May 1939 until I wrote my own orders to get out of there after the Germans had overrun the country.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you have anything to do with setting up the coup that overthrew the regency?

General FORTIER. Not that I had anything to do with it, but I was a very intimate friend of Gen. Bor Mirkovic, who was the deputy chief of aviation. He was the one who planned and implemented and executed the coup d'état on the 26th of March 1941. One of his lieutenants was Mikhailovich. I knew him quite intimately.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know Tito?

General FORTIER. I did not know Tito.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now it would be a grave mistake to recognize Red China?

General FORTIER. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now as you did in the past that it would consolidate them and give prestige and aid to them in their communism and their efforts as Communists?

General FORTIER. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel very strongly about that?

General FORTIER. I have felt right along there were two things that might happen that would consolidate Communist China. One would be for Chiang Kai-shek to make a deal with Mao Tsetung and lend his support to Mao Tse-tung.

The other would be for us to recognize them. In so doing, then they would have the moral and the economic force that would be needed to consolidate the country.

Senator EASTLAND. Would an armistice in Korea help consolidate the Communist regime in China?

General FORTIER. I doubt that seriously.

Senator WATKINS. May I inquire when it was that you had this conversation with Ambassador Jessup?

General FORTIER. Sir, it was in the early winter of 1949-50. If I recall correctly, it was in early January of 1950. The date can be fixed by studying Mr. Jessup's itinerary when he made that Far East survey in the winter of 1949-50. I have not any access to any records to determine the exact date on which I spoke to him.

Senator WATKINS. It was at least before the outbreak of the Korean police action?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. It was several months before the outbreak of the Korean war.

Senator WATKINS. I notice you refer to that as a "war." I said a police action.

General FORTIER. Well, a police action. I am sure it is a war to the man in there fighting.

Senator WATKINS. I quite agree with you.

This might be a bit far afield, but somewhere along the line, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we ought to make some inquiry into what caused the United States to get out of Korea when we had our forces there, to get out when they moved back into Japan.

Do you know the situation with respect to what prompted us to get out of Korea at that time? I mean when we withdrew our forces.

General FORTIER. I would not have been too well informed on that. I may have seen the papers, in fact I probably did see the papers, in connection with it; but as I recall it, it was some United Nations agreement that by a certain date the United States would remove its forces from Korea. I went to Korea in April of 1949 and at that time we had a reinforced regiment there plus a number of instructors. By the 30th of June 1949, we had removed all troops from the area and had nothing but military advisers in a group.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know whether or not it was the recommendation of the Army that caused us to get out of Korea?

General FORTIER. I wouldn't know, sir. You can probably obtain that from National Defense.

Senator WATKINS. Would you inform the committee now without violating any classified information just what the situation was in Korea at the time we got out?

General FORTIER. From what point of view, sir?

Senator WATKINS. From the point of view of whether it was a wise or unwise move.

General FORTIER. In my opinion, it was a wise move for us to move out at that particular stage in the game. After all, a reinforced regiment is purely a token force. We would have been neither fish nor fowl with a reinforced regiment.

Senator WATKINS. Do you believe that the North Koreans or the Chinese would have attacked the United States forces even if they were only a token force?

General FORTIER. That, I do not. I do not believe they would have attacked us.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not making sporadic drives across the line before we moved out, or were they?

General FORTIER. Throughout the entire period there were border incidents.

Senator WATKINS. There were no actual attacks on American troops, however? All of the attacks occurred later on after the American troops had been withdrawn?

General FORTIER. There had been border incidents with the South Koreans even when we were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Almost weekly?

General FORTIER. Not against our forces.

Senator WATKINS. That was part of your investigation, to investigate any possible threat to the United States from North Korea, from China, and that particular section?

General FORTIER. When I went over there, it was to get the feel of the country, to study the capabilities, get information direct from the people on the ground as to what might be the North Korean capabilities. I did the same thing by traveling, for example, to the Kowloon-Hong Kong front. I went to Saigon and Hanoi and spent a week in Tonkin. I was a house guest there of the French deputy commanding general.

I studied the location of his advance posts and talked with his staff about the situation internally and externally in Indochina. We did not feel too secure about the whole situation there in the spring of 1950.

Senator WATKINS. What are you referring to now, just Korea?

General FORTIER. No, sir. This map that we had was showing more and more red. We were getting this encroachment on our command. Here were these four Japanese islands and Okinawa. The Reds were driving south. At first our attention had been drawn to the north around Hokkaido, but as it swept down, don't you see, here was our southern flank becoming more and more exposed. We had the responsibility for the Philippines, too.

So, naturally, anyone who is in the intelligence profession, and particularly one who had that special responsibility that I had, would concern himself with what was going on and where were the build-ups, what were the capabilities, where might they strike if they did strike.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you expect war to break out on one of those four fronts in 1950?

General FORTIER. To answer your question directly, sir, I was very, very much concerned. I was afraid. I had enough of an intuition that something was going to break out in the Far East that the record will show that I was constantly on the move traveling, trying to find out where it might break out.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Intelligence know where the Chinese divisions were concentrated?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. We had very good information on where all these threats were, exactly how they were distributed. But I would like to say right here that to know what a potential enemy is capable of doing and to determine what he intended to do on the spur of the moment or at the last minute, those are two entirely different things.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was our potential enemy at that time that you were apprehensive?

General FORTIER. I was mostly apprehensive—well, of course, the Soviets never left my mind, and Mao Tse-tung and his forces.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in this atmosphere that you have described here that you discussed with Mr. Jessup as to when we might recognize Red China?

General FORTIER. Yes; it was. From around September 1949 until June 1950, to use the vernacular, I was "sweating it out" in the Far East Command.

Senator JENNER. When you talked to Jessup, he made his tour and inspection of Korea at that time?

General FORTIER. I think he was on his way out.

Senator JENNER. What did he say in regard to Korea?

General FORTIER. I did not discuss Korea with him.

Senator JENNER. Have you seen any statements he made to the American public upon his return to America about the situation in Korea being awfully peaceful over there and everything lovely?

General FORTIER. No, sir; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, Senators?

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know if he can give us that information as to what the real situation in Korea was as far as the Army knew it just prior to the outbreak of this police action in Korea.

General FORTIER. We were quite well informed about the disposition of the North Korean forces, their strength, their armament. We knew their capabilities. We did not know on the morning of the 26th day of June 1950 at 4:30 a. m., or whatever time it was, they were going to jump off.

Senator WATKINS. Did you know in a general way an attack from that section was impending?

General FORTIER. Not any more so than any of these others; not any more so than it would have been against Formosa or Indochina.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, the indications were pretty strong there was likely to be an attack on Formosa, were they not?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. And also Indochina?

General FORTIER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. If it were put in the same category, it would be in the realm of a probable attack coming from that point?

General FORTIER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That was your business to find out?

General FORTIER. It was my business to find out.

Senator WATKINS. Did you evaluate the North Koreans as a danger to your security?

General FORTIER. Yes, we did; not as much so as the Chinese Communists.

Senator WATKINS. What I would like to know: Were you really caught flat-footed by the North Korean attack on South Korea?

General FORTIER. We were not surprised, but we were amazed. Let's put it that way.

To answer your question, I think the greatest surprise was what happened 2 days later when we got word we would intervene in that action.

Senator WATKINS. You were surprised at that?

General FORTIER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Why were you surprised at that?

General FORTIER. I don't know why. I am just telling you.

Senator WATKINS. You say you were surprised. There must have been some reason for it.

General FORTIER. In the first place, we had no responsibility in the Far East Command for Korea at all, as you probably well know.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no authority whatever to send troops in there at the time?

General FORTIER. No.

Senator JENNER. Was it not a determined fact among the high command that Korea was militarily untenable?

General FORTIER. I didn't share that view.

Senator JENNER. Was that not the view?

General FORTIER. I don't know of any official expression that ever came from the Far East Command to that effect, but I think that it has been shown that South Korea is tenable and those of us who were there in the days of the latter part of June, July, and August learned what America can do with very few resources with every one playing as one team and as one coordinated unit.

Senator EASTLAND. How many American divisions would you think it would take to bring the Korean war to a speedy conclusion?

General FORTIER. We have had in the military service a rule of thumb in determining the number of divisions to hold its own against a potential enemy, and that has been usually a division for every ten miles of front. Korea happens to be a peninsula. If I recall correctly, it is about 150 miles wide. With the superiority of naval forces we have guarding either flank, with the Air Force that we have, if we had a total of 12 to 15 divisions in there, I do not think there would be any question about the liquidation of the Korean conflict successfully.

Senator EASTLAND. We could go to the Yalu River?

General FORTIER. You are asking me to pit my knowledge of military strategy—in other words, you are shifting my role, sir. I have been playing in the role of an intelligence officer. Now I am to become the commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you may proceed with your questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we had commenced to show the association between Mr. Jessup about whom we have had testimony today, and the Institute of Pacific Relations. We had set forth, to a partial extent, Mr. Jessup's association with the IPR.

I would like to put in in detail, Mr. Chairman, some of the roles that he did have in some of the more important conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations. For instance, the IPR holds a triennial conference which is one of the features of that organization, one of the principal means of expression.

I would like to show he had an important role certainly during the two conferences that were held during the war, the one at Mont Tremblant in 1942 and then again in the Hot Springs convention in 1945.

Mr. Mandel, will you put in the record Mr. Jessup's association with those two conferences?

The CHAIRMAN. From what are you reading, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This was formerly entered into the record as exhibit No. 110 on August 14, 1951. It is a letter dated June 15, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed: "E. C. C. from W. W. L.:". The memorandum reads as follows:

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards nongovernment people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

Then a list of names follows.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that reintroduced in the record and one of the points is to show that the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations, E. C. C. and W. W. L., were consulting at this

time Currie, Barnes, and Jessup for the makeup of the representation to that particular conference. As such, I would like it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. For that purpose it will be inserted again.

(The document referred to previously marked "Exhibit No. 110," was reintroduced and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 110

JUNE 15, 1942.

E. C. C. from W. W. L.

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

GOVERNMENT

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska.
 Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare.
 Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare.
 Wallace, H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget.
 Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information.
 Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information.
 Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information.
 Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information.
 Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture.
 Ropes, E. C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade.
 Berle, A. A., Department of State.
 Davies, Joseph, Department of State.
 Grady, Henry, Department of State.
 Hiss, Alger, Department of State.
 Hornbeck, S. K., Department of State.
 Sayre, Francis B., Department of State.
 Stinebower, L. D., Department of State.
 Vince, Jacob, Department of the Treasury.
 White, H. D., Department of the Treasury.
 Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board.
 Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
 Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
 Currie, Lauchlin, White House
 Lubin, I., White House

OTHERS

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross
 Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council
 Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point
 Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News
 Clapper, Raymond, Washington columnist
 Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register & Tribune
 Dennett, Tyler, historian
 Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp.
 Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland
 Field, Frederick V., New York
 Herod, W. R., International General Electric
 Jessup, Prof. Philip C., Columbia University
 Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission
 Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp.
 Luce, Henry, Time, Inc.
 Molyneaux, Peter, Texas Weekly
 Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute
 Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash.
 (ex-Senator)

Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York
 Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief
 Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives
 Wilkie, Wendell, attorney
 Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation
 Wilson, C. E., General Electric
 Yarnell, Admiral H. E., United States Navy, retired

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have something else?

Mr. MANDEL. Then we have former exhibit No. 104 from the open hearings of August 14, 1951.

It is a letter from the IPR files dated November 30, 1942. Memorandum to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant. It reads as follows:

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committees, I am putting down the following suggestions.

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup so that they are merely tentative for the present.

The Pacific Council—Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I believe Kizer is the best choice.

Program committee—Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later. * * *

That is a partial excerpt from the exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I notice that this exhibit and the previous one have already been introduced in the record at previous hearings.

I believe Mr. Mandel gave the previous hearing dates.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. This is former exhibit No. 132, used in open hearings on August 16, 1951. It comes from the files of the IPR and is on the letterhead of the Columbia University, addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, from Philip C. Jessup, and I read portions of this exhibit:

In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the conference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Jessup writing?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or J. A. MacKay, Launchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginus Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Adam Comstock Notestein.

Further:

In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.

There is a pencil note at the bottom which says: "Frank Coe of FEA also good."

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to point out in that list of names are names of 10 people identified before the committee as being members of the

Communist organization. I think it would be proper to make that comment as that exhibit number 132 was introduced in the open hearings of August 16, 1951.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this should go in the record at this point, notwithstanding the fact that the excerpts are already in.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be incorporated in its entirety?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Exhibit No. 132 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 132

Mr. RAYMOND DENNETT,

*Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American delegation. The Pacific council provides a secretariat for the conference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific council for that purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginius Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock Notestein.

In reply to your of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.

I definitely would exclude Hunter on the ground that we have too much of the Kizer group; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occupied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore Vanderbilt or Commodore Stassen.

I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes. I do not know anything about General Bissell. Yarnell should certainly come as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos your statement below "Military," on page II, I would get away from the idea of California naming a delegate.

Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Waymack, of Des Moines.

I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a balance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who would be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and Pacific island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things add up.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Frank Coe, of FEA, also good. [Penciled note.]

General FORTIER. I would like to have it quite clear that the Far East Command was not caught short on an external enemy. In other words, our function in General MacArthur's headquarters was to take care of the security, both external and internal, of the Far East Command. No attack came on Japan, no attack came on Okinawa that we had not foreseen or anticipated. In other words, we had no responsibility in the Far East Command or for the intelligence between South and North Korea. There was a State Department representation there in South Korea and likewise there was a mission functioning under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in South Korea. It was not the MacArthur mission by any means.

Senator WATKINS. The reason I asked the question about that was because it had been reported that the Far East Command had been caught napping.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, and I think Senator Ferguson will confirm what I am about to say, that before the Appropriations Committee many months ago there was presented to us evidence that the Intelligence Department had full knowledge of what was going on and that they knew that munitions were being delivered from Russian boats into North Korea and that was also brought to the attention of the State Department and to the attention of the White House. That is testified before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate.

Senator FERGUSON. And the withdrawal of civilians away from the line.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. I merely wanted to give you an opportunity to explain that situation if you were caught napping or if you had any responsibility so that we would know about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Let the record show that Korea was not General Fortier's command. I hope that is understood.

General FORTIER. It was never my command. Korea was not under General MacArthur's command.

Senator FERGUSON. You did need some intelligence in order to do your own work out of both Formosa and Korea?

General FORTIER. And we got considerable intelligence from these other sources, occasionally to confirm on the ground that which was confirmed in cables and dispatches, which I think is a very reasonable reaction.

Mr. MORRIS. In reply to your question about the 10 people who have been identified as part of the Communist organization on that last list recommended by Mr. Jessup, I will point out that we have had testimony that Benjamin Kizer was a member of the Communist Party, testimony that Lauchlin Currie was associated with an espionage ring and gave vital military secrets to the Russian espionage system, the military secret being, in one case, the fact that the United States had broken the Soviet code.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire whether Currie is in the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. My information is he is in Colombia.

John Carter Vincent has been identified as a member; Harry Dexter White as a member of an espionage ring; Owen Lattimore as a member of the Communist organization; Len DeCaux as a member of the Communist Party; Alger Hiss as a member of the Communist Party; Joseph Barnes as a member of the Communist Party; Frederick V. Field as a member of the Communist Party, and Frank Coe as a member of the Communist Party.

We have had other evidence on some of the other people there, but none of it that would warrant any such conclusion as we can make about those 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, have you any evidence that any salary or money is being paid to Mr. Lauchlin Currie furnished by the taxpayers of the United States Government?

Mr. MORRIS. I cannot answer that question, but that is one of the things we are inquiring about.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask now that we get that information as to whether or not taxpayers' money is being paid to Mr. Currie.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether he is on any payroll of the United States Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or getting money that the taxpayers are furnishing.

Senator WATKINS. Directly or indirectly.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I read a newspaper clipping last night. It would take me just 3 minutes to find it. It described his resignation from the World Bank and accepting the position with Colombia, and there was a related story about that.

Mr. Chairman, if you think it is appropriate, we could put in more associations of Mr. Jessup with the institute in the record at this time. Mr. Mandel is prepared to do so. For instance, his activity in the IPR bearing on the American Peace Mobilization. I wonder if you want that in the record now?

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you not insert that?

The CHAIRMAN. Please go on with your laying a foundation for each insertion.

Mr. MANDEL. I read exhibit 14 from the open hearing of July 26, 1951, being a telegram from Frederick V. Field, from Chicago, dated September 1, 1940, to Philip C. Jessup, as follows:

I have been attending a peace congress of some 6,000 representatives from all parts of the country, labor, farm, and middle-class organization. This is a genuine peace movement through the interpretation of democracy. These people and our program represent what I have for long profoundly believed in. They are asking me to become the executive of a continuing organization, and I feel a deep conviction that I must accept. As the people I should be working for will meet to elect officers tomorrow. I must, despite obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with you and others, and as the executive must be presented to them, make an immediate affirmative decision. This show has been and will be smeared by the newspapers. I anticipate losing the respect of many present friends. These developments I regard as inevitable if we do the job in this country that was not done in France, etc. In view the inevitable criticism and misunderstanding, and because of my continued deep interest in the IPR welfare, I feel that I must, by this telegram, affirm my immediate resignation from all the IPR responsibilities that its officers wish to accept. Finally I must urgently hope for both personal and professional associations that you will reserve your own judgment until I can talk with you.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom was that and to whom, again, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is from Frederick V. Field to Philip C. Jessup, dated September 1, 1940. He is referring to his acceptance of a position with the American Peace Mobilization which was organized at that time.

May I read at this point the statement of Attorney General Francis Biddle in reference to the gathering that Mr. Field was to be made an official of? He declares in regard to the American Peace Mobilization:

It was formed in December of 1940 under the auspices of the Communist Party and the Young Communist League as a front organization designed to mold American opinion against participation in the war against Germany.

The second communication is a part of exhibit 14, introduced in open hearings on July 26, 1951. It purports to be minutes of a meeting of the executive committee of the American Council of the Insti-

tute of Pacific Relations and it was taken from the files of the institute. Present, among others, was Philip C. Jessup, chairman, and Edward C. Carter. I read an excerpt:

The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all IPR responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

That is an excerpt from the exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. That has already been introduced in evidence.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 20, 1940, headed "WLH from ECC." I read this memorandum for the record:

For your private information I enclose a copy of a telegram which Field sent to Jessup on August 31 or September 1. Field telephoned me late on the afternoon of August 30 from Chicago saying that great pressure was being put on him to become secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. I told him that institutionally I hoped he could postpone a decision, but that if personally he decided it was his national duty to take the Chicago job, I would do everything I could to back him up. From Ellsworth early the next morning I sent him a wire urging him to postpone a decision for another week. I thought it was of the utmost importance that he should first consult Edith, Jessup, and his colleagues of the New York office.

The immediacy of the program, the pressure of the 20,000 attending the Chicago convention, and the very short time that was left before the Conscription Act would be voted in Congress made him feel, however, that he must make an immediate and affirmative decision. He took a thousand people from Chicago to Washington where they bombarded Congressmen for several days and I think Fred believes that the conscription bill got 100 less votes in Congress than it otherwise would. He is now working night and day with a large staff and thousands of backers throughout the country, to get the conscription bill repealed or nullified.

He expects at any moment he may go to prison but desires to work full steam ahead until the moment of arrest in a gigantic Nation-wide effort to launch a movement which will preserve our democratic institutions so that if we do have to go to war we will have something worth fighting for. He does not wish to have the United States imitate France.

For a considerable time he lived on benzedrine instead of sleep and feels, I think, that he is in exactly the same position as a man who is suddenly drafted to throw everything else over and join in the work of the national defense council or join the ranks. He was here for 2 days this week and has agreed next week to go into the whole question of the handbook. It is on his conscience, though I cannot make out whether it is on his conscience as much as it is on yours and mine.

I shall use your letter in my talk with him, so I don't know that there is any point in your writing him yet. I have asked Miss Greene to prepare for Fred,

you, and me a very careful analysis of just how much progress has been made in quantity and quality and a detailed sketch of what still remains to be done. When we have this we will have to make a cost accounting of what would be required to finish the job. I am wondering whether I would be justified in telling Fred that he ought to consider giving whatever money is necessary to enable us to employ a staff to finish the book. Though I think he imagines he can give a little time to it each week, I personally do not think there is a ghost of a chance of his being able to give enough time to bring the book to a speedy conclusion.

Can you give me an estimate of what the project has cost us thus far, or should I get this from Miss Austern?

I heard Fred speak to an audience of 2,000 in the Manhattan Center a couple of nights ago. There must have been 5 minutes sustained cheering when he stood up before he could begin his speech. He has long wanted to be a part of a great mass movement. Now he is at the head of one. I think the Pacific will be a marginal interest from 1 to 5 years. Some day it may come back as the focus of his life, but there is no point in putting on any pressure at the present time.

If you have anything to add to your letter of September 18 on this matter, please send it to me by air mail.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that?

Mr. MANDEL. That is headed "WLH from ECC." There is no signature.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who WLH is?

Mr. MORRIS. It is the practice, Mr. Chairman, of the institute to refer to their staff members by initials only. "WLH" is generally W. L. Holland, and "ECC" is generally E. C. Carter. That is almost without exception true.

Mr. MANDEL. I might quote from Attorney General Francis Biddle, who describes the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. What organization?

Mr. MANDEL. The American Peace Mobilization.

The most conspicuous activity of the American Peace Mobilization was the picketing of the White House which began in April 1941 in protest against lend-lease and the entire national defense program. On the afternoon of June 21, 1941, Frederick V. Field, national secretary, suddenly called off the picket line around the White House.

Here is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Public Relations headed "Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations" and coming from the Columbia University, signed Phil. The signature corresponds to the signature of Philip C. Jessup on other letterheads in the file.

I read this letter, to Mr. Edward C. Carter :

OCTOBER 29, 1940.

DEAR NED: I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as is, much as I would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the two, something like this:

"Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Council since 1928, has resigned in order to become executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. The American Peace Mobilization is a mass organization of progressive trade-unions, farm, church, youth, Negro and fraternal groups dedicated to preserving the interests of the United States through the strengthening of American democracy and through nonparticipation in the war between England and the fascist powers. Mr. Field had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility and felt that in view of the acceptance of his new position, it was not possible for him to continue his official connection with the IPR. The executive committee, being forced to the conclusion that Mr. Field's decision was final, felt compelled to accept Mr. Field's resignation with great regret. It expressed its appreciation of the distinguished service that Mr. Field had rendered during his 11 years of service to the American Coun-

cil and expressed the hope that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the IPR."

Perhaps we could add to that the expression of appreciation which came from the staff.

How does that strike you?

The paragraphs in regard to Lasker seem to me excellent.

Sincerely yours,

PHIL.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are reading these exhibits, Mr. Chairman, I might point out it is no longer necessary for General Fortier to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Thank you, General, for your presence.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, General.

May that letter of October 29, 1940, be introduced?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 256," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. We have Mr. Joseph Kornfeder available, Mr. Chairman, and he is prepared to testify today. The general nature of his testimony is to show that the Chinese Communist Party has been in the past a full-fledged member of the Communist Internationale, he having been in Moscow to make personal observations on this fact.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to hear that testimony, but I would like to have other members of the committee present also. I am inclined to believe we will have to defer on account of the vote being taken.

Mr. MORRIS. Until some time later today?

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest we convene at 2:30.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder is from Detroit and he is not easily summonable.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kornfeder, please be here at 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a. m., the hearing recessed until 2:30 p. m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Has the witness been sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH ZACK KORNFEDER, DETROIT, MICH.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this hearing, one of the purposes of this hearing, is that we would like the record to show something of the nature of the Chinese Communist organization.

It has been said on many occasions that Chinese Communists are not real Communists. An example of this can be found in a pamphlet which represents a cooperative project of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co. It is called *China Yesterday and Today*, by Eleanor Lattimore.

On page 108 of that pamphlet, we read the expression :

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word "Communist." They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.

Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic conditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable of taking part in political life, they are often described as a peasant party.

Then it goes on on that page, that is page 108 and page 109. Taking this, Mr. Chairman, as typical of such an attitude of the Chinese Communists, I think it is necessary that we have a witness here who can testify, first-hand, about the nature of the Chinese Communist organization.

For that reason, we have asked Mr. Kornfeder to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, would you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. KORNFEDER. My name is Joseph Zack Kornfeder, 3210 Book Tower, Detroit, Mich.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell your name?

Mr. KORNFEDER. K-o-r-n-f-e-d-e-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, when did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I joined the Communist Party at the time of its formation in 1919.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you remain a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I remained a member until October 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what the highest position you achieved in the Communist Party was, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was a member of the district committee of the Communist Party, New York district, a member of the central executive committee of the Communist Party, now known as the national committee, for several terms.

While in Moscow, I was a member of the Anglo-American secretariat of the Communist International at the Communist International headquarters, and later a representative of the Communist International in South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a Comintern delegate to North and South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was a Comintern delegate to South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, did you have any training in Moscow?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; I took a 3-year course in the Lenin School.

The Lenin School is a college to train leaders for the various Communist Parties in the various methods of political warfare.

Mr. MORRIS. What years were you so trained, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was in Moscow from the latter part of 1927 until April or May 1930.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was your next assignment after your training period?

Mr. KORNFEDER. After that, I went as a representative of the Communist International to South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe your relationship under those circumstances to the Communist Party of South America?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. Well, as representative of the Communist International in the Communist Parties of Columbia and Venezuela, I was in charge of these parties, that is, I was their political director about the same way Gerhardt Eisler was of the Communist Party of the United States, while he was here.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, in other words, Mr. Kornfeder, you were not a member of the Communist Party of South America, but you were their superior and their boss?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. That is right, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that really what your position was?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you say that you were then the counterpart of Gerhardt Eisler in the United States, do you mean that Gerhardt Eisler was the Comintern man that was sent here to run the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow did you have any opportunity to observe the workings of the Chinese Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. Yes, definitely so.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us whatever you can in connection with that question, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. Well, in 1927, there developed a big crisis inside of the Chinese Communist Party.

The reason for the crisis was that the Chinese Communist Party who, until then, had been a part of the Kuomintang, had been expelled from the Kuomintang by Chiang Kai-shek and his associates, and that created a crisis inside of the Chinese Communist Party.

The subject of that crisis and the question as to what was wrong in the policy, Communist policies, in China then became an item of discussion in all of the higher committees of the Communist International.

I attended the discussions. The result of these discussions was that the leading committees of the Chinese Communist Party were purged, reorganized, and those that Moscow disapproved of were expelled from the Communist Party as Trotskyites.

I also had an opportunity to become familiar with the Chinese Communist politics by attending the various meetings of the Communist International leading committees.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, before you get on to that, Mr. Kornfeder, in what capacity did you attend these other discussions that you have testified about?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. I was a member of the Anglo-American secretariat of the Communist International. That was a subcommittee in charge of the Communist Party's English-speaking countries.

The Communist Party of the United States always played a large role in the affairs of the Communist Party of China. So, because of that, I was interested to stay informed on affairs in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, Mr. Kornfeder, that the American Communist Party was very active in the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party in China?

Mr. KORNFEDEr. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, why were the American Communists employed in connection with the Chinese Communist activities? What is the reason for that?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the reason, as I get it from attending these discussion, is that America wielded a large influence in China all the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Wielded a large influence?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes. And the Comintern wanted to avail itself of that influence even if it was just in the form of representation from the United States, whether they had been Communist or Communist-controlled unions that claimed to represent a big following in the United States, or any other form.

It seemed to have an effect of building up the morale of the Chinese Communists to have Communist representation on the leading committees in the Chinese labor movement.

The CHAIRMAN. You say Communist representation, or do you mean American representation?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right, American Communist representation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow at these various Comintern meetings, did you encounter Chinese Communists there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, definitely so.

The Chinese Communist Party was represented on all the leading committees in the Communist International. They were on the executive committee of the Communist International, they were on the agitation and propaganda commission of the Communist International, on the organization commission of the Communist International, and there was a special secretariat of the Communist International which preoccupied itself entirely with the problems of China, Japan, Malaya, Indochina, and so on, the so-called far eastern secretariat of the Communist International.

Mr. MORRIS. Now could you tell us, Mr. Kornfeder, the evidence as you experienced it which indicated to you that the Chinese Communists were an integral part of the Comintern organization?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, in the first place, there was a tremendous college, the largest college to train leaders in the arts of political warfare, the so-called Far Eastern University, formerly also known as the Sun Yat-sen University.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is located where?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Located in Moscow.

That university had a capacity to train 2,000 organizers and agitators a year.

At the time I was there, the number of Chinese Communists being trained there was 1,200.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that be 1,200 a year, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. 1,200 a year; yes.

This training system started in 1926 and, as far as I know—well, it certainly was there while I was in Moscow, and as far as I know from others that were there subsequently, it continued throughout the years.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was there until 1930.

The CHAIRMAN. From when?

Mr. KORNFEDER. From 1927.

The CHAIRMAN. Attending that university?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I attended another one, the Lenin School, which was a college to train leaders for the more advanced countries, like the United States, Germany, England, France, and so on.

But the Eastern University trained Communist leaders for China, Japan, Korea, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, India, and so on, the so-called colonial countries.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony, then, that the Chinese Communist leaders were being trained in Moscow?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Definitely so.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the discipline exerted by the Comintern organization on the Chinese Communist Party as strong as the discipline exercised in other Communist parties throughout the world?

Mr. KORNFEDER. It certainly was, even stronger because they had a civil-war situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain that, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, in a strange situation like existed inside of China, the Communist Party under such conditions maintained a discipline that is even more severe than in countries where conditions are relatively stable.

This manifested itself in the control that Moscow headquarters had on the personnel of the Chinese Communist Party. There was not a single official of any consequence that could be elected by the Chinese Communist Party without previous consent of the Communist International, whether it be a secretary of the party, whether he be a head of, let us say, trade-union activities commission, or organization commission, or of the guerrilla army that they were already then forming. All of these leading personnel were all decided first in Moscow before they could be put into position.

The same procedure was true, by and large, with all of the other Communist parties.

The Chinese Communist Party was an integral part of the world Communist Party, which is monolithic, and there is no difference between the control of Moscow over that party as compared with other parties, except that discipline was even more severe because of the more severe internal situation in China.

The CHAIRMAN. How did these students, as you termed them as such, maintain themselves in this University of Moscow?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the university, its teaching staff, and operating personnel, and all the trainees, all the expenses of that were paid by the Soviet Government and, coming there, that is the transportation costs, were also furnished from the same source.

If they had relatives back home, which they had to maintain, then a subsidy was allowed for that purpose.

There were all together about four colleges like that in Moscow. They were all at the expense of the Soviet Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The students then, so-called, were maintained with their tuition, their living, their housing, their clothing, everything was furnished to them by the Soviet Government?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, have you ever met Stalin, personally?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us whether or not he took an active interest in the affairs of the Chinese Communist organization?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Stalin was in charge of the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party by decision of the political bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1926.

All matters of policy, whether relating to the line to be adopted or to organization strategy, were decided in the final sense by Stalin himself.

I am not the only one that says that. At the celebration for Stalin's seventieth birthday which took place, I believe, 2 years ago, Beria, the head of the political police, known as the MVD, in a laudatory speech on Stalin, which appeared in some of the papers, also said that the successes in China are due to the brilliant leadership of our great leader, Joseph Stalin, who has been guiding the affairs of the Communist Party of China ever since 1926.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know that to be a fact, that statement of Beria, you know that to be a statement of fact from your own personal experience?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right. I knew it long before he made the speech.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, did you attend the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; I attended the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that held?

Mr. KORNFEDER. The summer of 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anything take place at that congress bearing on the importance of the Chinese Communist Party in its future role in world affairs?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes. The situation in China, from a Communist point of view, was one of the very principal topics of discussion and decision at the congress. I have here, and if I may I could quote it.

Mr. MORRIS. What is it that you have there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I have here the Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, which was adopted at that congress, and all the principal parts of which were written by Joseph Stalin himself.

Mr. MORRIS. From what are you reading, Mr. Kornfeder? From what publication?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I would like to read from a copy of this, decisions, that appeared in the International Press Correspondence, which was a weekly news service of the Communist International, a thesis on the colonial question.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of the publication you are reading from, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. December 12, 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. And you attended this congress?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I attended the congress, and I know this is the resolution, the thesis that was adopted there.

Now, the decision at that congress revolved largely on the subject, that is, in reference to China, whether to orientate the activities of the Communists in China on the peasantry.

There is the accepted Marxian theory and the theory of Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, that the Communists should orientate

themselves on the factory workers and by forming labor unions there and so on and so forth, entrench themselves.

That was the accepted theory up until about the time of this congress, also for colonial countries.

Now, at the sixth congress, by the initiative of Stalin, the base of Communist politics in this type of country was fundamentally changed. From there on, the Communists were to base themselves on the peasants.

Now, the peasant, to make an illustration, would be something like a very poor sharecropper down in the South, not a farmer as we understand it. A farmer would be a relatively rich man. The peasant is something like the poorest type of sharecropper down in the South, except that in China their conditions are even worse.

Now, the Communists were to base themselves upon this strata, and conquer the countryside first, and then, after forming guerrilla armies in the countryside, conquer the cities.

Those of you gentlemen who may have followed the course of events must have noticed that that is the thing that took place in China, first the countryside was conquered and then the cities, instead of the traditional Marxian method of first conquering the cities and then conquering the rest of the country.

Now, the change in that direction, which required the Communists to change their organization methods, their agitation methods, to concentrate on what we call agrarian reform, and out of which some intellectuals here in this country got the impression that the Communists in China are agrarians—of course, that was entirely false. It was just the change of operational tactics on the part of Moscow.

Now, to show you here, I will quote this change. I will quote a part of this resolution on page 1665.

Along with the national-emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution constitutes the axes of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the chief colonial countries.

The chief colonial country was, of course, in Asia, China. It is the peasantry that, from here, becomes the center of operation.

Another part which was already then introduced in the strategy of the Communists in this type of country is to exploit nationalism.

You see, prior to this, the Communists operated, well, under their own flag. All the propaganda was outright Communist and so on and so forth.

After this Congress, more and more, they shifted to the use of nationalism, to operate behind nationalist movements, to infiltrate nationalist movements, to use their flag and operate under it, and so on.

There is a part here which introduces that change of tactics. It is on the same page.

It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investigate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a considerable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. How would that apply in the United States? Have you an illustration of it? Can you give us an illustration of it?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, in the United States they apply this thesis only to the Negroes. They consider the Negroes as colonials who are being exploited and oppressed by American imperialism, and who

should have an independent Republic based on the Negro Belt in the South.

That is the only part of this thesis that would apply to the United States, because the United States is an industrially advanced country where conditions are different.

You see, their strategy adjusts itself in its method of operation to the type of country in which the Communists operate.

In this country this would also be translated to the Communists hiding behind the skirts of the liberals.

The CHAIRMAN. Hiding behind what?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Operating behind the skirts of the liberals. That is, using the liberals as a front or pretending to be liberals.

They could not use nationalism in the sense that it is in China because, well, we are an independent Nation and the leading Nation.

But in their internal operations, they would make an assimilation of this tactic by not operating under their own flag, operating as liberals or so-called progressives, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. That concludes your comments on that world congress, Mr. Kornfeder, does it?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

I would suggest that it may be of use to introduce this part into the record, which is entitled "Communist Strategy and Tactics in China, India, and Similar Colonial Countries."

Of course, the Communist methods since that was adopted have gone through considerable changes, have become smoother. But the basic principles are still in here and are being used even today.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we have that introduced into the record for the purposes described by Mr. Kornfeder.

That is an official publication of the Communist International, and therein is a thesis on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semicolonies. We have had testimony from Mr. Kornfeder on that score.

The CHAIRMAN. And this is under date of December 12, 1928, volume 8, No. 88.

Mr. MORRIS. That is an official publication of the Communist International?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That part referred to by the witness may be inserted in the record, commencing on page 1665, under the caption "On Communist strategy and tactics in China, India, and similar colonial countries," extending down to the middle of page 1670, just before "The immediate tasks of the Communists."

It will be inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 257" and is as follows:)

[From International Press Correspondence, December 12, 1928]

III. ON COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN CHINA, INDIA, AND SIMILAR COLONIAL COUNTRIES

16. As in all colonies and semicolonies, so also in China and India the development of productive forces and the socialization of labor stands at a comparatively low level. This circumstance, together with the fact of foreign domination and also the presence of powerful relics of feudalism and precapitalist relations, determines the character of the immediate stage of the revolution in these coun-

tries. In the revolutionary movement of these countries we have to deal with the bourgeois democratic revolution, i. e. of the stage signifying the preparation of the prerequisites for proletarian dictatorship and socialist revolution. Corresponding to this, the following kinds of tasks can be pointed out, which may be considered as general basic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the colonies and semicolonies:

(a) A shifting in the relationship of forces in favor of the proletariat; emancipation of the country from the yoke of imperialism (nationalization of foreign concessions, railways, banks, etc.) and the establishment of the national unity of the country where this has not yet been attained; overthrow of the power of the exploiting classes at the back of which imperialism stands; organization of Soviets of workers and peasants and organization of the Red Army; establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; consolidation of the hegemony of the proletariat.

(b) The carrying through of the agrarian revolution; emancipation of the peasants from all precapitalist and colonial conditions of exploitation and bondage; nationalization of the land; radical measures for alleviating the position of the peasantry with the object of establishing the closest possible economic and political union between the town and village.

(c) In correspondence with the further development of industry, transport, etc., and with the accompanying growth of the proletariat, the widespread development of trade union organizations of the working class, strengthening of the Communist Party and its conquest of a firm leading position among the toiling masses; the achievement of the 8-hour working day.

(d) Establishment of equal rights for nationalities and of sex equality (equal rights for women); separation of the church from the state and the abolition of caste distinctions; political education and raising of the general cultural level of the masses in town and country, etc.

How far the bourgeois-democratic revolution will be able in practice to realize all its basic tasks, and how far it will be the case that part of these tasks will be carried into effect only by the Socialist revolution, will depend on the course of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and its successes or defeats in the struggle against the imperialists, feudal lords and the bourgeoisie. In particular, the emancipation of the colony from the imperialist yoke is facilitated by the development of the Socialist revolution in the capitalist world and can only be completely guaranteed by the victory of the proletariat in the leading capitalist countries.

The transition of the revolution to the Socialist phase demands the presence of certain minimum prerequisites, as, for example, a certain definite level of development in the country of industry, of trade union organizations of the proletariat and a strong Communist Party. The most important is precisely the development of a strong Communist Party with a big mass influence, which would be in the highest degree a slow and difficult process were it not accelerated by the bourgeois-democratic revolution which already grows and develops as a result of the objective conditions in these countries.

17. The bourgeois-democratic revolution in the colonies is distinguished from the bourgeois-democratic revolution in an independent country chiefly in that it is organically bound up with the national emancipatory struggle against imperialist domination. The national factor exerts considerable influence on the revolutionary process in all colonies, as well as in those semicolonies where imperialist enslavement already appears in its naked form, leading to the revolt of the mass of the people. On the one hand, national oppression hastens the ripening of the revolutionary crises, intensifies the dissatisfaction of the masses of workers and peasants, facilitates their mobilization and endows the revolutionary mass revolts with the elemental force and character of a genuine popular revolution. On the other hand, the national factor is able to influence not only the movement of the working class and peasantry but also the attitude of all the remaining classes, modifying its form during the process of revolution. Above all, the poor urban petty bourgeoisie together with the petty bourgeoisie intelligentsia is during the first period, to a very considerable extent, brought under the influence of the active revolutionary forces; secondly, the position of the colonial bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is still for the most part an ambiguous one and its vacillations in accordance with the course of the revolution are even more considerable than in the bourgeoisie of an independent country (e. g., the Russian bourgeoisie in 1905-17).

It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investigate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a con-

siderable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned.

Along with the national emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution constitutes the axis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the chief colonial countries. Consequently, Communists must follow with the greatest attention the development of the agrarian crisis and the intensification of class contradictions in the village; they must from the very beginning give a consciously revolutionary direction to the dissatisfaction of the workers and to the incipient peasant movement, directing it against imperialist exploitation and bondage as also against the yoke of the various precapitalist (feudal and semifeudal) relationships as a result of which peasant economy is suffering, declining, and perishing. The incredible backwardness of agriculture, the prevalence of oppressive rent relations, and the oppression of trading-usury capital represent the greatest hindrance to the development of productive forces in village economy in the colonies and stand in monstrous contradiction with the highly organized forms of exchange between the village agricultural production of the colonies and the world market created by monopoly imperialism.

18. The national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries does not adopt a uniform attitude in relation to imperialism. A part of this bourgeoisie, more especially the trading bourgeoisie, directly serves the interests of imperialist capital (the so-called comprador bourgeoisie). In general, it more or less consistently defends the antinational imperialist point of view directed against the whole nationalist movement, in common with the feudal allies of imperialism and the more highly paid native officials. The remaining portions of the native bourgeoisie, especially the portion reflecting the interests of native industry, support the national movement and represent a special vacillating compromising tendency which may be designated as national reformism (or, in the terminology of the Theses of the Second Congress of the Communist International, a bourgeois-democratic tendency).

This intermediate position of the national bourgeoisie between the revolutionary and imperialist camps is no longer to be observed, it is true, in China after 1925; there the greater part of the national bourgeoisie from the beginning, owing to the special situation, took the leadership in the national-emancipatory war; later on it passed over finally into the camp of counterrevolution. In India and Egypt, we still observe, for the time being, the typical bourgeois-nationalist movement—an opportunistic movement, subject to great vacillations, balancing between imperialism and revolution.

The independence of the country in relation to imperialism, being to the advantage of the whole colonial people, corresponds also to the interests of the national bourgeoisie, but is in irreconcilable contradiction to the whole nature of the imperialist system. Various native capitalists, it is true, are by their immediate interests to a great extent bound by numerous threads to imperialist capital. Imperialism is able directly to bridge a considerable portion of them (it may be even a greater portion than heretofore) and to create a definite Compradore position, a position of intermediary trader, subexploiter or overseer over the enslaved population. But the position of slave owner, of monopolist supreme exploiter, imperialism reserves for itself alone. Independent rule, a future of "free" independent capitalist development, hegemony over an "independent" people—this imperialism will never voluntarily yield to the national bourgeoisie. In this respect, the contradiction of interests between the national bourgeoisie of the colonial country and imperialism is objectively of a radical character. In this respect, imperialism demands capitulation on the part of the national bourgeoisie.

The native bourgeoisie, as the weaker side, again and again capitulates to imperialism. Its capitulation, however, is not final as long as the danger of class revolution on the part of the masses has not become immediate, acute and menacing. In order, on the other hand, to avoid this danger, and, on the other hand, to strengthen its position in relation to imperialism, bourgeois nationalism in these colonies strives to obtain the support of the petty bourgeoisie, of the peasantry and in part also of the working class. Since, in relation to the working class it has little prospect of success (as soon as the working class in these countries has at all begun to awake politically), it becomes the more important for it to obtain support from the peasantry.

But just here is the weakest point of the colonial bourgeoisie. The unbearable exploitation of the colonial peasantry can only be put an end to by the way of the agrarian revolution. The bourgeoisie of China, India, and Egypt is by its immediate interests so closely bound up with landlordism, with usury capital

and with the exploitation of the peasant masses in general, that it takes its stand not only against the agrarian revolution but also against every decisive agrarian reform. It is afraid, and not without foundation, that even the more open formulation of the agrarian question will stimulate and accelerate the growth of the process of revolutionary fermentation in the peasant masses. Thus, the reformist bourgeoisie hardly dare to decide to approach practically this basic urgent question.

Instead, it attempts by means of empty nationalist phrases and gestures to keep the petty bourgeois masses under its influence and to compel imperialism to grant certain concessions. But the imperialists draw the reins ever tighter, for the national bourgeoisie is incapable of offering any serious resistance. Accordingly, the national bourgeoisie in every conflict with imperialism attempt, on the one hand, to make a great show of their nationalist "firmness" of principle, and on the other hand, they sow illusions as to the possibility of a peaceful compromise with imperialism. Through both the one and the other, the masses inevitably become disillusioned and in this way they gradually outlive their reformist illusions.

19. An incorrect estimation of the basic national-reformist tendency of the national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries gives rise to the possibility of serious errors in the strategy and tactics of the Communist Parties concerned. In particular, two kinds of mistakes are possible:

(a) A nonunderstanding of the difference between the national reformist and national-revolutionary tendency can lead to a "khvostist" policy in relation to the bourgeoisie, to an insufficiently accurate political and organizational delimitation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, and to the blurring of the chief revolutionary slogans (especially the slogans of the agrarian revolution), etc. This was the fundamental mistake into which the Communist Party of China fell in 1925-27.

(b) An underestimation of the special significance which the bourgeois national-reformist, as distinct from the feudal-imperialist camp, possess owing to its mass influence on the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and even a portion of the working class, may lead, at least in the first stages of the movement, to a sectarian policy and to the isolation of the Communists from the toiling masses.

In both these cases, insufficient attention is given to the realization of precisely those tasks which the Second Congress of the Communist International had already characterized as the basic tasks of the Communist Parties in the colonial countries, i. e. the tasks of struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movement inside the nation itself. Without this struggle, without the liberation of the toiling masses from the influence of the bourgeoisie and of national-reformism, the basic strategical aim of the Communist movement in the bourgeois-democratic revolution—the hegemony of the proletariat—cannot be achieved. Without the hegemony of the proletariat, an organic part of which is the leading role of the Communist Party, the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be carried through to an end, not to speak of the socialist revolution.

20. The petty bourgeoisie in the colonial and semicolonial countries plays a very important role. It consists of various strata, which in different periods of the national-revolutionary movement play very diverse roles.

The artisan, who is hit by the competition of foreign imported goods, is hostilely disposed toward imperialism. At the same time, he is interested in the unlimited exploitation of his journeymen and apprentices, and accordingly, he is hostilely disposed toward the class-conscious labor movement. At the same time, also, he usually suffers himself from the exploitation of trading and usury capital. The exceedingly ambiguous and hopeless position of this stratum of the petty bourgeoisie determines its vacillations, and it frequently falls under the influence of utopian reactionaries.

The small trader—both in town and village—is connected with village exploitation through usury and trade, and he clings to the old forms of exploitation in preference to the prospects of an expansion of the internal market. These strata, however, are not homogeneous. These sections of the trading bourgeoisie which in one form or another are connected with the Compradores occupy a different position from those sections the activity of which is limited mainly to the internal market.

The petty bourgeois intelligentsia, the students, and such like, are very frequently the most determined representatives, not only of the specific interests of the petty bourgeoisie, but also of the general objective interests of the entire national bourgeoisie, and, in the first period of the national movement, they often come out as the spokesmen of the nationalist struggle. Their role at the

head of the movement is comparatively important. In general, they cannot act as representatives of peasant interests, for the very social strata from which they come are connected with landlordism. The upsurge of the revolutionary wave may drive them into the labor movement, bringing with them their petty bourgeois ideology of vacillation and indecision. Only a few of them in the course of the struggle are able to break with their own class and rise to an understanding of the tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat, and to become active defenders of the interests of the latter. It frequently happens that the petty bourgeois intellectuals give to their ideology a socialist or even Communist color. In the struggle against imperialism they have played, and in such countries as India and Egypt they even now, still partially play a revolutionary role. The mass movement may draw them after it, but it may also push them into the camp of extreme reaction or at least, cause the spread of utopian reactionary tendencies in their ranks.

Alongside of these strata, there are to be found in the colonial towns considerable sections of urban poor, the position of which objectively drives them to the support of revolution—artisans who do not exploit the labor of others, street traders, unemployed intellectuals, ruined peasants seeking work, etc. Further, the colonial town, as also the village, has a populous section of "coolies", semi-proletarians who have not passed through the school of factory production and who live by casual labor.

The peasantry, along with the proletariat and in the character of its ally, represents a driving force of the revolution. The immense many-millioned peasant mass constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population even in the most developed colonies (in some colonies it is 90 percent of the population). The many millions of starving tenant-cultivators, petty peasants oppressed by want and groaning under all kinds of precapitalist and capitalist forms of exploitation, a considerable portion of them deprived of the possibility of cultivation even on the lands that they rent, thrown out from the process of production and slowly dying from famine and disease, village agricultural laborers, all these are the allies of the proletariat in the village. The peasantry can only achieve its emancipation under the leadership of the proletariat, but the proletariat can only lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution to victory in union with the peasantry.

The process of class differentiation of the peasantry in the colonies and semi-colonies which possess important relics of feudalism and of precapitalist relationships, proceeds at a comparatively slow rate. Nevertheless, market relationships in these countries have developed to such a degree that the peasantry already no longer represent a homogeneous mass, as far as their class relations are concerned. In the villages of China and India, in particular in certain parts of these countries, it is already possible to find exploiting elements derived from the peasantry, who exploit the peasants and village laborers through usury, trade, employment of hired labor, the sale or letting out of land on rent, the loaning of cattle or agricultural implements, etc., etc.

In general, it is possible that, in the first period of the struggle of the peasantry against the landlords, the proletariat may be able to carry with it the entire peasantry. But in the further development of the struggle some of the upper strata of the peasantry may pass into the camp of counter-revolution. The proletariat can achieve its leading role in relation to the peasantry only under the conditions of unflinching struggle for its partial demands, for complete carrying through of the agrarian revolution, and only if it will lead the struggle of the wide masses of the peasantry for a revolutionary solution of the agrarian question.

21. The working class in the colonies and semicolonies has characteristic features which play an important role in the building up of an independent working class movement and proletarian class ideology in these countries. The predominant part of the colonial proletariat is derived from the pauperized village, with which the worker remains in connection even when engaged in production. In the majority of colonies (with the exception of some large factory towns such as Shanghai, Bombay, Calcutta, etc.), we find, as a general rule, only a first generation of proletariat engaged in large-scale production. Another portion is made up of the ruined artisans who are being driven out of the decaying handicrafts, which are widely spread even in the most advanced colonies. The ruined artisan, a petty owner, carries with him into the working class a guild tendency and ideology which serves as a basis for the penetration of national-reformist influence into the labor movement of the colonies.

The great fluctuation in the composition of the proletariat (frequent renewal of the labor force in the factories owing to workers returning to the villages and the inflow of new masses of poverty-stricken peasants into production); the considerable percentage of women and children; the numerous different languages; illiteracy; the wide distribution of religious and caste prejudices—all make difficult the work of systematic agitation and propaganda and retard the growth of class consciousness among the workers. Nevertheless, the merciless exploitation, practiced in the most oppressive forms by native and foreign capital, and the entire absence of political rights for the workers, create the objective pre-conditions on the basis of which the labor movement in the colonies is rapidly overcoming all obstacles and every year draws greater and greater masses of the working class into the struggle against the native exploiters and the imperialists.

The first period of the growth of the labor movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries (approximately 1919-1923) is organically bound up with the general growth of the national-revolutionary movement which followed the world war, and which was characterized by the subordination of the class interests of the working class to the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle headed by the native bourgeoisie. Insofar as the labor strikes and other demonstrations bore an organizational character, they were usually organized by petty bourgeois intellectuals who restricted the demands of the workers to questions of the national struggle. The most important characteristic of the second period of rapid growth of the labor movement in the colonies, on the other hand, the period which began after the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, was the emergence of the working class of the colonies into the political arena as an independent class force directly opposing itself to the national bourgeoisie, and entering upon a struggle with the latter in defense of its own immediate class interests and for hegemony in the national revolution as a whole. The history of the last few years has clearly confirmed this characteristic of the new stage of the colonial revolution, first of all in the example of the great Chinese revolution, and subsequently in the insurrection in Indonesia. There is every ground to believe that in India the working class is liberating itself from the influence of the nationalist and social-reformist leaders and is being converted into an independent political factor in the struggle against the British imperialists and the native bourgeoisie.

22. In order correctly to determine the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement, it is important as a starting point to take into consideration the degree of maturity attained by the movement in the separate colonial countries. The revolutionary movement in China is distinguished from the present movement in India by a series of essential features, characterizing the different degrees of maturity of the movement in the two countries. The previous experience of the Chinese revolution must, undoubtedly, be utilized in the revolutionary movement in India and other analogous colonial countries. But it would be a completely mistaken application of the Chinese experience if, at the present time in India, Egypt, etc., we were to formulate the immediate tasks, slogans and tactical methods in exactly the same form as took place in China, for example in the Wuhan period, or in the form in which it is necessary to formulate them there at the present time.

The tendency to skip over the inevitable difficulties and special tasks of the present stage of the revolutionary movement in India, Egypt, etc., can only be harmful. It is necessary to carry through much work in the building up and consolidation of the Communist Party and trade-union organizations of the proletariat, in the revolutionization of the trade-unions, in the development of economic and political mass demonstrations and in the winning over of the masses and their liberation from the influence of the national-reformist bourgeoisie, before it is possible to advance in these countries with definite prospects of success to the realization of such tasks as those which were fully carried out in China during the Wuhan period as the immediate tasks of the struggle of the working class and peasantry.

The interests of the struggle for the class rule of the national bourgeoisie compel the most important bourgeois parties in India and Egypt (Swarajists, Wafdist) still to demonstrate their opposition to the ruling imperialist-feudal bloc. Although this opposition has not a revolutionary but a reformist and class collaborationist character, this by no means signifies that it has not a special significance. The national bourgeoisie has not the significance of a force in the struggle against imperialism. Nevertheless, this bourgeois-reformist opposition has its real special significance for the development of the revolutionary

movement—and this both in a negative as well as in a positive sense—insofar as it possesses any mass influence at all.

Its chief feature is that it exerts a braking retarding influence on the development of the revolutionary movement, insofar as it is successful in drawing the toiling masses in its wake and holding them back from the revolutionary struggle. On the other hand, however, the demonstrations of the bourgeois opposition against the ruling imperialist-feudal bloc, even if they do not have any deep foundation, can exert a certain accelerating influence on the process of the political awakening of the wide masses of toilers; the concrete open conflicts of the national-reformist bourgeoisie with imperialism, although of little significance in themselves, may, under certain conditions; indirectly serve as the cause of the unleashing of even greater revolutionary mass actions.

It is true the reformist bourgeoisie itself endeavours not to allow of any such effect of its oppositional activities, and in one way or another seeks to prevent it in advance. But, wherever the objective conditions exist for a far-reaching political crisis, there the activities of the national-reformist opposition, even their insignificant conflicts with imperialism which are least of all connected with the real hearth of the revolution, can become of serious importance.

The Communists must learn how to utilize each and every conflict, to develop such conflicts and to broaden their significance, to connect them with the agitation for revolutionary slogans, to spread the news of these conflicts among the wide masses, to arouse these masses to independent, open manifestations in support of their own demands, etc.

23. The correct tactics in the struggle against such parties as the Swarajists and Wafdist during this stage consist in the successful exposure of their real national-reformist character. These parties have already more than once betrayed the national-emancipatory struggle, but they have not yet finally passed over to the counter-revolutionary camp in the manner of the Kuomintang. There is no doubt that they will do this later on, but at the present time they are so particularly dangerous precisely because their real physiognomy has not yet been exposed in the eyes of the wide masses of toilers. For this exposure there is still needed a very large amount of Communist educational work and a very great deal of new political experience on the part of the masses themselves. If the Communists do not already succeed in this stage in shaking the faith of the toiling masses in the bourgeois national-reformist leadership of the national movement, then this leadership in the coming upsurge of the revolutionary wave will represent an enormous danger for the revolution.

Consequently, it is necessary, by means of correct Communist tactics, adapted to the conditions of the present stage, to help the toiling masses in India, Egypt, Indonesia and such colonies to emancipate themselves from the influence of the bourgeois parties. This is not to be achieved by any noisy phrases, however, radical they may sound superficially, about the absence of any distinction between the oppositional national-reformists (Swarajists, Wafdist, etc.) and the British imperialists or their feudal counter-revolutionary allies. The national reformist leaders would easily be able to make use of such an exaggeration in order to incite the masses against the Communists. The masses see the chief immediate enemy of national emancipation in the form of the imperialist feudal bloc, which in itself is correct at this stage of the movement in India, Egypt, and Indonesia (as far as one side of the matter is concerned).

In the struggle against this ruling counter-revolutionary force; the Indian, Egyptian, and Indonesian Communists must proceed in advance of all, they must fight more determinedly, more consistently and more resolutely than any petty bourgeois section or national-revolutionary group. Of course, this fight must not be waged for the organizing of any kind of putsch or premature attempt at a rising on the part of the small revolutionary minority, but for the purpose of organizing the widest possible strata of the masses of toilers in demonstrations and other manifestations so that in this way the active participation of these masses can be guaranteed for a victorious uprising at a further stage of the revolutionary struggle.

At the same time, it is no less important mercilessly to expose before the toiling masses the national-reformist character of the Swarajist, Wafdist and other nationalist parties, and in particular of their leaders. It is necessary to expose their half-heartedness and vacillation in the national struggle, their bargainings and attempts to reach a compromise with British imperialism, their previous capitulations and counter-revolutionary advances, their reactionary resistance to the class demands of the proletariat and peasantry, their empty nationalist-phraseology, their dissemination of harmful illusions about the peaceful decolon-

ization of the country and their sabotage in relation to the application of revolutionary methods in the national-emancipatory struggle.

It is necessary to reject the formation of any kind of bloc between the Communist Party and the national-reformist opposition; this does not exclude the formation of temporary agreements and the coordinating of separate activities in connection with definite antiimperialist demonstrations, provided that the demonstrations of the bourgeois opposition can be utilized for the development of the mass movement, and provided that these agreements do not in any way limit the freedom of the Communist Parties in the matter of agitation among the masses and among the organizations of the latter. Of course, in this work the Communists must know how at the same time to carry on the most relentless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois nationalism and against the slightest signs of its influence inside the labor movement. In such cases, the Communist Party must take particular care not only to maintain its complete political independence and to make quite clear its own character, but also, on the basis of facts, to open the eyes of the masses of toilers who are under the influence of the bourgeois opposition, so that they will perceive all the hopelessness of this opposition and the danger of the bourgeois democratic illusions that it disseminates.

24. An incorrect estimation of the chief tendency of the parties of the big national bourgeoisie gives rise to the danger of an incorrect estimation of the character and role of the petty bourgeois parties. The development of these parties, as a general rule, follows a course from the national-revolutionary to the national-reformist position. Even such movements as Sun Yat-senism in China, Gandhism in India, Sarekat Islam in Indonesia, were originally radical petty bourgeois ideological movements which, however, as a result of their service to the big bourgeoisie became converted into a bourgeois nationalist-reformist movement. After this, in India, Egypt, and Indonesia, there was again founded a radical wing from among the different petty bourgeois groups (e. g. the Republican Party, Watanists, Sarekat Rayat), which stand for a more or less consistent national-revolutionary point of view. In such a country as India, the rise is possible of some new analogous radical petty bourgeois parties and groups.

But the fact must not be lost sight of that these parties, essentially considered, are connected with the national bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeois intelligentsia at the head of the parties puts forward national-revolutionary demands but at the same time appears more or less conscious as the representative of the capitalist development of their country. Some of these elements can become the followers of various kinds of reactionary utopias, but when confronted with feudalism and imperialism, they, in distinction from the parties of the big national bourgeoisie, appear at the outset not as reformists but as more or less revolutionary representatives of the anti-imperialist interests of the colonial bourgeoisie. This is the case, at least, so long as the development of the revolutionary process in the country does not put on the order of the day in a definite and sharp form the fundamental internal questions of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, particularly the question of the realization of the agrarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. When this happens, then it usually denotes the end of the revolutionary character of the petty bourgeois parties. As soon as the revolution has placed the class interests of the proletariat and the peasantry in critical contradiction not only to the rule of the feudal-imperialist bloc, but also to the class rule of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeois groups usually go back to the position of the national-reformist parties.

It is absolutely essential that the Communist Parties in these countries should from the very beginning demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion, both politically and organizationally, from all the petty bourgeois groups and parties. In so far as the needs of the revolutionary struggle demand it, a temporary co-operation is permissible, and in certain circumstances even a temporary union between the Communist Party and the national revolutionary movement, provided that the latter is a genuine revolutionary movement, that it genuinely struggles against the ruling power and that its representatives do not put obstacles in the way of the Communists educating and organizing in a revolutionary sense the peasants and broad masses of the exploited. In every such cooperation, however, it is essential to take the most careful precautions in order that this cooperation does not degenerate into a fusion of the Communist movement with the bourgeois-revolutionary movement.

The Communist movement in all circumstances, most unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement and its own independence in

agitation, in organization and in demonstrations. To criticize the half-heartedness and vacillation of the petty bourgeois groups, to anticipate their vacillations, to be prepared for them and at the same time to utilize to the full all the revolutionary possibilities of these strata, to carry on a consistent struggle against petty bourgeois influence over the proletariat, employ all means to liberate the wide masses of the peasantry from the influence of the petty bourgeois parties and to win from them the hegemony over the peasantry—these are the tasks of the Communist Parties.

25. How rapidly the revolutionary movement in India, Egypt, etc., will reach such a high degree of maturity as it has already reached in China, depends to an essential extent on how quickly there arises there a big revolutionary wave. In the event of its postponement for a considerable time, the political and organizational ripening of the driving forces of the revolution can only proceed by way of a gradual and relatively slow process of development. If, however, the coming powerful revolutionary wave rises earlier, then the movement may quickly be able to attain a much higher stage of maturity.

Under exceptionally favorable circumstances, it is not even excluded that the revolution there may be able in one single mighty wave to achieve the conquest of power by the proletariat and peasantry. It is also possible that the process of the development of the revolution from one stage to another more mature stage will be interrupted for a more or less prolonged period of time, in particular if the coming wave of revolutionary upheaval reaches a relatively small height and is not of great duration. Consequently, it is necessary in every case to subject the concrete situation to the most detailed analysis.

The following factors are of decisive significance for the immediate growing over of the revolution from one stage to another higher stage: (1) The degree of development of the revolutionary proletarian leadership of the movement, i. e. of the Communist Party of the given country (the numerical strength of the Party, its independent character, consciousness and fighting readiness, as well as its authority and connection with the masses and its influence on the trade union and peasant movement); (2) the degree of organization and the revolutionary experience of the working class, as well as, to a certain extent, of the peasantry. The revolutionary experience of the masses signifies experience of struggle: in the first place, liberation from the influence over them of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties.

Since these prerequisites for the first big mass outburst of the revolution, even in the best circumstances, are present only to an insufficient degree, an unusually deep revolutionary crisis and an unusually high and persistent revolutionary wave are required for it to be possible for the bourgeois-democratic revolution with the aid of this one wave of upheaval to lead to the complete victory of the proletariat and peasantry. Such a possibility is most easily presented, for example, when the ruling imperialism is temporarily distracted by a long-continued war outside the frontiers of the colonial country concerned.

26. Living, concrete, historical dialectics, such as were demonstrated by the now completed first period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, will give to the Communists, especially those working in the colonial countries, a valuable experience which it is necessary to study carefully in order to draw the correct conclusions, especially from the mistakes committed in the course of Communist work in the colonies.

The rise of the revolutionary wave in China was unusually prolonged (over 2 years), since it was connected with a protracted internal war. Inasmuch as the Northern Expedition was not conducted directly against the great imperialist powers and inasmuch as the latter, owing to competition between them, were partially passive during the first period, while the bourgeois leadership of the national movement had already for some years held Canton in its hands—a definite, though limited, territory—as well as a centralized power backed up by the army, and so forth, it is understandable that in this exceptional case a great part of the bourgeoisie in the beginning looked upon the national emancipatory war as its own particular affair. The Kuomintang, in which it practically played a leading role, in the course of a short time came to be at the head of the national revolutionary movement, a circumstance which in the course of further events represented an extremely great danger for the revolution.

On the other hand, among the peculiarities of the situation in China must be numbered the fact that the proletariat there was stronger in relation to its bourgeoisie than the proletariat of other countries. It is true that it was weakly organized, but during the upsurge of the revolutionary wave the growth of labor organization proceeded at a very rapid rate.

The Communist Party also rose in a short time from a small group to a party with 60,000 members (and presently even more) and possessing a wide influence among the workers. Naturally, in these conditions many petty bourgeois elements also entered the party. The party was lacking in revolutionary experience and, even more, in traditions of Bolshevism. In the beginning, the upper hand in its leadership was taken by wavering elements, which were still only to a very small degree liberated from petty bourgeois opportunist tendencies which inadequately understood the independent tasks and role of the Communist Party and which came out against any decisive development of the agrarian revolution.

The entry of the Communists for a certain period into the leading party of the national revolution, the Kuomintang, in itself corresponded to the requirements of the struggle and of the situation, and was also in the interests of the indispensable Communist work among the fairly wide masses of toilers who followed this party. In addition, at the beginning, the Communist Party of China received in the territory under the rule of the Kuomintang Government the possibility of independent agitation among the masses of workers and peasants and among the soldiers of the national army and their organizations. At that time the party possessed greater possibilities than it actually made use of.

At that time the party did not sufficiently clearly explain to the masses its proletarian class position in distinction from Sun Yat-senism and other petty bourgeois tendencies. In the ranks of the Kuomintang, the Communists did not conduct any independent policy, leaving out of account that in any such inevitable bloc the Communists must adopt an unconditionally critical attitude toward the bourgeois elements and always come out as independent force. The Communists failed to expose the vacillations of the national-bourgeoisie and of bourgeois-democratic nationalism, just at the time when this exposure ought to have constituted one of the most important tasks of the Communist Party. The inevitable disruption of the Kuomintang drew nearer and nearer as the national army advanced, but the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party undertook nothing or almost nothing in order to prepare the party in case of a breach, and in order to guarantee its independent position and to unite the revolutionary workers and peasants in an independent fighting bloc which would oppose itself to the leadership of the Kuomintang.

Thus, the bourgeois-counter-revolutionary coup of Chiang Kai-shek found the revolutionary proletariat completely unprepared and threw its ranks into confusion. Further, the leadership of the Communist Party even at that time badly understood the process of the development of the revolution from one stage to another and did not carry through the correct changes in the line of the party made necessary by this coup. Inasmuch as the left wing of the petty bourgeois leaders of the Kuomintang during the course of a certain time still went together with the Communist Party, there took place a territorial separation; there arose the separate governments of Nanking and Wuhan. But the Communist Party did not occupy a leading position even in Wuhan.

Very quickly, in the Wuhan territory there commenced a second period, characterized, among other things, on the one hand, by the presence of elements of an incipient, still indefinite dual power (the seizure by peasant unions of a number of ruling functions in the villages, and the extension of the functions of the trade unions, determined by the endeavour of the masses to reach a "plebeian" independent solution of the questions of power), and, on the other hand, by the absence of sufficiently mature conditions for the organization of Soviets as organs of revolt against the Wuhan government, insofar as the latter still carried on a revolutionary struggle against the Nanking government which represented the treachery of the bourgeoisie to the revolution.

The Communist Party at that time directly hindered the independent actions of the revolutionary masses, it did not facilitate their task of gathering and organizing forces, it did not assist in breaking down the influence of the leaders of the Left Kuomintang and their position in the country and in the army, instead of utilizing its participation in the Government for these purposes, it, on the contrary, screened the whole activity of this Government (individual petty bourgeois leading members of the party went so far that they even participated in the disarming of the workers' pickets in Wuhan and in sanctioning the punitive expedition to Changsha!).

At the bottom of this opportunist policy lay the hope of avoiding a rupture with the petty bourgeois leaders of the Wuhan governments. But, as a matter of fact, this rupture could only be put off for a short space of time. When the mass risings acquired a threatening character, the leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang also began to reach out toward unity with their allies on the other side of the

barricades. The revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants still continued to exert all its forces in order to achieve victory.

The Communist Party of China now also corrected its line, elected a new leadership and took its place at the head of the revolution. But the revolutionary wave had already ebbed. The heroic mass struggles under the slogan of Soviets could only achieve a few temporary successes. Only in individual localities did the uprising of the agrarian revolution begin sufficiently early, in the remainder the many millions of the peasants' rearguard were delayed in their advance. Instead of the former gross errors of opportunist leadership, there were now revealed on the contrary, in various places extremely harmful putschist mistakes. The preparations for risings also did not take place without great defects on the part of the Communists. The heavy defeats once more threw back the revolution, which in the south had already entered into the second stage of development, to the starting point of this stage.

27. Thanks to the fact that the Chinese national bourgeoisie obtained power, the composition of the former bloc of the imperialists and militarists was partly altered and the new ruling bloc now represents the immediate chief enemy of the revolution. In order to overthrow it, it is necessary to win over the decisive masses of the proletariat and peasantry to the side of the revolution. This constitutes the most important task of the Chinese Communist Party for the immediate future. The Chinese workers have already acquired an enormous experience. The further strengthening and revolutionization of the trade union movement and the further strengthening of the Communist Party is essential. A certain portion of the Chinese peasantry has already outlived bourgeois democratic illusions and shown considerable activity in the revolutionary struggle, but this is only an insignificant minority of the huge peasant population of China.

It is very probable that some petty bourgeois groups will take up the position of national reformism (inside or outside the Kuomintang), in order by a certain display of bourgeois-democratic opposition to conquer influence over the toiling masses (to these petty bourgeois reformists belong also Tang Ting-san and the Social Democratic trade-union-leaders). Under no circumstances must the significance of these attempts be underestimated. The isolation of these groups and their exposure before the masses by means of correct Communist tactics constitutes an absolutely essential precondition for the Communist Party to be able to take a really leading position in the moment of the coming new rise of the revolutionary wave in China.

Already at the present time, the party must everywhere propagate among the masses the idea of Soviets, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the inevitability of the coming revolutionary mass armed uprising. It must already now emphasize in its agitation the necessity of overthrow of the ruling bloc and the mobilization of the masses for revolutionary demonstrations. Carefully studying the objective conditions of the revolution as they continue to mature, utilizing every possibility for the mobilization of the masses, it must consistently and undeviatingly follow the line of seizure of state power, organization of Soviets as organs of the insurrection, expropriation of the landlords and big property-owners, expulsion of the foreign imperialists and the confiscation of their property.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, after you finished your assignment in South America, that is, you were Comintern delegate to South America, what was your next assignment?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, my next assignment was I was put in charge of the Communist Party's labor union activities in the New York area.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were assigned from South America back to New York?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That was about the end of 1931.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what you did when you reported for your duties, your new duties?

The CHAIRMAN. I think before you get into that, I have a question I would like to ask you. When you left South America, did you return to Russia?

Mr. KORNFEDER. No, I returned to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell me, what was the date of your departure from Moscow to go to South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I departed from Moscow, I believe, in April 1930. It may have been the early part of May.

Mr. MORRIS. So you were in South America a little more than a year?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was in South America about 17 months.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you in South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was first in Colombia, stationed in the capital of Colombia, Bogota, and then I was in Venezuela, in the capital, Caracas.

The CHAIRMAN. Specifically, what was your mission down there? Was it to organize?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the strategic objective was to get at the oil fields of Venezuela and Colombia. But since there were no competent Communist Parties in existence, the job was, first, to organize Communist Parties with which to do it, and after organizing native Communist Parties, and organizing a labor federation, then to concentrate on the organization of the oil fields.

The CHAIRMAN. Through the labor population, is that right?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. How far along did you get with it while you were there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, I succeeded to reorganize a very loose, inefficient, socialistic political party in Colombia, and make out of it a Communist Party, and organized also a committee for the formation of a labor federation, which had the affiliation of the existing local unions that then were operating in Colombia.

I also succeeded to organize organizing committees amongst the Colombian peasants and plantation hands—that is, the plantation workers, the coffee plantations, and some groups, two small organizing groups, in the oil areas and in the banana region.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the purpose of this work of the Communist organization to cut off raw materials from the United States in the event of an emergency with that country?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the whole strategic purpose of activities in this type of country is to isolate the hinterland from the advanced countries, and does deprive the advanced countries from raw materials and markets for their goods. That is the broad strategic purpose.

In the specific case of Venezuela and Colombia, the general purpose was similar, but the specific purpose was that, in the event of a war, a war between the United States and Russia, which was, of course, anticipated in Moscow all the time—because the United States was considered the ultimate fortress of capitalism—they wanted to be in a position during a strategic moment to tie up the oil fields. That was the immediate strategic objective of organizing Venezuela and Colombia.

Mr. MORRIS. A few years ago, Mr. Kornfeder, there was a Communist demonstration in Bogota. Do you know whether or not any of the people engaged in that uprising were people you organized when you were in South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes. All the leaders whose names appeared in the news dispatches from there were, at the time I was there, members of the central committee of the Communist Party that I had organized.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, we are just getting a little bit from our principal subject here.

Will you describe the activities, or rather describe your visit back to the United States in 1941? What was the first thing you did when you got to the United States?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the first thing I had to do was to find a place where to live, and since I didn't have one, I camped in Earl Browder's apartment for 6 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was there during that period of 6 weeks?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, almost all the then leaders of the party off and on used to come to that apartment for discussions, tactical and organizational and strategic problems.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the city of New York?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That was in the city of New York.

And among them was one that I imagine you would be interested in, Harrison George.

Harrison George was then taking the place of Earl Browder in the Pan-Pacific Union secretariat.

The subsidiary body of the Red international labor unions, which was seeking to infiltrate the labor movement in China and Japan, and other countries in the Far East, had received a new project. The project was that this secretariat that he was then heading was to move from China to San Francisco because, in China at that time, the situation had become difficult for the Communists, and they were moving the headquarters of the Communist International that was operating secretly in Shanghai or Hankow, moving them to the United States.

There is one special episode I think I should mention before this committee.

From then on, the Communist Party of the United States began to concentrate on the district in California, which had been neglected until then. A great many of the agitators, writers, organizers, were from there on assigned to develop the party organization in California, especially in Frisco, Los Angeles, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you say from there on. From about what date would that be?

Mr. KORNFEDER. From 1932 on.

Now, among the problems that Harrison George raised was the problem under what auspices to do a great deal of this work, not only in the United States but in the countries at which these activities were especially aimed, that is, China, Indochina, Indonesia, India, and so on.

It is in this connection that I first took notice of the organization known as the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The subject came up because there was needed an organization that could function as a front for the operations in that area, a respectable enough front that is not suspect.

Earl Browder, as I recall it, said that the Institute of Pacific Relations could be made an instrument for that purpose, that the party had already important contacts in there at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. And was that in your line of activity in the Communist movement, to work on such a project, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. No, that was not in my line of activity.

Mr. MORRIS. And you learned that just because of the fact that you happened to be staying at Earl Browder's house at that time?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you continued on and worked in the Communist Party until how long?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I continued in charge of their labor union and unemployment activities in the New York area and later on in Ohio, until 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. And then did you break with the Communist Party in 1934?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, as a matter of interest, how long did it take you to completely disassociate yourself from the Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, to disassociate myself completely, not only from their organization but from their theories and ideology, I would say it took me until 1937, about 3 years.

I first rejected, of course, Stalin's methods and then I questioned Lenin's theories, but still held on to the principal concepts of Marxism, and then I sweated through that subject as to whether Marx was right or not.

Politically, I thought he was wrong 2 years after, but as to whether, on his economics, he was wrong, it took me another year.

So it took me about 3 years to completely disassociate myself from the philosophy, theory, et cetera, of that movement.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you initiate the break?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the break occurred on a difference on current policy, which, at that time, involved the question as to whether the Communist Party should work through the craft unions of the American Federation of Labor and dissolve the independent nonaffiliated unions that it controlled, or whether it should form a new organization of the type, as later on, as the CIO became.

I was in favor of the type of organization like the CIO which, at that time, was contrary to the line dictated from Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a Marxist before you were a Communist?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why it took some time to break your ties with Marxism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see now really any difference between Marxism and communism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Not in the objectives, but there is a big difference in methods.

Senator FERGUSON. In the methods?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But do you not think that in the end they have to be one and the same if they are going to be successful?

Mr. KORNFEDER. In the end, if they get control, in order to stay in control they will have to use more and more Communist methods themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. They will have to use force to keep their control, will they not?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that not really their policy, was that not the Marxist policy?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That was Marxist policy; yes.

You see, the disputation between the Socialists and the Communists is, to a considerable extent, on the interpretation of what Marx meant. But they both consider Marx as their ideological prophet.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, after you broke with the Communist organization, and you say that break took you about 3 years, still you were not orientated to the point of view that you would have testified before a Senate committee at that time, would you, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Definitely not. I would not have appeared before any official body of the Government, whether judicial, legislative, or any other. It requires the complete break and the realization that this thing is a menace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not mean that it requires more than a complete break, Mr. Kornfeder, that in addition to the complete break there must also come this realization you speak of, the menace of communism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, definitely so. Yes.

I came to look upon communism as a modern form of reaction in the sense that it seeks to reimpose the domination of the state in an absolutist form, a thing that humanity has struggled against for centuries.

So once that picture dawns upon your mind, well, then you are finished with the whole thing.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is sold to you in the package that it is something new?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; that it is something new, that through its methods you are going to achieve great innovations that are good for the humanity as a whole, and especially for the underdog; and especially, if you are one of the underdogs, it is very appealing.

Senator FERGUSON. It does not show you the side that you become the slave of the state?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Definitely not.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it criticizes the economic royalists and it advocates the political royalists, does it not?

Mr. KORNFEDER. It criticizes the monopolies of capitalism and imposes a supermonopoly of the state.

Senator FERGUSON. Of statism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So it would be well for us to see how we can get rid of the monopolies of the economic royalists and not impose upon ourselves a political monopoly?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Something even worse.

Senator FERGUSON. Something even worse?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this pamphlet again?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have the following passage, two or three passages, read into the record, and then I will ask Mr. Kornfeder a few questions on it.

This is from page 107, from a pamphlet called *China Yesterday and Today*, by Eleanor Lattimore, edited by Marguerite Ann Stewart, a cooperative project between the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and Webster Publishing Co.

Until early 1946, however, the Kuomintang refused to recognize other parties as legal political bodies. Friction has been especially bitter between the Government and the Communists. Soon after the war with Japan ended, armed conflicts occurred between them which, if allowed to become an all-out civil war, could easily have destroyed all that China had gained during her war against Japan.

For the Communists are by no means the small minority party they were when they were driven from the south by Chiang's troops. They are now second to the Kuomintang in size and influence, and control an area inhabited by about 100,000,000 people.

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word *Communist*.

And the word "Communist" is italicized.

They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read that again?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.

Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic conditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable of taking part in political life, they are often described as a peasant party.

They have established a system of popular elections in the regions under their control; they favor extending the vote to the people of the rest of the country; and they have long declared that they would support a democratic republic in which not only they themselves but all other Chinese political parties would be represented.

At the time this is being written—

and the date is 1946—

negotiations are being carried on between the Chinese Government and the Communists which, it is hoped, will result in a more democratic government. For not until China achieves a government in which the Chinese people are adequately represented and which brings about agricultural reforms designed to give her farmers enough to live on will the underlying causes of communism be removed.

Mr. Kornfeder, I ask you if you will comment upon those passages that I have just read. I offer this book for your scrutiny.

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, I think I already covered one angle of this, namely, that the Chinese Communists are just a peasant party.

The change of strategy from basing upon the factory workers to the Chinese peasants was important, decisive, tactical change.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it decided, Mr. Kornfeder, at that Sixth World Congress that you attended, that the Chinese Communists would be represented as a peasant party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. No; it wasn't decided. They don't accept the peasant party, they only accept affiliations of Communist parties. The change was to orientate the strategy on the peasants. The peasant can be made ideologically a Communist just like a factory worker.

A Communist is not necessarily made in the economic category, he is made through ideology. So the calculation of Stalin worked out, that you can work, which was one of his major contributions to Com-

munist strategy, by the way, the change of orientation in the colonial countries from the workers which, in the colonial countries, are only a few. There is not much industry. But the peasants which are the big, downtrodden mass, and the Chinese Communist Party became a Communist Party, recruited mainly from peasants who had become Communists. But it was a Communist Party in every sense.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say Communist Party, you mean international, under the domination of the Kremlin?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Under the complete domination of the Kremlin; yes.

Now, as to private property. Well, you see, this is a very skillful piece of sugar-coating the Communist position, very cleverly written. You could imply this, and you could imply another thing.

But it is a part of Communist strategy when they seize a country not to expropriate the peasants and the small shopkeepers right away. They cannot do it. But they nationalize the land.

Here it says that nationalization is taking place. Well, nationalization means that the Government takes title to all the land, whether it enforces that title right away or not in a matter of tactics, of operation.

In Russia, the land was nationalized immediately after seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks, but the nationalization wasn't really enforced until years later when they had consolidated themselves and collectivized the farms, had supercollectivized them, and so on and so forth.

So you can say, half-truths, that they are going to maintain private property. But for how long?

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that the facts today, that China today, and I am talking about the mainland, has disproved that statement?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, they nationalized the land. They have not yet taken the land off the peasants. They have taken the land from the larger landowners and distributed it among the peasants in order to get the support of the peasants and their cooperation until they entrench themselves.

Then, after they have entrenched themselves, they will do in China, carry out, the same Bolshevik program as in Russia. They will make state farms, and they will make supercollectives which are dominated, controlled, and managed by the state.

But in the first stage, in a colonial country, that would be a suicidal method, if the Communists would attempt to force collectivization immediately. They first have to have complete control of the Government apparatus, a well-organized political police, a well functioning Communist Party, and all the committees, before they can attempt to create a war with the peasants because when they begin to take the land away from the peasants, and the so-called collectives, the peasants will resist.

They resisted in Russia and they certainly will resist in China. So this is a very misleading, skillful piece of selling the Communist program with the pretense that it isn't Communist. But it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are referring to the article in the book handed to you by Mr. Morris?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is "China Today," is that it?

Mr. MORRIS. No; this is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co., by Eleanor Lattimore, published in 1946, and it is entitled "China Yesterday and Today."

In other words, Mr. Kornfeder, you do not agree with Mrs. Lattimore when she says here:

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word "Communist."

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right. I disagree with it in every sense.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know that the Chinese Communists, from your own experience, is a member of the Comintern organization?

Mr. KORNFEDER. They are not only Communists, they are among the most intransigent, they are among the best Communists.

They really believe and they are thoroughly indoctrinated, like semi-illiterate persons. When they absorb a doctrine, they really are all-out for it. The Chinese Communists are that type.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before putting this into the record, I would like to make the observation that the photograph appearing on page 108, from which we have made these extracts, has been supplied by courtesy of the China Aid Council, and I would like the record to show that two witnesses have identified the China Aid Council as a Communist-controlled organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you say what the photograph is?

Mr. MORRIS. It is the photograph that appears on page 108. It says "Courtesy China Aid Council," and the caption is "Communist students of China's northwest studying in front of the loess cave which is their classroom."

May that go into the record, Senator? The text does not have to go in because I have read it.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot put the picture into the record. The rest will go into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 258" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all we have of Mr. Kornfeder.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have some more exhibits. I think we will take a few minutes to put them into the record, if you have the time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, this last exhibit that went in, this pamphlet, is there any description in the record as to who Eleanor Lattimore is?

Mr. MORRIS. Eleanor Lattimore is the wife of Owen Lattimore, and is the Eleanor Lattimore who has held office in, and who has worked for, the Institute of Pacific Relations.

There would seem to be absolutely no doubt that she is the wife of Owen Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. What is in the record from before?

Mr. MORRIS. She has testified in executive session before this committee.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 31, 1938, addressed to Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter. It reads as follows:

DEAR JESSUP: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put.

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom is that addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. To Prof. Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter.

We have a letter, also from the files, from Birchfield, Norfolk, Conn., dated April 2, 1938, addressed to Mr. Carter, from Philip C. Jessup, reading as follows:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday the 20th. Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Senator FERGUSON. May I have the letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, and ask that that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Mr. Mandel, will you kindly identify that as having been taken from the institute's files?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Taken from where?

Mr. MANDEL. The files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record, and properly identified.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 259" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 259

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, March 31, 1938.

Prof. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Norfolk, Conn.

DEAR JESSUP: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a 100-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put?

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

BIRCHFIELD,

Norfolk, Conn., April 2, 1938.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday, the 20th. Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you identify the Moscow trials?

Mr. MANDEL. The Moscow trials were in 1937, and were popularly known as the purge trials, and created a tremendous furor throughout the world because noted Soviet leaders were brought to trial, and they confessed to having tried to overthrow the Soviet Government. Many of them were liquidated or disappeared. They aroused indignation throughout the world and especially in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. I refer now to a document which is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 12, 1943, addressed to Hon. John H. Kerr, chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations, and it is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Now, the reference in this letter that I want to read is this:

I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation.

As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup of Columbia University was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that Mr. Bisson has been identified before this committee as a member of the Communist organization.

May I offer this into evidence, Mr. Chairman, for whatever probative value there may be in that one reference?

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, this is a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, the Hon. John H. Kerr was the chairman of a special subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, of the House of Representatives, and apparently the question of Mr. Bisson's loyalty had come up and letters of recommendation were sent in from various people, according to our scrutiny of the files,

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 260" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 260

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, April 12, 1943.

Regarding T. A. Bisson.

Hon. JOHN H. KERR,

*Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation.

As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University, was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval. Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of that book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the quality of his writing. This book has received high praise from a great many outstanding American experts on the Far East. It has consequently had a wide sale and is a standard reference book in a great many public and university libraries.

Mr. Bisson is 100 percent American. He was alert to the Japanese menace long before the general public became aware of the implications to the peace of America of Japanese aggression and in many of his writings he faithfully stated the issues that the United States must face vis-à-vis Japanese military expansion.

If you wish further information, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 16, 1940, addressed to Mr. Motylev, Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip C. Jessup with reference to the *City of Flint* at Murmansk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

And I have here the clipping, a copy of the clipping, from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, and I read the last paragraph of the article referred to as follows:

Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest supporters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter *City of Flint* at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing the *Mormacsun* to enter a belligerent port he described as contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law.

May I point out that this occurred during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record and be marked as the next consecutive exhibit? That is the letter from the institute's files, Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, as well as the clipping from the New York Herald Tribune that Mr. Mandel read.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 261" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 261

129 EAST 52D STREET,
NEW YORK CITY,
February 16, 1940.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip C. Jessup with reference to the *City of Flint* at Murmansk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 1940]

UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY DOGMA CALLED MILD-MANNERED—JESSUP, OF COLUMBIA, FINDS CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The assertion of neutrality rights by the United States was called mild-mannered yesterday by Prof. Philip C. Jessup, of the Columbia University Law School, at a luncheon of the school's alumni association at the Lawyer's Club, 115 Broadway. He said the British blockade was not a blockade in any technical sense but a measure of reprisal against Germany for its submarine warfare.

Under earlier concepts of international law, Dr. Jessup explained, the burden of proof was on the captor of a merchant vessel in wartime. Under the present procedure of British prize courts, he said, this burden of proof had been shifted to the complainant, making it almost impossible for the neutral owner of a vessel to prove what would be the eventual destination of his cargo.

Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest supporters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter *City of Flint* at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing the *Mormacsun* to enter a belligerent port, he described as contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law.

Mr. MANDEL. In connection with the last item, may I refer to the New York Times of October 29, 1939, which carries a statement as follows, under the headline "United States accuses Soviet in *Flint* confusion. Formal charge is made that Russia treats American envoy with contempt."

The first paragraph:

With the freighter *City of Flint* evidently having left Murmansk carrying her American crew on board under a German prize detail, and with Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Russia, having been unable to communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the ship, the State Department tonight charged the Soviet Government with "withholding adequate cooperation."

The article goes into greater detail.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire, then, is it a fact that Mr. Jessup was taking a stand contrary to the stand taken by the United States of America through its State Department?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, in that article?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then this stand, which was opposing the stand of the United States of America, was being sent by Mr. Carter to a Russian Communist in Russia?

Mr. MANDEL. To a Russian official.

Senator FERGUSON. And a Communist in Russia?

Mr. MORRIS. Whether he is a member of the Communist Party, we cannot say, Senator. But Dr. Motylev, who is the representative of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whether he is a member of the Russian Communist Party, we cannot say.

Senator FERGUSON. And this letter says "I think it will be interesting." You will be interested in this stand, in other words, of Dr. Jessup against the stand of the United States Government; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I had a little difficulty at first getting the significance when you put it in at first. Until you read the last, I wondered whether I was right in my conclusions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Mr. Mandel make a photostat of this article from which he read, and have that introduced into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I think it should be, to make this perfectly clear as to what this is.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done. See that it gets into the record at the proper sequence.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

[From the New York Times, October 29, 1939]

UNITED STATES ACCUSES SOVIET IN "FLINT" CONFUSION—FORMAL CHARGE IS MADE
THAT RUSSIA TREATS AMERICAN ENVOY WITH CONTEMPT

(By Bertram D. Hulen)

WASHINGTON, October 28.—With the freighter *City of Flint* evidently having left Murmansk carrying her American crew on board under a German prize detail and with Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Russia, having been unable to communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the ship, the State Department tonight charged the Soviet Government with "withholding adequate cooperation."

The charge, made in a formal statement, reflected the intense irritation felt in Washington over the cavalier fashion in which the diplomatic representative of this Government in Moscow has been treated by the Soviet authorities. Officials expressed unconcealed anger over the failure to ascertain any definite facts officially regarding the vessel.

State Department officials discussed the situation from every angle during the day. It was learned that staff conferences, headed by Secretary Cordell Hull, were held behind closed doors twice during the day. Officials, however, preserved an unusual reticence and nothing more than the formal statement was made public.

HIGH OFFICIALS CONFER

Conferring with Mr. Hull were top-flight officials of his Department, including R. Walton Moore, counselor; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; and Green H. Hackworth, legal adviser of the Department.

It is generally believed that the *City of Flint* sailed, possibly 2 or 3 days ago, to run the British blockade and reach a German port in the Baltic before institution of prize court proceedings by the Nazi authorities.

According to press reports, the United States Embassy in Moscow was convinced tonight that she had sailed. This word had not been communicated to the State Department by the Embassy, but it was regarded as a reasonable assumption.

Previous reports from Moscow and from Berlin, first that the *City of Flint* had sailed, then that she had not, were considered an obvious effort to confuse the situation in order to minimize, if possible, the risks the ship must take in eluding British blockaders.

But it was apparent from the State Department's statement tonight that if she does run the blockade German claims to her permanent possession will be resisted in the expected legal proceedings.

The statement, factual in its contents and reciting the circumstances that have surrounded the *City of Flint* since her seizure, clearly implied that the Russian Government had disregarded the requirements of international law.

It implied also that neither Russia in her dealings with Ambassador Steinhardt nor Germany in her conversations with Alexander C. Kirk, the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, had been frank, if indeed honest.

It emphasized that Mr. Steinhardt throughout had been denied access to the primary source of information, the vessel herself.

So far, Mr. Steinhardt has been unsuccessful in persuading the Soviet regime to conform to the customary diplomatic procedure, even although this be of the most formal character. In short, official Washington considers that he has been treated with nothing less than contempt.

The State Department statement was considered as forming a basis for resistance to any claim for permanent possession of the vessel that Germany might advance in prize court proceedings.

VIEWES NOT VOICED IN NOTE

The statement could be considered a protest, although outside formal diplomatic channels. While some thought may have been given to voicing these views in a note, that course has not yet been adopted, at least so far as was revealed tonight.

An emphatic form of protest could be registered by ordering Mr. Steinhardt home for consultation, but no consideration is said to have been given to that course as yet.

Today's statement pointed out that, judging from press reports from German sources, the German authorities were not without information, although Mr. Steinhardt was having extraordinary difficulty in obtaining the facts and was given no facility for personally verifying them.

A short time before the statement was issued, the Ambassador reported to the State Department that again he had been unable to make telephone contact with Captain Gainard.

Officials here were satisfied that the vessel had left Murmansk and was seeking to reach a German harbor. Obviously, it was pointed out, Russia would not give this information if she were deliberately siding with Germany. If really neutral, she might feel that to announce departure of the ship would be to inform Great Britain and for that reason be an unneutral act.

That Germany would bend every effort to conceal the departure of the vessel was considered only natural, so reports on this score from Berlin today were discounted.

Mr. Kirk reported from Berlin to the State Department that in reply to an inquiry at the Ministry of Marine this afternoon he was told that the American crew was on board the *City of Flint* at Murmansk. After a further inquiry late this afternoon at the Foreign Office, Mr. Kirk was informed that, according to the latest reports, the vessel and crew were still in the Arctic port. It was also said that if, after the completion of repairs, the ship were taken to another port, the American crew would presumably be kept on board to operate the vessel.

Mr. Kirk also reported that, according to information he had received from the American consul general in Hamburg, the prize commissioner has received no news of the vessel.

The rebuffs received at the hands of Russia were resented here no less because the Foreign Office was following its customary course of putting off and humiliating an Ambassador and his Government. It is a well-understood technique of the Soviet regime.

An Ambassador will seek official information, only to be refused an appointment at the Foreign Office or be told that there is no information available. Later the substance of what he has sought will appear in press reports, and when he again calls at the Foreign Office this will be given him. In this and other ways the Moscow Government follows a calculated policy of insolence toward the envoy.

Diplomats of long experience in revolutionary Russia know the pattern well and are not surprised, though their resentment reaches the boiling point. To them it reflects Bolshevik philosophy of treating governments with contempt in making announcements first through Soviet press channels on the theory that in this way they are dealing directly with the people of a country, not with their representatives.

But the White House and the State Department are not concerned with the philosophy that might explain the treatment accorded the United States Government in this case. They are deeply resentful over the whole episode.

UNITED STATES STATEMENT ON "FLINT"

WASHINGTON, October 28.—Following is the text of the statement issued by the State Department tonight on the case of the steamer *City of Flint*:

"The *City of Flint* was captured by a German cruiser at an estimated distance of some 1,250 miles from New York, with a mixed cargo destined for British ports. The date of capture is understood to have been October 9.

"The *City of Flint* was taken into the harbor of Tromsøe on October 21, with a German crew and flying the German flag. After remaining 2 hours to take water, it was ordered by the Norwegian Government to depart, which it did.

The *City of Flint* was taken into the harbor of Murmansk on the evening of October 23.

"On October 25 the American chargé d'affaires cabled from Berlin that the Foreign Office, at its press conference, said that the *City of Flint* was captured by a German vessel and contraband was found on board, destined for England. The Foreign Office then added that it was found, however, that the ship was unseaworthy in that it did not have navigation charts adequate for bringing the ship into a German port.

"When the vessel entered the harbor of Murmansk, according to an announcement presumably from the Soviet Government through the Tass news agency, 'the naval forces at the port of Murmansk have temporarily held the vessel and interned the German crew.'

"On October 25 the American chargé d'affaires at Berlin cabled that the German Foreign Office, referring to the seizure of the *City of Flint*, said that 'the German authorities were communicating with the Soviet authorities in the matter.'

"On the same day [October 25] the Tass Agency reported that 'the German crew of the cargo steamer *City of Flint* has been released from internment by the maritime authorities of Murmansk in view of the fact, as has been established, that the vessel was brought into port for repair of her machinery. The vessel is meanwhile remaining in Murmansk for verification of the exact composition of her cargo.'

"On October 26 the American chargé d'affaires cabled from Berlin quoting a memorandum received that morning from the Foreign Office relative to the *City of Flint* and its crew, which, among other things, stated that a 'prize crew placed on board [the *City of Flint*] has brought the steamer to the harbor of Murmansk because of sea damage.'

"When transmitting the memorandum an official of the Foreign Office stated informally to the chargé d'affaires that the Foreign Office had no details as to the damage which necessitated taking the ship to Murmansk, but he maintained, in response to an inquiry, that the term 'damage' would cover the case of a ship lacking charts with which to navigate the waters through which she had to proceed.

"For some reason as yet unexplained the German crew was interned in spite of the fact that according to German authorities they were without charts and had put into Murmansk because they could not proceed to a German port without charts. Later, they were released, seemingly under a plea that their entry into Murmansk was required for necessary repairs to defective machinery.

"A prize crew may take a captured ship into a neutral port without internment only in case of stress of weather, want of fuel and provisions, or necessity of repairs. In all other cases, the neutral is obligated to intern the prize crew and restore the vessel to her former crew.

"The conclusion from the foregoing facts and circumstances indicates that when the *City of Flint* entered the harbor at Murmansk, any plea relating to the chart requirements if advanced must have been ignored since the German crew was interned. A second and entirely different reason for entering Murmansk, namely, defective machinery which called for immediate repairs, was not advanced until later.

"A subsequent cable from the American chargé d'affaires at Berlin, also dated October 26, quoted a statement of the Foreign Office at its noon press conference to the effect that the fact that the Russians have freed the German crew indicates that the Soviet authorities have confirmed the view of the prize crew that the *City of Flint* was unseaworthy and it was therefore permissible to take the ship into a neutral harbor.

"Testimony of the American crew as to the full facts pertaining to the taking of the *City of Flint* into Murmansk is not yet available.

"It seems manifest that even if it is assumed that the German crew was proceeding legally prior to the entry of the *City of Flint* into the harbor of Murmansk, the known facts and circumstances support the contention of the American Government that the crew did not at the time of entry offer any reasonable or justifiable grounds such as are prescribed by international law for taking the vessel into this port, and that, therefore, it was the clear duty of the Soviet Government

to turn the *City of Flint* over to the American crew. This has been the major contention of the American Government.

"In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, each person can judge for himself the question as to how much light is shed on this entire transaction by the action of the Soviet Government in withholding adequate cooperation with the American Government with respect to assembling and disclosing to the American Embassy in Moscow the essential facts pertaining to the landing, the whereabouts, and welfare of the American crew; by the facts that it was first alleged by the German authorities that the need for charts was the ground for bringing the vessel into port; and by the fact that later this ground seems to have been abandoned and a new ground or theory relating to defective machinery was set up."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we are preparing more exhibits along the lines that we are presenting today, and I ask that they be presented at some other time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Is there anything further today?

Senator FERGUSON. I hope, Mr. Chairman, if they are along this same line, that they may all be put into the record as soon as possible because I understand there will be another hearing of another committee where Mr. Jessup's name will be up for confirmation by the Senate.

I think it is only fair to Mr. Jessup and to the Senators that anything that this committee has in relation to these exhibits should go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, Senator Ferguson, that today I have, as chairman of this committee, addressed a letter to the chairman of the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate advising him that I am having a transcript of the proceedings of this committee bearing on Mr. Jessup prepared for that committee's perusal and use.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is proper because we should not have a hearing where one matter is brought up and then not refer that to another committee that is going to pass upon Mr. Jessup.

The CHAIRMAN. The entire files of this committee will be made available to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, may I point out some of the difficulties?

There is one point that arose this morning on whether or not Fred Field is the one who recommended Mr. Jessup for a particular office.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter is here. Why do we not clear this up and ask Mr. Carter if the Fred who signed that telegram is Fred Field?

Mr. Carter, can you give us information on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Come forward, Mr. Carter, if you care to.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have the telegram?

The CHAIRMAN. You were here this morning when that wire was read?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I was in the back row.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you look at this wire?

Mr. CARTER. I would be delighted.

Mr. MORRIS. One of the difficulties here, Senator, is that we have an estimated 300,000 letters here, and then we have all the files of the

institute. It takes a long time to track anything down, as Mr. Carter can appreciate.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that, and that is why I knew Mr. Carter was here, and he might clear this up.

Mr. CARTER. Well, the internal evidence, which is very slender, would seem to indicate that this was Frederick V. Field.

In what year was this, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. The year is not given.

Mr. CARTER. That is rather important.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you remember such a recommendation that Field made?

Senator FERGUSON. It is a recommendation at a certain convention or committee meeting that might bring it back to your mind. I think the place of the meeting is shown on the next page.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the record will show that Mr. Carter has been sworn.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, when did Jessup serve as research chairman? Do you recall that?

Mr. CARTER. I think it is here in the document you just gave to me.

Senator FERGUSON. The meeting is given, Mr. Carter, on the sheet attached to the telegram.

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't want to be too sure, but, frankly, I am mixed up as to whether Mr. Field was speaking of Mr. Jessup. I am confused on two points: One, whether it refers to the Mount Tremblant conference in 1942, or the Hot Springs conference in 1945.

It says, "approve him as research chairman." For the life of me, on the spur of the moment, I can't remember whether it was Mount Tremblant, 1942, or Hot Springs, 1945, where Jessup was proposed as research chairman and so served.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But was he proposed by Fred Field at either one of those? Did you have another Fred in either 1942 or 1945?

The CHAIRMAN. That is, on your staff.

Mr. CARTER. I think we only had one Fred.

Senator FERGUSON. That was Fred Field?

Mr. CARTER. From the text of this short telegram, Fred doesn't nominate him; someone else has nominated him.

Senator FERGUSON. But he approves him?

Mr. CARTER. But he approves him.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be Fred Field?

Mr. CARTER. That would be Fred Field.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not quite right, is it, Mr. Carter? It says here, "approve the nominations and suggest Jessup for research chairman."

In other words, the suggestion is coming from Field, if it is Field, that Jessup be research chairman?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. But just on the one telegram, without refreshing myself on all of the operations—this was a complicated international organization, with a dozen countries and committees within each country, trying to get agreement between the British and the French and the Australians, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. This Winsted, Conn., November 23 would not give you a clue, would it? The Hot Springs convention was in the summer, was it not?

Mr. CARTER. No; it was along, I think, in January.

Mr. MORRIS. Hot Springs?

Mr. CARTER. Winsted is far away from Hot Springs.

Mr. MORRIS. But someone may have lived there in 1942 and not in 1945. That does not mean anything to you?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he identified it earlier. Fred Field is the only one they have. Therefore it is apparent that it is Fred Field.

Mr. CARTER. I could call up Mr. Holland, who has the remains of the files there, and his memory might be better than mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all for today?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be called any time you want it called.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a witness for next Tuesday.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, if you have any additional files or records bearing upon matters that should go before the Committee on Foreign Relations, would you so advise the committee?

We will stand in recess until the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., Thursday, September 20, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

Mr. Morris, have you anything to proceed with?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of requests made by this committee of the various branches of the Executive Department that are in a state of either we have been turned down on our requests, or else we have gotten a generally unsatisfactory answer. I would like that the record show some of the difficulties we have encountered in this respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Today, Mr. Chairman, we are going to take testimony on a 3-day conference that was held by the State Department in October 1949. At that time Secretary of State Acheson had appointed Philip C. Jessup to be the head of a panel of three people to advise him on the formulation and the review of far eastern policy. Thinking this to be completely in line with the line of our investigation because most of the people invited were Institute of Pacific Relations people, we requested on August 24, 1951, of Hon. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., over your signature, a request which reads as follows:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has had testimony in executive session concerning the 3-day round-table discussion arranged by the Office of Public Affairs of the State Department for the purpose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on United States foreign policy toward China, and which took place on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

It is requested that the minutes, which our testimony indicates were taken at the time, be made available to this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would like that request on your part to Secretary of State Acheson on August 24, 1951, introduced in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be introduced in the record.

(The document referred to and read into the record by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 262" and filed for the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer?

Mr. MORRIS. The answer is dated September 12, 1951, and reads:

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I have received your letter of August 24, 1951 (received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China. I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many departmental officers in San Francisco.

As I think you know, the record kept of this decision was classified confidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Government people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that their remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State. To honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a confidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this meeting.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. MCFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

I would like that introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 263" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 263

SEPTEMBER 12, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I have received your letter of August 24, 1951 (received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China. I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many departmental officers in San Francisco.

As I think you know, the record kept of this discussion was classified confidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Government people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that their remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State. To honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a confidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this meeting.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. MCFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

LIST OF CONSULTANTS, CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN CHINA

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Claude A. Buss, director of studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, department of political science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
Arthur G. Coons, president, Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y.
John K. Fairbanks, committee on international and regional studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
William R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co., New York, N. Y.
Arthur N. Holcombe, department of government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane, Wash.
Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

Ernest B. MacNaughton, chairman of the board, First National Bank, Portland, Oreg.

George C. Marshall, president, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.

J. Morden Murphy, assistant vice president, Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.

Nathaniel Peffer, department of public law and government, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

Harold S. Quigley, department of political science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

Edwin O. Reischauer, department of far-eastern languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

William S. Roberston, president, American & Foreign Power Co., New York, N. Y.

John D. Rockefeller III, president, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, N. Y.

Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Eugene Staley, executive director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, Calif.

Harold Stassen, president, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.

Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

Harold M. Vinacke, department of political science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, during the testimony of General Willoughby testimony turned up which indicated that there are records in the War Department which could be available to this committee and which would aid us in our investigation. Accordingly, on August 20, 1951, a letter was sent to the President at the White House in Washington, D. C. It reads:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the open public hearing of the Internal Security Subcommittee held on August 9, 1951, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby was questioned concerning the loyalty of three individuals who were attached to SCAP headquarters in the postwar period. General Willoughby replied that he was forbidden by official directive to testify on the contents of the files of the three employees involved. Each of these three persons, namely, Miriam S. Farley, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson, was an active leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations prior to, during, and subsequent to their assignments to Tokyo.

It is respectfully requested that the contents of these files be made available to the members of the Internal Security Subcommittee in order that they may translate the information in such files into evidence for the subcommittee, if the facts warrant such action. Naturally, if any confidential sources of information must be protected, the subcommittee will scrupulously protect identities.

Very sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN.

I would like that introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was marked "Exhibit No. 264" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. On September 19, 1951, over the signature of Harry Truman, President, we received a letter reading:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter asking that the files of Miriam S. Farley, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

I am informed that none of these persons is now employed by the Federal Government. However, all three were formerly employed at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan. According to the records of the Department of the Army, Miriam S. Farley was employed there from January to May 1946; Andrew Grajdanzev was employed from January 1946 to August 1947; and T. A. Bisson was employed from October 1945 to May 1947.

I have asked the Secretary of the Army to make available to the subcommittee the employment records of these three persons. However, for reasons which I have set forth at length on a number of occasions, I do not feel that the in-

formation so made available to the subcommittee should include investigative data of a confidential nature.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN.

I would like to have that introduced, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was marked "Exhibit No. 265" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. On August 27, 1951, over the signature of Pat McCarran, chairman, a letter was sent to the Hon. Dean Acheson.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I go back to this and ask what the employment records of the three persons mean to us? It only means the dates, does it not?

Mr. MORRIS. We have received nothing, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is all confidential data and the personnel file is kept from us?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason for discharge if they were discharged, recommended for their employment, and so forth?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Will you read this, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 27, 1951, addressed to Hon. Dean Acheson from Pat McCarran:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee introduced into the record on August 23, 1951, two items from the Daily Worker, copies of which are enclosed herewith. One is dated October 4, 1942, pages 1 and 5, and is an article by Mr. Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party U. S. A., on the State Department; and the second is an article entitled "Welles States United States Policy on China," published October 16, 1942, pages 1 and 2.

The second article is preceded by a statement that the memorandum was the result of an interview between Mr. Earl Browder and Mr. Robert Minor, both representing the Communist Party, U. S. A., Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, held on October 12, 1942.

It was pointed out in the course of the hearing that in fairness to the State Department it might be well to request a brief statement on this matter from the Department. In this connection, we would appreciate the following information:

1. Was there an interview held at the State Department in which Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr. Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauchlin Currie participated on October 12, 1942?

2. Who arranged this interview and how was it arranged?

3. Is the enclosed memorandum, as taken from the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, a true copy of the memorandum submitted by Mr. Sumner Welles and Mr. Lauchlin Currie on that date?

Your kind cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

The reply dated September 1, 1951, is signed by Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary, and reads as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 27, 1951, addressed to Secretary Acheson requesting information concerning an alleged meeting held at the State Department October 12, 1942, in which Earl Browder, Robert Minor, Sumner Welles, and Lauchlin Currie participated.

The Department received a similar request from a Member of Congress some time ago and at that time made a thorough but unsuccessful search of departmental files for evidence of such a meeting. These efforts to obtain information respecting the meeting were complicated by the fact that the De-

partment officers who reportedly participated were no longer with the Department.

The Department will again examine its files with a view to obtaining information bearing on the specific questions in your letter of August 27 and will write you further upon completion of this reexamination.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter again?

Mr. MANDEL. The date is September 1, 1951.

Then on September 21, 1951, a telephone message came to the office from Mr. Holland, Chinese Affairs Division of the State Department, who said that they are working on the answer to the letter of August 27 in regard to Browder. This requires considerable research, but they want us to know that they are working on it. That is not a verbatim transcript of the message.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like those two letters to go in the record, along with the telephone conversation as read by Mr. Mandel, and given the next exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted.

(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel were marked as "Exhibit Nos. 266, 267, and 268" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from Senator Pat McCarran dated July 10, 1951, to the Honorable Dean Acheson:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Perhaps it might save some time for all of us if, in addition to my previous requests for information on loyalty cases, you sent us a complete list of individuals dropped or permitted to resign from the State Department since the end of 1944 because of loyalty considerations.

Thank you for your courtesy in this matter.

The reply is dated August 2, 1951, from the Department of State, signed Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I refer to your letter of July 10, 1951, in which you request to be supplied with a complete list of the individuals who were dropped or permitted to resign from the State Department since the end of 1944 because of loyalty considerations.

I regret that I am precluded from furnishing you with the information which you requested, by reason of the President's directive of March 13, 1948 (Federal Register, March 16, 1948), with regard to the confidential status of employee loyalty records.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those two letters introduced and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted.

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 269 and 270" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 31, 1951, addressed to Hon. Dean Acheson and signed by Eva B. Adams, administrative assistant to Senator McCarran:

In connection with some matters now under consideration by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, we will have occasion to refer to certain memoranda from Foreign Service officers quoted in part on pages 564 to 567 of the State Department's publication "The United States Relations with China." In all fairness to the Department and the individuals involved, we would like the full documents for our use rather than the excerpts quoted. We would appreciate your sending us the full memoranda from which the quotations were taken.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Sincerely yours,

EVA B. ADAMS.

That refers to the reports of Davies, Ludden, and Service, along with Emmerson, in the white paper. The reply is dated September

12, 1951, Department of State, signed by W. K. Scott, Acting Deputy Under Secretary:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: The receipt is acknowledged of Miss Adams' letter of August 31, 1951, requesting the full text of certain memoranda quoted in part in pages 564 to 576 of the Department publication "United States Relations With China."

The Department will examine its files for the documents in question and will communicate with you further respecting this matter.

Sincerely yours,

(For the Secretary of State).

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. September 12, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. I recommend that these two letters be introduced into the record and be marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted.

(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandell were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 271 and 272" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I have just one more exchange, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Has any further reply come from the State Department on that last letter?

Mr. MANDEL. I am searching to find if there is any further reply.

This is a letter dated September 12, 1951, to the Hon. Dean Acheson from Senator Pat McCarran:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: For purposes of use by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, we would like to have a copy of a report sent to the State Department by John Kenneth Emerson, dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political Factors in the Present Japanese Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945, entitled "The Japanese Communist Party."

We would like to use this material in connection with a hearing on Friday, September 14. We shall be glad to send a messenger to the Department if you will telephone us that this material is available.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

On Thursday, September 13, we received a telephone message from a Mr. Anderson of the State Department, extension 2206, in reference to the documents mentioned in our letter of September 12, 1951, telling us we would hear further.

On September 14 Mr. Walter K. Scott of the State Department called and stated that a letter "is being written us that they will not be able to release the documents requested."

We did not receive the letter for unexplained reasons, but we got this letter over the telephone from the State Department that they had sent us dated September 19, 1951:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This is in reply to your request for copies of two reports sent to the State Department by Mr. John Kenneth Emerson, one dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political Factors in the Present Japanese Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945, entitled "The Japanese Communist Party."

It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. In the present context, the release of these reports by individual officers would undoubtedly have the effect of inhibiting the free and frank expression of views by officers in the field in their reports to the Department. For that reason, the request must be respectfully declined.

As this matter is of great importance to the Department, I should very much appreciate an opportunity to discuss it with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Signed by Mr. Webb, Acting Secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like those letters to go in the record, together with the memoranda and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 273, 374, and 275," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show that Professor Colegrove is here today under subpoena, and we are going to ask him to testify about a meeting that took place 2 years ago. Mr. Chairman, there is a transcript of this meeting, and we have requested it and it has been denied us.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to take time now, but I do want to comment on some of this information that is now put in the record about the cooperation of the executive branch, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH COLEGROVE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILL.

Senator FERGUSON. We asked the professor to come here and he has been waiting quite a while. I did want the record to show that I did not want the record to stand as it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. My name is Kenneth Colegrove. My address is Harris Hall 305, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

Mr. MORRIS. What are your present duties?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I am professor of political science, Northwestern University.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have held that position since 1919. I have been absent from Northwestern University on sabbaticals, traveling in Europe and Asia, but the position has been held since 1919.

Mr. MORRIS. What has been your major assignment in Northwestern?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Teaching political science, particularly the field of international law and international relations and also Asiatic politics in government.

Mr. MORRIS. What degrees do you hold, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have an A. B. degree from the State University of Iowa, a Ph. D. from Harvard University. Columbia University gave me an honorary Doctor of Letters some years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, what books have you written?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have written one book on Militarism in Japan, in 1936; a book on International Control of Aviation. That was back in 1930. I have written a book on United States Senate and World Peace, in 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, what has been your specialty in international affairs?

Mr. COLEGROVE. My specialty has been international control of aviation and treaty-making in the United States, and then government and politics and diplomacy of Japan. I might say that my studies on Japan amount to about 20 articles which are published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of International Law and other learned journals.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, when did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I joined at an early date. I am sorry to say I didn't refresh my memory on that, but somewhere in the middle of the thirties, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you remained a member of the institute?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have been off and on, a member of the institute. You joined the institute simply by paying your dues. That is all it amounts to.

May I say I joined the institute back in the early thirties because at that time the institute had the reputation of unbiased scientific system of investigation and many of the books that it published and the survey which it published were very excellent helps in teaching and in research.

It also purported at that time to be wholly unbiased, wholly scientific, and a very large number of professors and libraries subscribed to it. I think most of the members like myself became members in order to get the publications rather than to participate in the studies.

Senator FERGUSON. The studies were done by a group that could spend the time and the effort?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. The books that were sent out to the student of international affairs and teachers, you did want to be in a position to get these as they came out?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. We referred our students to these studies. They were excellent studies on the whole. Sometimes you could detect a bias but you attached that to the writer rather than to the institute itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know people were writing under fictitious names or aliases?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I didn't realize that with reference to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not what the teacher really wanted. He wanted to know who the writer was, his experience, et cetera?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, were you associated with the publication Amerasia?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I was, from the first issue down to the time when I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the first issue in 1937?

Mr. COLEGROVE. 1937. I resigned from the advisory board. I was a member of what was called the advisory board of editors from 1937 until 1942 when I resigned first and was persuaded to come back. Then I resigned for good in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances surrounding your first becoming associated with the publication and the two resignations you have just mentioned?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was invited to join the editorial board by Frederick Field who was and still is a very personable young man.

Senator EASTLAND. What year was that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was in 1936, the year before the first publication.

At that time the American people were not widely awake to Asia and Asiatic problems. I was among those who felt we ought to know more about Asia, that we ought to study Asia more in the schools and we ought to have more information with reference to Asia and we ought to awaken a large public opinion with reference to Asia.

America knew a great deal about Europe but Asia had been very greatly neglected. What Frederick Field and what Mr. Jaffe and others connected with Amerasia, proposed to do was to publish a monthly journal called Amerasia, America-Asia, running the two together, which would translate into popular language the learning regarding current affairs in Asia. To me that was a very attractive proposition. I think most of the editors, most of the scholars who agreed to become editors, felt that they were really doing a service to the American people and doing a service to the schools, doing a service to public opinion, by serving on this Amerasia.

The first numbers of Amerasia were excellent. Some of the very best things we have on Asia were published in Amerasia.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your voice just a bit, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Some very good articles were published in Amerasia. I did not detect any special line in 1937, 1938, and 1939. I knew that some of the editorial board were attached preeminently to the American interests, looked at the national interest of the American people as first and foremost. I knew that others were not so careful of the American interests and sympathized with revolutionary processes, some of which are rather dangerous.

I thought at the time it was a well-balanced board. All views were expressed there.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, looking back do you think there was a line there or do you think you just did not detect a line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In the first few years as I look over the old numbers I would say there was no line to be easily detected. Later on the line appeared, especially in articles by a Chinese scholar by the name of Chi.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the line, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It is very hard to say exactly what the line was. When I use "the line," I mean a person is following the policy of Soviet Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if you had followed the line you would have gone to the Kremlin?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; the line would go back to the Kremlin.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. That is what I meant by party line.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor. I would like to offer you an exchange of correspondence involving you, which Mr. Mandel will certify came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want the witness to see them first?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. This is a letter from Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. MORRIS. There were three letters, a copy of a letter from Mr. Lockwood to you and the second letter is one which purports to be an original of yours.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I recall the correspondence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that?

Mr. MANDEL. These letters dated November 30, 1942, November 20, 1942, November 18, 1942, and November 17, 1942, were taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, will you tell us your recollection of this exchange of correspondence?

Mr. COLEGROVE. As I just said, I served on this advisory editorial board from 1937 on. I was one of the few members from the West, and I must say I never attended a meeting of the editorial board, although I understand meetings were held about every month in New York City. I never happened to be in New York City when such a meeting was held.

In the beginning it was my understanding with the board that I would be given the right to approve all the articles on Japan that were published in Amerasia. These articles were sent out to me in bunches. I read them and sent back my comments. Later on I noticed that Amerasia did publish some articles on Japan which I had not O. K.'d. I was very busy at the time and didn't protest at this seeming neglect.

Then around 1940 a number of articles began to be published in Amerasia by Kate Mitchell and by Mr. Mattuch and Mr. Gohol very antagonistic to the British rule in India and also to the Dutch rule in Indonesia.

During the war Great Britain became our ally, or we became an ally of Great Britain and I thought this was very bad policy to publish these articles without having articles on the other side. I protested at this lack of impartiality and scholarship. Mr. Jaffe promised me that I would have the right before any article attacking British rule in India or Dutch rule in Indonesia——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you please speak up?

Mr. COLEGROVE. American articles were published in Amerasia attacking the British rule in India and the Dutch rule in Indonesia. That of course was following the Communist line. I didn't know that at the time. I thought it was very unscholarly to publish articles attacking British rule in India and Dutch rule in Indonesia without publishing articles on the other side. Mr. Jaffe agreed with me on this matter because I suppose he wanted to keep the old members of the board together, and said that before any article attacking the British in India or the Dutch in Indonesia was published, he would allow me to secure some other writer to publish an article on the other side.

Mr. Jaffe, I am sorry to say, in my view broke that agreement, and in the fall of 1942 I resigned from the editorial board, saying this was

not following the scholarly procedure. This correspondence relates to my resignation.

Mr. Jaffe later on persuaded me to come back, with the very firm promise that it would never happen again. I regret to say that it did happen again and I resigned for good in April 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, does Mr. Lockwood concede there was a line to Amerasia in his letter to you there?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I am afraid he does. Mr. Lockwood seems to be on both sides.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the second paragraph?

This is his letter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date?

Mr. COLEGROVE. November 30, 1942.

It seems to me that as matters now stand the editors are put in an embarrassing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned and therefore all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything that is said whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen it in advance. Jaffe recognized the validity of this objection and promised to think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again.

In later correspondence Jaffe promised that would not be done in the future.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask that these four letters identified by Professor Colegrove and by Mr. Mandel as letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations be introduced into the record and be marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. There seems to be something more than letters here.

Mr. MORRIS. This is just our summary of the exchange. The four letters should go in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The letters will be inserted into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked as exhibits Nos. 276, 277, 278, and 279, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 279

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
November 17, 1942.

Mr. PHILIP J. JAFFE,

Amerasia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. JAFFE: I am writing you regarding the lack of objectivity and scholarship displayed in recent articles in *Amerasia* dealing with India.

In the October 25 issue of *Amerasia* occurs an article by Mr. Kurt R. Mattusch under the title "The American Public and India," which is not only bitterly anti-British but also unscholarly.

For instance, on page 403 he says that the debate on the Cripps Mission in the House of Lords envisaged safe reservations for British interests within India. As a matter of fact, the debate of July 30 was on Europeans in India and was not on the Cripps mission. The Marquess of Crewe, whose speech is quoted, was not an official spokesman. Mr. Mattusch completely ignores the statement of the Duke of Devonshire, who, speaking for the Government, said: "It is really impossible to make an offer both of complete self-government and to exact guarantees for specified British interests."

Again, his statement about taxes and the upkeep of Gibraltar, Malta, and Eden is simply fantastic. Numerous other errors in this article could be pointed out.

I wish also to refer to the number of *Amerasia* published in May and devoted to India and the war. This number contained numerous misrepresentations that

no scholar would tolerate. For instance, on pages 4 to 8, the onus of defeat of the Cripps mission seems to be laid on Mr. Jinnah, who is pictured as a scheming politician. Now, everyone with even a slight acquaintance with Indian affairs knows that the working committee of the Indian National Congress contains politicians just as scheming and selfish as Mr. Jinnah. Nevertheless the commentator ignores this fact.

The commentary also fails to give a proper consideration to Pakistan, to explain the Moslem case, to give proper consideration to the plight of the untouchables under the Hindu domination. It fails to call proper attention to the very small percentage of Indian people, barely 10,000,000 out of 389,000,000, who are political-minded. A scholarly treatment of the question should point out all these facts.

There is another consideration other than lack of scholarship in the publication of these one-sided articles and comment. We are engaged cooperatively in a war for the self-preservation of our institutions. Great Britain is our ally in this war. The publication of articles which misrepresent the facts while attacking Great Britain can do little else than impair our war effort. Loyalty to our own country requires intellectual honesty and moderation in any criticism of our ally.

I find myself under necessity of resigning from the editorial board unless Amerasia is willing to publish in the very near future two articles to offset the above-mentioned anti-British articles. I would like to see this principle also applied to the editorials.

It is a matter of deep regret to me to be compelled to write to you in this fashion. There is nothing personal in my feeling in this matter. But as a teacher I cannot permit my name to be used on an editorial board of a magazine which prints such unscholarly and unfair articles without also publishing articles on the other side.

It is probable that in any case I ought not be on the editorial board, inasmuch as I live so far from New York City and cannot attend the periodical meetings of the editorial board.

Please do not consider this letter as any ultimatum in this matter. I have nothing but the most friendly feeling toward you personally and all my colleagues on the board.

Faithfully yours,

KENNETH COLEGROVE,
Professor of Political Science.

EXHIBIT No. 278

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS,
Evanston, Ill., November 18, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM LOCKWOOD,
*Secretary, American Committee for International Studies,
Princeton, N. J.*

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have just sent to Mr. Philip Jaffe, editor of Amerasia. I regret very much the necessity of sending this letter, but I feel that I cannot remain a member of the editorial board of a magazine which publishes articles severely criticizing our ally Great Britain unless those articles are scholarly in character and also unless the British side, or again the Moslem side, is also expressed on the pages of the magazine.

I suppose, anyway, it is time for me to withdraw from the editorial board, inasmuch as, living in Chicago, I cannot attend the board meetings. I hope, of course, if the editorial board cannot arrange to publish some articles on the other side of the Indian question, and if I find it necessary to withdraw from the board, Amerasia will publish my letter of resignation, indicating exactly my reason for retiring.

Hastily yours,

KENNETH COLEGROVE,
Professor of Political Science.

EXHIBIT No. 277

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY,
Princeton, N. J., November 20, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
*Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
 New York City.*

DEAR BILL: I am sorry we opened the enclosed letter from Kenneth Colegrove, which is not on American committee business even though it is addressed to you as secretary of the committee.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Ed.

(Typed) EDWARD MEADE EARLE.

P. S.—Incidentally, I was pretty peeved about the review of Mackinder, which I thought flippant.

EXHIBIT No. 276

NOVEMBER 30, 1942.

Prof. KENNETH COLEGROVE,
*105 Harris Hall, Northwestern University,
 Evanston, Ill.*

DEAR PROFESSOR COLEGROVE: I have read with interest and some sympathy your letter to Phil Jaffe on Amerasia. I felt the same way about the treatment of India and have said so to him and to Kate Mitchell.

It seems to be that as matters now stand the editors are put in an embarrassing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned; and, therefore, all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything that is said, whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen it in advance. Jaffe recognized the validity of this objection and promised to think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again.

For some time I've been frankly rather puzzled as to whether to remain on the board, being torn between reluctance to sponsor the "line" being taken and, on the other hand, the feeling that Amerasia had a lot of useful stuff in it. Also, I dislike making any sort of break with Jaffe and Miss Mitchell, both of whom are close personal friends of mine.

It may be that the whole board of outsiders ought to disappear and the magazine be made frankly the personal vehicle of the two people doing all the work. They are reluctant to have that happen. The real reason I haven't withdrawn, confidentially, is the hope that sooner or later some kind of combination could be made between Amerasia and the two IPR periodicals which would strengthen their total usefulness to the public and eliminate the present duplication and competition. From the IPR standpoint, this of course would preclude a consistent and personalized editorial line, though it wouldn't by any means preclude a forum of opinion presenting a variety of views. Personnel is getting so scarce that there ought to be some combination in this general field of Far East periodicals. The new form of Amerasia serves really to increase the duplication and competition with Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey, particularly the former.

My own ideas aren't very clear on this, and I'm writing you my puzzlement in the hope that you may have some suggestions. As a nonstaff person who has been interested both in Amerasia and in the IPR, I would very much appreciate having your views as to what we ought to do.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD.

NOTE.—I understand this is what happened: IPR people would not go along with Jaffe's personal views as reflected in Amerasia, which had started as an objective and substantiated paper.—CLAYTON LANE, *January, 1950.*

(Above is handwritten.)

Mr. MORRIS. Were you invited to participate in Government service during the war?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I was invited to be a consultant by the Office of Strategic Services.

Mr. MORRIS. By whom?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was invited by Charles Burton Foss. I might say as a matter of amusement here, that during the war a great many of us old professors were invited to serve in Government agencies by our bright young students who had gone into the Government service and gotten into positions of some importance. Charles Burton Foss was a former student of mine. He was inviting his old professor to come down and help him during the war, which I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What other invitation did you have to join the Government service, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. During the war my consultation with the Office of Strategic Services was my only service. Immediately after the war, I was invited to become a consultant for General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. That was in 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you as a matter of fact work for OSS, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I served as a consultant on four or five different occasions in Washington for the OSS. I might say that Charles Burton Foss was first the Chief of the Japan Section of the OSS under the Far Eastern Division. Then he succeeded Carl Remer and was Chief of the Far Eastern Division of OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever asked to join the Office of War Information?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I was offered the post of head of the Japanese desk in the OWI in Japan. I was asked to take that position by Prof. Owen Lattimore, who was serving the Office of War Information from the San Francisco position.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you accept that offer, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No; I declined that position.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Lattimore at the time of your declination, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Professor Lattimore wrote me several letters and then asked me to meet him as he came through from Washington to San Francisco; asked me to meet him in Chicago. I met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us what happened during the course of that conversation, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was in December 1943, and Lattimore again offered me the post of the Japan desk in San Francisco. He seemed a little annoyed that I didn't accept it. We had dinner together. I was courteously awaiting until his plane took off for San Francisco; so we continued the conversation. We discussed first the position that Amerasia had taken with reference to the British in India, and I objected to Amerasia's attitude and articles and said that was one of the points why I resigned. Lattimore seemed to take great offense at that.

Senator FERGUSON. At your position?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, at my position; very great offense at my arguments, and I was entirely wrong regarding it. For some reason or other, we got on the subject of the Dutch in Indonesia. Lattimore was still more furious at my contradicting him with reference to the

benefits of Dutch rule in Indonesia. I was opposed to liquidating Dutch imperialism in Indonesia immediately after the war. Then I mentioned something about the Chinese Communists, and this surprised me a great deal to have Lattimore, whom I thought by this time had lost some of his control, claim that he had more information on China than I had, which was, of course, true. He went so far as to say that Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were real democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no connection with Soviet Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. You say Professor Lattimore said the Chinese Communists were democrats, agrarian reformers, and had no connection with Soviet Russia?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you taken the opposite view?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes. I think most scholars felt the same way at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. That you were right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt I was right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did most scholars feel—

Mr. COLEGROVE. At that time I think most impartial scholars were very hesitant to believe that the Chinese Communists did not have some connection with Soviet Russia, that Mao Tse-tung was a Marxian doctrinaire and not a mere agrarian reformer, and certainly not a democrat in any respect.

I told Lattimore on this occasion that I felt that he was saying something he didn't believe himself, and I was surprised to see Lattimore back down.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was conversing with you in a state of temper?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I think he got very annoyed with me and didn't exercise caution which he generally does exercise.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he mention whether or not he felt that the Chinese Communists were receiving aid from Soviet Russia?

Mr. COLEGROVE. He claimed they were not. In fact, he went so far as to say there was no means of communication.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not quite well known at that time that young Chinese had been taken to Moscow and indoctrinated and trained? That was a matter of pretty common knowledge; was it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Certainly, among persons who followed the situation in Asia, that was very well known.

The CHAIRMAN. Mao Tse-tung was one of them?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, Mao Tse-tung had not gone to Moscow. He was one of the few who did not. Every one of his lieutenants were Moscow-trained. That applied especially to Chou En Lai.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you not somewhat surprised at Lattimore's stand being in the OWI, Lattimore taking the stand he did in relation to these Communists in China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was amazed, frankly. I got the impression that perhaps Professor Lattimore was not following instructions from the State Department that he should be following with reference to his duties in San Francisco.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I meant.

Mr. COLEGROVE. About this time the official view of the United States was that nothing disparaging should be said of the Japanese

Emperor, the Tano system; nothing should be done to arouse hatred or antagonism of the imperial household, because my understanding is that Mr. Grew, who was the Under Secretary of State, had the opinion that the Emperor would be of very great assistance in bringing about the surrender of Japan when finally Japan should wisely surrender. The militarists would never give in. So, if you could only get the Emperor, you would save a situation.

Owen Lattimore's view from conversations was, as I recall, that the Emperor's system was the greatest deterrent to democracy in Japan and that the Emperor and his whole family should be exterminated.

Senator EASTLAND. You mean killed?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Killed, destroyed. Publicly he did not go that far. He went that far privately.

Senator FERGUSON. With you?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Publicly his proposal was that the Japanese Emperor and his whole family should be sent over to China to be dealt with by the Chinese. Everybody who knew Asia at that time would realize the Chinese would annihilate the Emperor and his family or put them beyond all power of living.

Senator FERGUSON. Professor, this line that Lattimore was taking, both on the Emperor and the situation of the Chinese, was that, in your opinion, the Soviet line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. That has always been the Soviet line. The Communist Party in Japan ever since 1921 has opposed the Emperor. That has been the line of the Communist Party in Japan while they were underground. They were underground from 1923 on. Of course, the Communist Party line in Japan was dictated by the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. But here was a man, Owen Lattimore, that was well informed as to America's stand, or should have been, and as to the world situation. When he was advocating to you privately these matters, in your opinion, as you said to him once, I believe, that he was advocating something that he could hardly believe himself but he was still advocating it, that was the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I do not charge him—

Senator FERGUSON. With being a Communist?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No. I did not charge him with following the Communist line. I simply told him I was sure he knew better, that Mao Tse-tung was not a democrat and a mere agrarian reformer. I probably did not make my statement clear here when I said I talked these things over with Lattimore on the occasion of our visit in December 1943.

Also I discussed with Lattimore the policy of the United States toward the Emperor that was being followed by the State Department, the War Department and the OWI at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you decline a job in San Francisco?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Largely personal. I did not trust Owen Lattimore. I did not care to be associated with him.

Senator EASTLAND. You thought they were following the Communist line out there?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I can't say that I was that alert, Senator. Some of us professors are not as alert as we should be. I could not say that Owen Lattimore was following the Communist line. I didn't like his attitude on Asiatic problems.

Senator EASTLAND. You say it was a Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I say it was the Communist line.

Senator EASTLAND. You say you did not trust him. Therefore, you did not take the job. Is that right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you not trust him?

Mr. COLEGROVE. For those reasons.

Senator EASTLAND. Because he was following the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I would say in the back of my mind that would stand out, but at that time I would not have said that Owen Lattimore is following the Communist line.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no doubt about it now?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was the Communist line. As you look back over the situation and compare it with the editorials in the Daily Worker, you can see definitely that was the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, on the 10th of July of this year while you were examined in executive session you were shown a letter dated July 10, 1938, by Owen Lattimore to Mr. Carter. I would like to show this to you once again and ask you if you will make any general comment on the last full paragraph on the first page and the first paragraph on the second page.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this?

Mr. MORRIS. This, Senator, is a letter which has been introduced in evidence previously, a letter from Owen Lattimore to Edward C. Carter, dated July 10, 1938, and officially made a part of our record.

The CHAIRMAN. You are drawing his attention to certain paragraphs?

Mr. MORRIS. Two paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question?

Mr. MORRIS. I have just called attention to the fact that he was shown that letter in executive session and asked to comment on it. I am going to ask him if he will make any comments now.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well for you to read the paragraphs.

Mr. COLEGROVE. One paragraph that you refer to here Professor Lattimore says:

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Chi was a member of the editorial board of Amerasia and I did not know at that time he was a Communist, but it was very evident that he was following the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. It was evident to you, Professor, that Chi, while you were on the board of Amerasia with him, was following the Communist Party line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That came gradually into our minds, that he was following the Communist line. At first we thought he was a bright young Chinese scholar who had a mass of information, which he did. He had a mass of information. We finally realized it was along the Communist line entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. When you use the term "we" are you using the editorial "we" applying to yourself?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I would say it included members of the committee like Cyrus Peake and myself. I assume other members who were very sympathetic toward the Kremlin knew it all the time.

The last paragraph reads:

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position for the IPR differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

That sentence, together with his whole letter, seems to me to be one of the most intellectually dishonest academic documents that I have ever seen. This is a complete negation of what the IPR said to professors and teachers all over the country that it was. In its solicitation for membership it had always emphasized the scholarly, scientific viewpoint that it was presenting, amplified by the fact that it was not trying to advocate the interest of any particular country but only giving us the benefit of their researches and their scholarship.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you thought it was an honest organization and this sentence indicates to you that it was really a fraud?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. This is fraudulent. This is one of the most contemptible things I know from the whole academic world. Thousands of university professors and hundreds of thousands of students all over the country who were beginning to study Asia looked upon this institute as an unbiased, wholly scientific institution engaged in research, engaged in discovery of the truth and in not following any line.

I and other scholars would have been shocked if we knew that one official of the Institute of Pacific Relations was writing to the secretary-general telling him to follow a certain line with reference to China, Japan, with reference to Indonesia.

Senator FERGUSON. Professor, to do it in such a way as to deceive the people, not to come out and announce it was a Communist propaganda agency but to deceive the people, isn't that true with that sentence?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. It was shocking. It is almost revolting to think that you yourself were misled by such an organization. This will have done a very great injury to organized scholarship in the United States. It is no wonder people are suspicious of the Rockefeller Foundation or of the Carnegie Corp. which gives so much money to organizations of this sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Then to realize those that had charge of it would use it as a means of deceiving the people and use it really as a propaganda agency or front?

Mr. COLEGROVE. This shows behind the front the Institute of Pacific Relations was nothing else than a propaganda organization supporting a line.

Senator EASTLAND. A Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In this case a Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Professor.

This, Mr. Chairman, has already been introduced into the record as exhibit No. 4 on the first day of the open hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show exhibit No. 4 is the exhibit in the hands of the witness at this time from which he testified.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, did you attend a conference held under the auspices of the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I was invited to attend that conference. The invitation came in a telegram signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your understanding of this conference, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. My understanding had been that Professor Jessup had been charged by the State Department with the formulation of a new policy for China and that a committee had been set up with Professor Jessup as chairman, President Case and Dr. Fosdick as the two other members, and that Ambassador Jessup and the State Department wished to receive advice from experts regarding what the policy of the United States in China should be.

I might say the collapse of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Government had occurred that summer.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, were Messrs. Jessup, Fosdick, and Case all three IPR men?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I believe they were, but Mr. Jessup of course was the member of the board of trustees. I believe Dr. Fosdick was also. I have always assumed that President Case was a member.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified, Professor, that this conference, to your understanding, was called by Mr. Jessup in order to assist the Secretary of State in formulating far-eastern policy?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I wouldn't like to be positive about that. I would say that impression was that the list was prepared by Ambassador Jessup. The invitation was over the signature of the Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that the conference we are now having testimony about is the conference, the transcript of which was asked for by you of the State Department and which was denied.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record so show.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time of receiving a letter from the State Department a list of consultants who did attend this conference was made available. I would like now to show this list to Professor Colegrove to refresh his recollection on the make-up of that particular conference.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the list attached to the letter addressed to me under date of September 12, 1951, over the signature of Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. COLEGROVE. May I use this?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Would you just state that most of the participants of that conference were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It seems to me, Mr. Morris, that most of these are members of the IPR, and many of them are high-ranking officers.

The CHAIRMAN. High-ranking officers of what?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Of the IPR, that is, members of the board of trustees. I must say I was never a high-ranking officer in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was merely a member. Thousands of

people in the United States were members simply to subscribe to the Survey and other publications.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the editorial staff?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No; but I was a member of the advisory editorial board of Amerasia but not of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I propose that the best way of identifying or establishing whether or not these people were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations is during the course of the testimony of the next witness on this conference to ask Mr. Holland, presently secretary-general, to confirm those who were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Mandel has made a compilation from our records, but I suggest it is inadequate and that the best way of establishing it would be to have Mr. Holland assert for our record who the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations are.

The CHAIRMAN. He is coming on?

Mr. MORRIS. No; but during the testimony of our next witness in regard to this conference have Mr. Holland establish that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. As I understand the witness' testimony now, he is saying that a considerable number of the names on that list were high-ranking officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; many were, not a majority, but many were.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe for us the developments of the conference as they unfolded, Professor?

The CHAIRMAN. You did attend the conference, first of all?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, I was present during the 3 days that the conference was held.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did it assemble?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In the State Department, in the large conference room right off of the offices of the Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Who if anyone was the presiding officer?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The presiding officer was Ambassador Jessup, but Dr. Jessup was detained in Lake Success with the United Nations affairs and was not present in the opening session.

Mr. MORRIS. He was present during the second and third sessions?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Dr. Fosdick presided over the first day's session.

Mr. MORRIS. What were some of the subjects discussed at that conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Morris, may I say with reference to giving testimony on the subject of this conference in the State Department that the State Department did say that the proceedings would be confidential and would not be given to the press. The implication was that members of the conference should not discuss this matter with the press.

On the other hand, I take it that it is proper for any member of the conference who is testifying before a Senate committee to speak very frankly with reference to what was said and done in the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not only proper, sir; you are under oath.

Mr. COLEGROVE. And must answer the questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You were called in by the United States Government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. The telegram was signed Dean Acheson. Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. You were acting as a Government official?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid or not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Travel expenses were given and a per diem.

Senator FERGUSON. You were to advise with the various members there?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Advise with Ambassador Jessup's committee.

Senator FERGUSON. It was public business; that is, the Government was paying for it, setting it up and taxpayers' money was being used for it?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The obvious purpose was to formulate far eastern policy?

Mr. COLEGROVE. So we understood.

Senator JENNER. Were there any press releases issued from this conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Some time later, as I recollect, and I am sorry I cannot give you the exact date, the State Department published a list of consultants.

Senator JENNER. Did they publish any news or anything said in the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No. My understanding is they did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the question of Communist China discussed?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. The recognition of Communist China was one of the very important questions discussed. When Ambassador Jessup arrived he frankly said that the Department wanted the advice of these consultants on the question of recognition of Communist China, on the question of the Japan Peace Treaty, on the question of a Pacific pact, and on the question of giving economic aid to Communist and non-Communist countries in Asia. Those four subjects were broadly discussed and a great many other subjects, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a tendency of the various people during the course of these 3 days to break down into groups and take positions on the subjects as they arose?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, there was that tendency. As you will notice, it always occurs in a group of individuals. You can classify them more or less closely into groups. If you are going to limit the groups to three. I would say that one group was very obviously pro-American in its thinking, put America first, that is, foreign policy must serve the national interest of the American people.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that group generally take a strong anti-Communist position?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That group took a very strong anti-Communist position. Now on the other side of this group they were not thinking so much of America as they were thinking of other things and that group tended to be sympathetic to Communistic China and very, very considerate of the Kremlin.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I would say the leader of that group, if you consider he was a leader, was Professor Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Owen Lattimore. I would put in that group Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, of IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show at this time that Lawrence K. Rosinger has been identified by two witnesses as having been a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. By two witnesses before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Before this committee.

Mr. COLEGROVE. More or less, Professor Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. Prof. John K. Fairbank?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

To some extent Reischauer of Harvard and Professor Peffer of Columbia University.

Senator EASTLAND. As I understand, Ambassador Jessup invited Owen Lattimore to a conference in Washington to advise and assist in formulating United States Government's China policy and advise with him on the Japanese Peace Treaty; is that right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, if Owen Lattimore received the very same telegram that I received, it was signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.

Senator EASTLAND. You say the list was made up by Professor Jessup?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I assume that. I don't know; that was the talk.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know that Professor Jessup was in charge of this particular conference you attended?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I think the Secretary of State would not act very wisely if he didn't allow Ambassador Jessup to select his own expert.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that in 1949?

Mr. COLEGROVE. October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned the interest for America in the first group and then you said there were others you thought were thinking of something else than the primary interest of America and her relations to the world. What was that other thing?

Mr. COLEGROVE. With reference to this extreme group?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt that they were very sympathetic toward Chinese Communists and also were extremely careful with reference to the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they were favoring, in your opinion, the Communist line rather than the good interests of the United States of America?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. From what was said?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Did they advocate economic aid to Communist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, very, very strongly.

Senator FERGUSON. And recognition of Communist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Immediate recognition of Communist China, and were very much opposed to a Pacific pact.

The CHAIRMAN. You have named certain people who were present at that meeting as belonging to that particular group that favored Communist China and the Kremlin. Have you named all of them that you can recall who belonged to that group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I see one other name I should have thought of, Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, who is very decidedly of that group; sometimes Eugene Staley, Professor Staley.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the chairman take any side as to what group he was with?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Ambassador Jessup gave no sign he was in favor of one or the other. He was a good presiding officer. He was a good parliamentarian. Ambassador Jessup is suave, courteous, almost deferential. He knows how to cut off debate without offending anyone's sensibilities. He is an excellent presiding officer.

At the same time Professor Jessup is a great scholar. I have very great respect for his scholarship, his learning, and his books on international law particularly are very notable contributions.

In this conference Mr. Jessup did not indicate his own personal attitude on any question whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, as a matter of fact which group dominated the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt that the group that was sympathetic to Red China dominated the conference. Governor Stassen was among those who were very much opposed to Soviet Russia. Ballantine, Joseph W. Ballantine, was opposed. Professor Brodie was very much opposed. I was decidedly opposed myself. I think we could add the name of Professor Buss as among those who took a strong anti-Communist attitude. I felt that we were in the minority, I am sorry to say.

Mr. MORRIS. And the people who did favor Communist China were in the majority and they dominated the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Then the third group I mentioned was a group between, that was on one side once and on the other side again, persons who were a little unstable—well, a little undecided as to the position they wished to follow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may the record show at this time that a subpoena has been sent to Governor Stassen to appear before this committee next Monday afternoon in connection with the testimony given today by Professor Colegrove?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The subpoena has been issued?

Mr. MORRIS. It is going out today, Senator.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have not had an opportunity to read the transcript that the State Department kept.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. A transcript was made of everything by the State Department. Governor Stassen was very shrewd; I believe he had his own secretary there making a transcript. But I have had no opportunity to review this, the proceedings, and I am speaking wholly from my memory 2 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. You have spoken generally of opinion, so you have not attempted to give specific statements.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; except I would be specific on the question of recognizing Red China. Mr. Lattimore was wholly for it. Mr. Kizer was for it. Mr. Rosinger was for it and Mr. Staley was for it, also Mr. Fairbank. I was opposed to it, Governor Stassen opposed to it, Ballantine opposed to it, and Brodie opposed to it.

Senator JENNER. Was there anything discussed in this conference with regard to our attitude toward Korea and Formosa?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Owen Lattimore, who had furnished the State Department with a memoranda, proposed in that memoranda that the United States immediately liquidate its responsibilities for Korea, and in the conference he expressed the same view. I remember that very distinctly.

Senator EASTLAND. As a loyal American, were you satisfied with the men who were invited to that conference at the State Department to advise Mr. Jessup on the formulation of China policy?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Frankly, Senator, I was very much surprised.

Senator EASTLAND. You were disappointed, were you not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was very much disappointed.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, the group that had been invited was the group largely that had betrayed the Chinese Government to the Communists?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That is exactly the situation.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, there were no new experts but it was the same crowd that had betrayed this country and sold China down the river?

Mr. COLEGROVE. And the State Department knew their views.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I might add this, and I have nothing to back it up except my impression—I thought the State Department in its briefing was doing a little propaganda work on a professor such as myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Who did the briefing?

Mr. COLEGROVE. There were several officers who briefed us. Nelson Johnson of the Far Eastern Commission did a very good job of briefing. I was very much disappointed in the briefing done by Cora Du Bois, who briefed the conference upon southeast Asia. I suspect, but I haven't much to go on, that the State Department thought it was good for some of the experts, so-called experts, to indoctrinate us and when it was over to approve the new policy which would be recognition of New China.

Mr. MORRIS. You thought that had been the policy and they just wanted to get somebody to back them up?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I got that impression, I am sorry to say.

Senator EASTLAND. Now did you read the American white paper on China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, all students of Asia studied that with a great deal of care.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that an honest or dishonest and false document?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In my opinion it was one of the most false documents ever published by any country.

Senator EASTLAND. It was a dishonest document?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Thoroughly dishonest.

Senator EASTLAND. Who supervised the preparation of that white paper?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The New York Times said that Ambassador Jessup had been appointed by the State Department to edit that but I can hardly believe that Phil Jessup really supervised that document. He is a scholar, he is a learned man, and as a scholar the man must have realized that that document is not the real story.

Senator JENNER. Owen Lattimore is a scholar and learned man?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, a fine scholar, he has a fine command of certain Asiatic languages, that is true.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the letter of transmittal?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That letter of transmittal was thoroughly dishonest, especially the paragraph of the letter which says that there is nothing that the United States could have done to save Chiang Kai-shek and again, except to reemphasize it, the United States had left nothing undone that might have saved him and kept the Communists from winning the victory.

Senator EASTLAND. You thought that was a lie?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That obviously was a lie, and I must say that those sort of statements are one thing we try to teach freshmen at Northwestern University never to make, such general sweeping statements like that, and I think by the time they have become seniors we have taught them those are not the kind of statements to make.

Senator EASTLAND. Who signed that letter of transmittal?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That letter was under the signature, I understand, of the Secretary of State, but obviously someone in the Department drafted it for him.

Senator EASTLAND. In reality was it drafted by Professor Jessup?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I don't know. I hope it was not. I sincerely hope that Phil Jessup did not draft that letter.

Senator EASTLAND. But the newspaper said he prepared that white paper, did it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. My understanding was that he supervised the editing of the paper.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, supervised the editing.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you remember when Mr. Alfred Kohlberg made charges that the Institute of Pacific Relations was Communist-controlled?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I was one of the members at that time that voted in favor of Mr. Kohlberg when an attempt was made to change the direction—

Senator EASTLAND. All he wanted was an investigation?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Merely an investigation, an outside investigation.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he get that investigation?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No; he did not.

Senator EASTLAND. It was whitewashed, was it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Very distinctly.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not even get an inside investigation, did he?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Presumably he got an inside investigation because a letter was sent saying that his charges had been found utterly false.

Senator EASTLAND. You know it was a whitewash, do you not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt that very strongly even at the time.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Professor Jessup have a hand in that whitewash?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I regret to say that Jessup's name is among the eight who signed the letter to the members informing them that the charges were false.

Senator EASTLAND. And he had a hand in whitewashing and concealing Communist control of the Institute of Pacific Relations, an organization which was offering alleged experts in foreign policy to the American Government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. To my great regret, his name was in the list of eight informing the members.

Senator EASTLAND. Now what about Indonesia? Were you satisfied with Professor Jessup's stand in the United Nations on the Dutch Government in Indonesia?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I might say, in answer to that, that my whole attitude in this matter goes back some years and I was utterly surprised that Phil Jessup would accept the chairmanship of the board of trustees of the IPR. He is a great international jurist; that is his field. He had not made a reputation, had not at that time, in the Far East. He had written no articles I know of and no books. He had made no special study. So the appointment of Professor Jessup as chairman of the IPR seemed to me at the time to be very peculiar, something extraordinary.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; but then it was extraordinary and in his attacks on the Dutch Government and Dutch imperialism in Indonesia he followed the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; the Communist line for many years has been the destruction of the Dutch rule in Indonesia.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it your judgment that he went beyond his instructions from the State Department to follow the Communist line in this instance?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, it seemed to me that the speeches that Ambassador Jessup made to the Security Council in December 1948 and again in January 1949 against the Dutch Government were very unfair and were not the speeches that a scholar should make. There was a rumor around the State Department that Ambassador Jessup had exceeded his instructions in pressing the Security Council to take drastic action against the Dutch.

I recall a dinner I had with Ambassador Jessup in February of 1949 at which I said to him that rumors had been to the effect that he had exceeded his instructions in the Indonesia affair. Phil Jessup, however, denied that had been the case and told me that he had not exceeded his instructions. Nevertheless the rumors persisted.

Senator EASTLAND. He was following the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, that is the Communist line.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, do you know Edward C. Carter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; he is a fine, old gentleman. I have always been annoyed by Mr. Carter. He is really, let me say, not the type of man who should have headed a research institute.

Senator EASTLAND. I certainly agree with you. He ought to have been on Union Square.

Now in April of 1945 there were charges that Carter was attempting to influence the State Department to force the Generalissimo to take the Chinese Communists into his government; that is true, is it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; those rumors were present and began even before that time.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think the board of trustees of the institute should have called Carter to rein then?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was very much disturbed by those rumors. I wrote to Raymond Dennett, who was acting as secretary at that time, and also I chose him because I knew him very well. I wrote to him informing him that the rumors were that Edward Carter and other IPR officers had been lobbying for the State Department to force Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to take the Communists into his government and even to share the Chinese government on a 50-50 basis. I said I objected very strongly to any officer of the IPR lobbying this way with the State Department and particularly on work that was said to have been done by Edward Carter.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you not think that Professor Jessup and the trustees of the institute should have stopped Carter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Certainly. I got a letter back saying that Carter wasn't doing anything like that but I can hardly believe that letter because I think the letter informing me was——

The CHAIRMAN. From whom was the letter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Raymond Dennett, son of Tyler Dennett. Dennett at that time was acting as secretary of the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. In that instance were you not disappointed in Professor Jessup, that he did not attempt to prevent Carter from lobbying with the State Department to force Communists in the generalissimo's government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was disappointed with the whole board of trustees.

Senator EASTLAND. Jessup was one of them?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Jessup was one of the board of trustees at that time. I was disappointed with all of them for not taking these rumors and examining them and for not taking action against Carter, who I believe unquestionably was lobbying with the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. You believe unquestionably he was lobbying with the State Department?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. To force Chiang Kai-shek to put Communists in the government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. You said on a 50-50 basis?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, that was the rumor.

Senator EASTLAND. That would have meant a bloodless revolution in China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Whenever the Communists move in, even on less than a 50-50 basis, they take over the government in a very short time. We have seen that too frequently in Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. We have had great trouble discovering who in the State Department prepared the memorandum for General Marshall when he went out to accomplish that mission.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, Professor Jessup had been close to this left-wing group all along, had he not, Lattimore, Field?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Unfortunately that seems to be the case.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to go back to this question of the experts being briefed at the meeting in the State Department. Was that briefing before you were asked to give your opinion?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It began with a briefing by George Kennan on the very first day and the rest of it was interspersed. I was very much

disappointed in the briefing by George Kennan. This was a conference upon the Far East and George Kennan didn't tell us anything that we hadn't known or thought about for years and years and years. I thought George Kennan just wasted the time of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You got a kind of feeling that the briefing was to give you some propaganda to take back to the people?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt distinctly that the briefing by Cora Du Bois was of that kind. The briefing done on the military situation by Colonel McCann didn't give us anything we had not already read in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get an impression from this conference on the Far East, which you said was in your estimation propaganda, that it was the desire of the State Department to have a policy of great leniency at least toward the Communists in China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The State Department didn't tip its hand in this respect. I indicated that Ambassador Jessup—

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about his action but the lady who briefed you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I would like to have him conclude his sentence there. It would be interesting. You said didn't tip its hand?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Didn't tip its hand, and Ambassador Jessup is a very clever and able presiding officer. He didn't disclose his own views, but the briefing by Cora Du Bois was a briefing very sympathetic toward the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Those were the kind of questions that were being brought up in the meeting?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when her briefing took place?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I think her briefing took place in the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the question discussed on the recognition of China by the United States?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Curiously enough that was discussed in every session but particularly emphasized in what would be the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. How did this lady who briefed you stand on that question? Did she express herself?

Mr. COLEGROVE. She was talking only about southeast Asia and did not cover other subjects.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record at this time the only document that we have on the reports made at this particular conference. That is a text of Lattimore's memorandum which he himself released during the time of the Foreign Policy Committee's investigation of the same subject a year ago. I think it is appropriate if we put that in the record, Mr. Chairman.

I think we might ask Mr. Colegrove whether or not the views set forth there coincide generally with the views that Mr. Lattimore expressed at the conference, according to his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you read this memorandum?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have read this memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. This that has been handed to the chairman purports to be the New York Times of Tuesday, April 4, 1950. It is a photostatic copy of certain parts of the New York Times. What is it that you want? How do you identify it?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel will authenticate that photostat.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the New York Times of April 4, 1950, pages 1 and 21, being a news release accompanying the text of Lattimore's memorandum on the United States far-eastern policy. It says:

Following is the text of Owen Lattimore's memorandum on United States in the Far East, drafted for a State Department advisory committee last August and made public today by Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the photostat of the New York Times of the morning of—

Mr. MANDEL. April 4, 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. As such may it be introduced in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 280-A" and "Exhibit No. 280-B" and are filed as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 280-A

[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950]

LATTIMORE BARES HIS MEMORANDUM ON FAR EAST POLICY—PROFESSOR ACTS AFTER SENATOR CHALLENGES STATE DEPARTMENT TO RELEASE THE DOCUMENT—HE OPPOSED AID TO CHIANG BUT URGED EFFORTS TO CONVINCE ORIENTALS THEY SHOULD TURN TO UNITED STATES AND NOT RUSSIA

WASHINGTON, April 3.—Prof. Owen Lattimore made public today a secret memorandum on proposed far-eastern policy that he had submitted to the State Department last August.

He did so after Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin, who has accused the Johns Hopkins University professor of being a "top Soviet espionage agent," demanded that the State Department release the document, or "it will be my duty as a United States Senator to do so."

The State Department said, however, that Mr. Lattimore's views, together with those of about 30 other persons, were solicited on a confidential basis, and that it had no right to make them public.

Then a few hours later, Mr. Lattimore, who has called the spy charge "an unmitigated lie," released the contents of his memorandum, saying:

"Senator McCarthy in typical fashion is seeking by insinuation and concealment to spread some of the poison of which he has an inexhaustible supply."

AID FOR CHIANG OPPOSED

In the memorandum, Professor Lattimore warned against United States support for the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, but recommended efforts to convince the far-eastern peoples that it was this country and not the Soviet Union to which they should turn.

Mr. Lattimore bade the State Department "avoid premature or excessive" commitment of American resources in the Far East, and said that if there was to be war, "it can be won only by defeating Russia—not Northern Korea, or Viet Nam, or even China."

He said that Russia had won gains in the Far East without lessening the strength she could "deploy toward Europe" and cautioned against any United States assumption that Russia would become so involved in China that she would no longer be able to "maneuver in Europe."

WOULD BAR USE OF JAPAN

"It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American policy," he said, and "South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests of the United States."

"The kind of policy that failed in support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-shek cannot possibly succeed if it is applied to a scattering of 'little Chiang Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in Asia," he wrote.

In his statement, Senator McCarthy said that the State Department considered the Lattimore report "so important and of such a confidential nature that the American people were not entitled to know its contents." He has been arguing that Mr. Lattimore laid down a policy line as a State Department consultant that aided the Chinese Communists and "betrayed" the Chinese Nationalists.

The Senator had called a press conference for this morning at the Naval Medical Center in nearby Bethesda, Md., where he is undergoing treatment for a sinus condition. But after about 20 reporters arrived, they were told by the commanding officer of the institution, Capt. R. M. Gillett, U. S. N., that Mr. McCarthy was "under minor surgical procedure" and could not appear before them for interviews and questions.

Some reporters had intended to ask the Senator whether he wished to repeat off the Senate floor, and thus outside his congressional immunity from suit for libel, the charges he had made against Professor Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore, head of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins, has threatened, through his lawyers, to sue Senator McCarthy if given an opportunity outside the area of immunity.

The Senator's statement asserted in substance that Secretary of State Dean Acheson had not been truthful in saying last week that he believed he had never even met Professor Lattimore.

Mr. McCarthy declared that Drew Pearson, a newspaper columnist and one of the Secretary's "very loyal friends," had written in August 1945 that Mr. Acheson had arranged for a meeting between the professor and President Truman.

This meeting, Mr. McCarthy said, was "for the purpose of weaning Truman away from the Byrnes-Grew far-eastern policy." (He was referring to former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and former Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew).

"While Lattimore was not unsuccessful in convincing Truman at that particular time," the Senator went on, "it is significant that very shortly afterward both Grew and Byrnes left the State Department and the Acheson-Lattimore crowd took complete control."

The Senator coupled with this charge that Secretary Acheson had not conceded having received the Lattimore memorandum "until after learning that I knew the contents."

JESSUP REPLIES TO CHARGE

Tonight, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, who had been accused by Senator McCarthy of "accepting" contributions for the American Council of Institute of Pacific Relations from Frederick Vanderbilt Field, denounced this as a false "insinuation" that the council was "being paid to peddle the Communist Party line."

Mr. Jessup declared in the first place that he was not, as alleged by Mr. McCarthy, largely in control of the organization. At the time in question, 1942 and 1943, the Ambassador added, its head was Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California, and sponsors for a drive for funds included Henry Luce, the magazine publisher, and Juan Trippe of Pan-American Airways.

Mr. Field's contributions of \$3,500, Mr. Jessup said, were part of \$200,000 taken up, much of it from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corp., and large industrial concerns.

Of Messrs. Luce and Trippe, Ambassador Jessup observed:

"Surely these gentlemen would never have accepted payments from Mr. Field or anyone else for 'selling the Communist Party line.' Neither would I if I had been in control."

Senator McCarthy had called Mr. Field a known Communist.

EXHIBIT No. 280-B

[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950]

TEXT OF LATTIMORE'S MEMORANDUM ON UNITED STATES FAR EASTERN POLICY

WASHINGTON, April 3 (AP).—Following is the text of Owen Lattimore's memorandum on United States policy in the Far East, drafted for a State Department advisory committee last August and made public today by Mr. Lattimore:

"In clearing the way for a fresh approach to the problems of United States policy in the Far East, several negative statements can usefully be made.

"1. The type of policy represented by support for Chiang Kai-shek does more harm than good to the interests of the United States, and no modification of this policy seems promising. Chiang Kai-shek was a unique figure in Asia. He is now fading into a kind of eclipse that is regrettably damaging to the prestige of the United States, because the United States supported him. His eclipse does not even leave behind the moral prestige of a good but losing fight in defense of a weak cause.

"On the contrary, he put up the worst possible fight in defense of a cause that was originally strong and should have won. The kind of policy that failed in support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-shek cannot possibly succeed if it is applied to a scattering of 'little Chiang Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in Asia.

"2. China cannot be economically coerced by such measures as cutting off trade. Nothing could be more dangerous for the American interest than to underestimate the ability of the Chinese Communists to achieve the minimum level of economic stability that will make their regime politically secure. Sound policy should allow for a cautious overestimate of the ability of the Chinese Communists in this respect, and avoid a rash underestimate.

"3. It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American policy. There are two alternatives in Japan. The first alternative is to keep Japan alive by means of American 'blood transfusions' of raw materials and credits. Under this alternative Japan can be made to put on the surface appearance of a strong ally; but the reality will be an overcommitment of American resources to a distant and vulnerable region.

"Under the second alternative Japan can keep herself alive by coming to terms, economically and politically, with its neighbors in Asia, principally China. Under this alternative Japan cannot serve as a trusted American ally. Its own interests will compel it to balance and bargain between what it can get out of Asia and what it can get out of America.

"4. South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests and policy of the United States. It is doubtful how long the present regime in South Korea can be kept alive, and mere effort to keep it alive is a bad advertisement, which continually draws attention to a band of little and inferior Chiang Kai-sheks who are the scorn of the Communists and have lost the respect of democratic and would-be democratic groups and movements throughout Asia.

"5. The colonial and quasi-colonial countries of southeast Asia cannot be forced to grant priorities to the economic and military recovery of Europe at the expense of their own economic and political interests. In this region as a whole there is a rapid development of combined political and military resistance to coercion which can be indefinitely sustained by local resources. On the other hand, attempts at reconquest by European countries are so expensive that they defeat their own ultimate purpose, which is the strengthening of the country attempting the reconquest.

"The situation can now be handled only by convincing the Nationalist leaders in those countries that any sacrifices they are asked to make are matched by sacrifices made by their former or titular rulers, and are not designed to give priority to the interests of these rulers, but to bring joint benefits both to the ruling countries and to the colonial country, on terms that satisfy the colonial aspiration to equality.

"6. The United States cannot assume that Russia will move in to take over direct control in China, and will thus be subjected to heavy strategic and economic strains. It is dangerous to assume that there will be a diversion and commitment of Russian resources in Asia which will limit Russian ability to maneuver in Europe. Recent developments in the Far East have been favorable to Russia, but not in a way that lessens the resources that Russia can deploy toward Europe.

"Policy toward Russia and policy toward the Far East meet at the point where such a move as the imposition of an economic cordon sanitaire around China is considered. Such a move would increase Chinese dependence on Russia; but it would probably not make it necessary for Russia to undertake a large-scale program in China. The Russians would get credit in Asia, multiplied by propaganda, for any grants they might make to China, but would probably not have to make grants large enough to distort or strain their own resources.

"It would be possible, therefore, if the mistake is made of waiting for the Chinese Communists to come hat in hand to ask for American terms, for United

States policy to encounter another set-back in Asia, without even the compensating advantage of hampering Russia's ability to apply pressure in Europe.

"The foregoing statement defines negative aspects of the situation in Asia, limiting the freedom of maneuver of United States policy. Within these limitations, it seems advisable that a number of positive objectives should be defined.

"1. Policy in the Far East and policy toward Russia have a bearing on each other. It certainly cannot yet be said, however, that armed warfare against communism in the Far East, on a scale involving a major commitment of American resources, has become either unavoidable or positively desirable. Nor can it be said with any assurance that, in the event of an armed conflict undertaken for the purpose of forcing Russia back from Europe, the Far East would be an optimum field of operation.

"There are still two alternatives before us—a relatively long peace, or a rapid approach toward war. If there is to be war, it can only be won by defeating Russia—not Northern Korea, or Viet Nam, or even China. Sound policy should therefore avoid premature or excessive strategic deployment in the Far East.

"If there is to be a long peace, the primary factor in making peace possible will be a stabilization of relations between the United States and Russia. Sound policy should therefore maintain a maximum flexibility. If and when negotiated and mutually acceptable agreements with Russia become possible, American policy in the Far East should be in a position to contribute to Russo-American negotiations. It should not be so mired down in local situations that direct American-Russian negotiations are actually hampered.

"2. Any new departures in United States policy in the Far East must be able to fend off any accusation of 'appeasement' of local or Russian communism. In view of the effectiveness of the Russian issue as a weapon in in-fighting in American party politics, it would seem that the advice of experts on domestic politics should be coordinated with the opinions of those who are consulted on foreign policy.

"The dilemma is simple, but not easy to solve; but unless it can be solved, no successful United States policy in the Far East is possible. Any United States policy that is interpreted in various countries in the Far East as pressure applied for the purpose of creating a league against Russia will merely increase the ability of those countries to bargain with both the United States and Russia.

"It will also increase the identification, in those countries, between local nationalism and local communism. On the other hand, any proposed United States policy in the Far East that is attacked in America itself as a bid for better relations with Russia runs the danger of being defeated.

"3. The success of United States policy in the Far East will be measured largely by the contribution that it makes to the recovery of economic relations between the Far East and Europe. This recovery will be possible only if the assent and good will of the far eastern countries are won.

"Assent and real cooperation, in turn, can only be won if the representatives of the far-eastern countries, including those that are still technically the subjects of European countries, are convinced that they have as direct access to the highest American authorities as do the European representatives, and if they are convinced that their economic needs and political standards are not being given a second priority, lower than that of the European countries involved in the same negotiations.

"The two test cases in southeast Asia on which the leaders of various nationalist movements will rate the difference between what can be attained through friendly association with representatives of the United States and what can be attained through outright defiance of a European country which has strong economic support from the United States are Indonesia and the Viet Nam regime under Ho Chi Minh.

"If the negotiations between Dutch and Indonesians, brought about largely through benevolent United States pressure, eventuate in a settlement which seems, in Indonesia, to contain too much of hope deferred, while the resistance in Indochina under Ho Chi Minh achieves more and more of hope fulfilled, the results throughout southeast Asia will be adverse to the United States interest.

"Heavy and primary United States commitments in Western Europe makes it difficult to bear constantly in mind that when the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations are consummated, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of popular opinion in Indonesia, will have wider repercussions than the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of Dutch public opinion.

"It is a fact, nevertheless, that Indonesian opinion is more difficult to satisfy than Dutch opinion, and it is also a fact that the repercussions will be more serious if Indonesian opinion is not satisfied than if Dutch opinion is not satisfied. These facts mark an important difference between prewar and postwar colonial Asia. They are facts that Americans fully accepted; but they are also facts that are critical for the formulation of an over-all United States policy in Asia.

"4. The foregoing considerations indicate that the major aim of United States policy in the Far East should be to convince the countries of the Far East that they can get along well with the United States and with the countries of Western Europe. They must be persuaded that they can get along well because of the mutual benefits to themselves, to the United States, and to Western Europe.

"They must not be made to suspect that the real aim of the United States is an ulterior aim of using them against Russia.

To put it in another way, the aim of the United States policy should be to enable the countries of the Far East to do without Russia to the maximum extent.

This is a much more modest aim than an insistence on and organization of hostility to Russia; but it is an attainable aim, and the other is not.

"A few suggestions for implementation are appended.

"1. Conferences with the independent governments of the Far East, on the basis of helping them to build their own economies, to revive their trade with Europe, and to expand their trade with us. Emphasis on positive steps that can be taken. No negative conditions, such as prohibitions of trade with Russia or Communist China; no conditions that could be interpreted as American regulation of their political parties.

"2. Working relations, and a refusal to be bound by a protocol, with legitimate nationalist leaders in countries whose full political aspirations have not been met by their European rulers.

"3. The United States should not allow any European country, in its relations with any country in the Far East, to state openly or to imply by propaganda that its policy is 'backed by the United States.' European representatives, in negotiating with the representatives of countries in Asia, should be discouraged from stating or implying that they are authoritative interpreters of United States policy, or intermediaries without whom the United States cannot be approached.

"4. It should be made clear that if there is delay or difficulty in establishing relations between the United States and Communist-controlled countries, such as China, the trouble comes from the Communist side and not from the United States side.

"5. It should be made clear that friendly and beneficial relations with the United States depend essentially on the inherent friendliness or unfriendliness of the nation concerned, and not on the formalities of diplomatic recognition. In order to facilitate the contrast between countries which are on friendly terms with the United States and countries which are not, the number of countries formally recognized by the United States should be increased.

"As a first step, the United States should accept the list of countries recommended for admission to the United Nations by Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the first place, it would at this time be a good move for the United States to accept with good will an initiative from the Secretariat of the United Nations. In the second place, the list is on balance more favorable to the United States than to the Soviet Union. In the third place, and with particular reference to the Far East, the move would bring within the scope of United States diplomatic activity the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia), an increasingly important potential listening-post country in the heart of Asia.

"6. The United States should disembarass itself as quickly as possible of its entanglements in South Korea."

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the views expressed by Lattimore in the record?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you have read this?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, I have read that memoranda. That memoranda covers many of the points that Mr. Lattimore made in the con-

ference. The memoranda among other things calls for liquidation of American responsibilities in Korea. That was a point which Mr. Lattimore made during the conference. This was in October 1949. Professor Lattimore took the position of prompt recognition of Red China. He was very careful to say we should bargain with them when we were doing it, but nevertheless we should recognize them.

Professor Lattimore was opposed to dividing economic aid in Asia. He wanted to give economic aid to Communist countries equally with non-Communist countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear expressed at the conference, Professor, a sentiment as to the disposition of Formosa?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Governor Stassen made a very strong appeal to defend Formosa to the letter. I said something on that subject myself. I particularly commended the acceptance of General MacArthur's concept of what is now called the MacArthur line, namely from Korea, Formosa, Okinawa, the Philippines, and around to Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, do you know that on October 26, if that is the exact date, 1949, the State Department sent a message to the Nationalist government in China notifying them they would not give them any more military aid?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you learn that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I didn't learn that until I saw that in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. That was after this meeting?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was shortly after this meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. So the policy was really laid down before you went to this meeting as far as Formosa was concerned?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, with respect to Formosa and breaking the so-called MacArthur line they were therefore aiding the Communists of China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Specifically, Governor Stassen has spent a good deal of time on maintaining Formosa and I believe—I am speaking without any record here—I believe that Joseph Ballantine said something on that subject that is favorable to holding Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, did General Marshall attend that conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, General Marshall was present at every session. He was one of the first ones there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he take part in this discussion at all?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No. General Marshall sat in the same seat at the end of the room, not at the conference table, about 5 feet from the end of the conference table, opposite Ambassador Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. And was he sitting near Owen Lattimore?

Mr. COLEGROVE. He was about 5 feet away from Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he hear Owen Lattimore express his views on those occasions?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I assume he heard Owen Lattimore talk the 13 or 14 times.

Mr. MORRIS. Thirteen or fourteen times Lattimore spoke?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now could you testify whether or not Rosinger had an active part in this conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Not as active a part as Owen Lattimore. He spoke probably six times, and all of his speeches, his comments, were very favorable to Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that we have had testimony in the past that Benjamin Kizer and John K. Fairbank, whom Professor Colegrove has included with this group dominated by Lattimore, to the effect that both of those were members of the Communist Party also.

How many times did you speak at that conference, Professor Colegrove?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I believe I spoke about 8, 9, or 10 times.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the line of questioning developed by Senator Eastland on the importance of the actual preparation of the letter of transmittal on the white paper, I was wondering if you thought it necessary that we should ask the State Department for the facts behind that letter of transmittal.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall be very glad to write a letter. I may not be able to get any more information than I have, however.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that you do write a letter, that we keep on trying, because I think this is so vital to the Congress and to the people that we should not be discouraged.

Professor Colegrove, have you anything further to say about the letter of transmittal?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I objected to that letter of transmittal because of the bland statement that the white paper had given all of the evidence and presented a very unbiased view of it. It was very obvious that it had not given all the evidence. Even the Wedemeyer report was slightly expurgated as published by the State Department. All records as to Korea were pulled out of that report and it did not have the Wallace report in it. I felt that the State Department had glossed over the trouble between the State Department and General Hurley. They had not given both sides of that story.

What I objected most strongly to in the letter of transmittal was the argument that the letter made in favor of our policy, favored by withdrawing help to Chiang Kai-shek, and glossing over what help we had given the Chinese Reds, and in particular that paragraph at the end where the State Department sums up, in which it says that the United States Government had done everything that was possible to save the Nationalist government and that the United States had left undone everything that would have been helpful to Red China.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you not really think there was a conspiracy by people in the State Department to throw China to the Communists?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have been of that opinion for quite a while.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, have you testified to the best of your ability on the question that arose at the conference we have been discussing on the possibility of sending economic aid alike to Communist and non-Communist countries? Is there anything more you can testify to on that score?

Mr. COLEGROVE. At least four members took strongly the position that no economic aid—of course no military aid—should be given to Communist countries in Asia. That would include Governor Stassen, myself, Mr. Brodie, and Mr. Ballantine.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you four took opposition to that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Yourself, Mr. Brodie, Mr. Ballantine, and Governor Stassen?

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the four whom you mentioned, including yourself, took the position that aid should go to Nationalist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; and in no way to Red China.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the other group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The other group took the position that economic aid should go to Communist and non-Communist countries alike.

Senator JENNER. What was their argument for that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Their argument, curiously enough, was this: That if we gave aid only to non-Communist countries, Soviet Russia would use this as propaganda, saying we were imperialistic, that we were trying to guide the affairs of Asia and be very effective propaganda against it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show the difficulty the witness would have without the benefit of the transcript which he requested be made available during the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. What transcript?

Mr. MORRIS. The transcript of the proceedings about which we are taking testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You want the record to show that the witness is testifying from memory because the transcript is not available; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, and that Professor Colegrove did ask before testifying that he be aided by the transcript in the course of his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, the record will so show.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. As a committee, I think we should take up this question of getting aid from the executive branch of the Government. Here is a good example that if the committee had, in executive session at least, this transcript which we are asking witnesses to come up and testify on several years later, that we would be aided in the solution of the problem that we have before us, which is a very important problem; and while some of the members of the committee may get discouraged that we are not being given the aid that we should have, and we certainly are not, I think the Chair should keep after this information.

For instance, I can cite another example that was not brought up here. That is where the question came up as to Fred Field trying to become an officer in the OSS of the United States Government. When we tried to get who were his sponsors and who recommended him, and so forth, all we could get from the military authorities even was the memorandum as to his physical examination. Now that is the only thing. I would say if anything was to be kept from the committee, that is the one thing that they must have held out, his physical examination, because that could have shown things that probably did not concern the IPR, but certainly the other items in the report were of great value to this committee in the solution of this problem.

So I hope that the Chair will keep after this, because I think that the time will come when public opinion in America will have some-

thing to say on this, and we should have this information before the Congress and the people.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say, Senator, that the Chair does not get discouraged when it is pursuing a course for the protection of this Government of ours. This committee has pursued that course with diligence and will continue to pursue it with diligence. We will ask for every aid that we think we might be able to get from any of the executive branches of the Government or from any other source that is at all authentic. To that end we will persist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our witness for tomorrow will be Raymond Dennett, who was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1944 and 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We stand in recess until tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

(The hearing recessed at 12 noon until 10 o'clock, Wednesday, September 26, 1951.)

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